Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 1 and 2 September compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 2 and 3 September the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM asked armed forces and formations what orders or codes of conduct they had received following the recommitment to cease fire from 25 August; none were able to produce copies of such orders or codes of conduct. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including 29 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). Between the evenings of 2 and 3 September, it recorded more ceasefire violations, including 21 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 1-2 September the SMM recorded 14 undetermined explosions 4-8km south-east and 3-5km west, and small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-east and 1-2km south. At the same location on the night of 2-3 September the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 3-6km south-west, one explosion assessed as an outgoing round of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) 1-3km south and small-arms fire 3-6km south-west and 3-5km south-east.

On the night of 1-2 September the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, five tracer rounds from east to west and one rocket-assisted projectile from west to east, followed by a total of 115 tracer rounds (110 in flight from east to west, five from west to east), all at undetermined distances north.

On the night of 2-3 September the same camera recorded, in sequence, five tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, five tracer rounds from east to west, two tracer rounds from west to east, seven from east to west and five from west to east, followed by a total of 145 tracer rounds (135 from east to west and ten from west to east), one undetermined explosion and one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, all at undetermined distances north.

Positioned at different observation posts in south-western areas of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) on 2 September the SMM recorded seven undetermined explosions 2-5km west and small-arms fire 1-3km west and north-west over a period of about six hours. While in the same area of Yasynuvata for about five hours on 3 September, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 2-5km west and west-south-west and small-arms fire 0.5-1km west.

Positioned at the bus station in the Trudivskyi area of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre) on 2 September the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 3-7km south-west, west and north-west over a one-hour period.

Positioned at the central railway station in Donetsk city (6km north-west of city centre) for about three hours on 3 September the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 2-3km north-north-west.

In Luhansk region between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no violations). Between the evenings of 2 and 3 September, it recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM asked armed forces and formations what orders they had received following the recommitment to cease fire from 25 August. In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) a Ukrainian officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the battalion commander in the area had received a specific order from his superiors on 24 August. According to him, all personnel were asked to sign the order showing that they had understood it. The interlocutor was unable to show the SMM the order but showed the SMM a document (dated 2 September) that he said had been sent in response, in which the battalion’s acting chief of staff said that all personnel assigned to his battalion had signed the order.

In government-controlled areas east of Mariupol the SMM spoke with Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at four checkpoints. Soldiers at two checkpoints said they were aware of the recommitment to the ceasefire, while soldiers at the other two said they had not heard of it. A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) said that his brigade had received orders on the non-use of weapons and interaction with the SMM but said that he could not show these orders without the permission of his superiors.

The commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit in government-controlled Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that he had received a specific order on the recommitment to cease fire. He also said that about one month prior he had received specific orders regarding his interaction with SMM. When the SMM asked to see copies of the said documents he referred the SMM to brigade headquarters.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander in government-controlled Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that he had received updated orders on 31 August restricting the use of weapons to cases of self-defence only. He said the order was classified and could not be shared with the SMM. The SMM asked if he had received specific instructions on interaction with the SMM; he said he had and shared a copy of a document (dated 28 April 2017) prepared by the Ukrainian Armed Forces deputy commander of the ATO.

The commander of a Ukrainian National Guard unit in government-controlled Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk) said he would show the SMM an order regarding the recommitment to cease fire in the next few days. He also said that there was a specific instruction regarding the passage of the SMM across the contact line.

Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders at four checkpoints in northern and western parts of Luhansk region told the SMM that they were not aware of, and did not have in their possession, any copies of orders, codes of conduct or instructions that regulated the use of weapons or that outline interaction with the SMM.

An armed man in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata told the SMM that he was aware of an order to cease fire. The SMM asked if disciplinary measures were in place for those who disobeyed the order. He said that measures were in place but did not know if any follow-up had taken place. An armed man in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that he had signed a declaration not to fire weapons about two months ago.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. At the hospital in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM spoke with an injured woman (about 55 years old). In the presence of a military doctor, the woman said that on 1 September, as she walked along a road on the north-western outskirts of Stanytsia Luhanska, she had heard a whistling sound followed by an explosion that had knocked her off her feet. The SMM observed that she had sustained injuries to her left hand and had bandages on her legs.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 30-31 August the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded one flare in flight from south-east to north-west 1.5km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and one projectile in flight from north to south 3-6km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

While on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska on the night of 1-2 September the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 3 September, while in the western part of the town the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines the SMM saw three howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika 122mm) under camouflage netting near government-controlled Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) on 2 September.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites the SMM observed one self-propelled howitzer (D-30, 122mm) towed by a military truck in government-controlled Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) on 1 September.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM observed that a “DPR” site continued to be abandoned, with six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 1 September the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-1) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), one IFV (BMP-1) on a flatbed truck being transported south near Stanytsia Luhanska, and one armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) on a flatbed trailer in Artema (26km north of Luhansk). On 2 September the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government controlled areas on 1 September the SMM observed one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a Ural truck heading west towards the southern side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM observed fresh APC (MT-LB) tracks on the M03 road in Debaltseve.

The SMM visited three border areas not under control of the Government. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour on 2 September, the SMM saw five people (different genders and ages) exit Ukraine and six people (different genders and ages) entering.

On 3 September, while at the border crossing point at Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about ten minutes the SMM saw two cars entering Ukraine (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and one car (with Russian Federation licence plates) exit.

On 3 September, while at the border crossing point in Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed, over a 75-minute period, 29 cars (21 with Ukrainian licence plates, eight with Russian Federation licence plates), two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates, one with “Stakhanov–Moscow” written in Russian), each with about 40 passengers, and about 150 pedestrians exit Ukraine. The SMM observed three buses (with “Moscow–Pervomaisk”, “Moscow–Kirovsk”, “Moscow–Luhansk” respectively, written in Russian) with Ukrainian licence plates, eight cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates and three with Russian Federation licence plates), three covered trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with a “DPR” sticker) and about 80 pedestrians enter Ukraine. The driver (man, aged about 55) of one car told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours to cross.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 2 September three armed men stopped the SMM at a checkpoint on the western side of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and denied it passage to the east. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 3 September two armed men stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Markyne (94km south of Donetsk), and one asked to see the SMM’s patrol plan. When the SMM refused to hand it over, he denied further passage. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 2 and 3 September the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.
• On 2 and 3 September the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.
• On 2 and 3 September the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.
• On 2 and 3 September the SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC both times.

Delay:

• On 3 September armed men stopped the SMM at a checkpoint on the west side of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and denied it passage to the east. The SMM informed the JCCC and left the area. The SMM attempted to cross almost an hour later and was granted passage.

 

[1]  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.