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Home Newsroom News and press releases Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 August 2017
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Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 August 2017

KYIV 30 August 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on information of a civilian injured by shelling in Lukove. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske, Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. Its access remains restricted there and elsewhere, including at a checkpoint in Novoazovsk. An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Kremenivka, Sakhanka, and Bezimenne. The SMM also noted that a previously observed hand grenade and UXO close to civilian infrastructure near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and Novohryhorivka, respectively, had been removed. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance to infrastructure in Zolote, Vesela Hora, Shchastia, and Krasnyi Lyman.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] but the same number of explosions (about 30) compared with the previous reporting period.

On the evening and night of 28-29 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station recorded, in sequence, four tracer rounds in flight from east to west, three tracer rounds from north-west to south-east, four tracer rounds from north-east to south-west, two tracer rounds from east to west, nine tracer rounds from west to east, one projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, four tracer rounds from west to east, three projectiles from north to south, two tracer rounds from east to west and one undetermined explosion, all 500m-3km south.

In the early morning of 29 August, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk, the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-west. On 29 August, positioned for four hours in a  south‑western part of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard over 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km west, west-north-west, north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 48 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).                                                                                                         

On 29 August, positioned in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 10km south-east. The same day, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions 5-8km south-south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions of artillery rounds 20-30km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. At a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that a woman (73 years old) injured by shelling on 24 August in “DPR”-controlled Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) had been treated in the hospital and discharged. However, the medical staff refused to discuss the nature of the woman’s injuries, insisting the SMM needed approval from “DPR” members.* In Lukove, the SMM also spoke with the woman’s son who said that his mother had not yet been released from the hospital (see SMM Daily Report 27 August 2017).

On 29 August, the SMM asked two armed men wearing camouflage attire in Yasynuvata about the recommitment to the ceasefire for the start of the new school year; one of them stated that they had only heard about such a ceasefire recommitment on television. A member of the State Border Guard Service at the entry-exit crossing point in government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol) told the SMM that he knew about the recommitment to the ceasefire from the news, but was not personally aware of any related orders. A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) field office in “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) told the SMM that he has no channel of communications to “DPR” members in his area of responsibility and therefore could not comment on whether they were aware of the ceasefire recommitment.                                   

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM observed that a hand grenade fixed to the side of a fence at knee-height in a passageway used by pedestrians near an armed formation’s position 4-5m south of the broken part of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge had been removed, as had the hook and wire attached to the tyre wall opposite the grenade. (See SMM Daily Report of 28 August.)

On the evening of 28 August, while in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-5km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 29 August, positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 single shots at an undetermined distance to the east-north-east (assessed as outside the Petrivske disengagement area). In Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation. The same day, positioned west of government-controlled Zolote, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and saw a plume of white smoke 300m north assessed as resulting from the explosion and as outside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, on 24 August an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 15 towed howitzers (thirteen 2A65, Msta‑B, 152mm and two D-20, 152mm) near Kremenivka (78km south of Donetsk) and two mortars (PM-38, 120mm) south-east of Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk). In non‑government-controlled areas on 25 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted one mortar (120mm) near Bezimenne.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted on 24 August five surface-to-air missile systems (two 9K330 Tor and three 9K33 Osa) near Kasianivka (81km south of Donetsk) and one surface‑to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Kremenivka. (This is the first time the SMM has reported Tor surface-to-air missile systems).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In areas under government control beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K35) and 11 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM observed an anti-aircraft gun, armoured combat vehicles[2] and their tracks, and an unidentified UAV in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) and four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (three BTR-70 and one MT-LB) stationary south-east of Vodiane as well as an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck heading east in Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk). The SMM also observed a small UAV flying from east to south-south-east at an altitude of 60-80m near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw six IFVs (five BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and three APCs (one BTR-60 or -70 and two MT-LB), all stationary near Bezimenne. In Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed several IFV and APC (BMP-type and MT-LB) tracks and in Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed tracks from two IFVs (BMP).                                             

The SMM observed that unexploded ordnance (UXO) – a mortar (120mm) shell – previously reported in “LPR”-controlled Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk), had been removed.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the thermal power plant in Shchastia, to the water wells in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) by Popasna Vodakanal, to a water pipeline near Zolote and to the Vesela Hora-Khrystove power transmission line near Vesela Hora.

In Lukove, the SMM observed three or four men in military-style uniforms in trenches that included some areas covered with wood and dirt for shelter assessed as infantry firing positions located about 100m north-west of the village school. A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC field office in “DPR”-controlled Boikivske (formerly Telmanove; 67km south-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that it “should have informed” the JCCC before going to Lukove.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

  • Armed persons prevented the SMM from proceeding through a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

  • The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
  • The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
  • The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
  • The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

  • While the SMM was following up on reports of a civilian casualty at a hospital in “DPR”-controlled Starobesheve, medical staff refused to provide information, referring the Mission to “DPR” members for “approval”.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.