Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 17 August 2017
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* The SMM observed up to several hundred civilians queuing to walk across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance to infrastructure in Shchastia, Artema, Yashchykove and Zolote.
In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 75 explosions).
On the evening of 16 August the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded one explosion assessed as an impact 4-6km east-south-east. During the day on 17 August, positioned in Avdiivka for about five hours, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and six bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-east.
On the evening of 16 August, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight explosions and about 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 5-7km south-east.
On the night of 16-17 August the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, about 30 tracer rounds in flight from west to east, one from east to west, one from west to east, one from east to west, three from west to east, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, followed by aggregate totals of 56 tracer rounds in flight from west to east, 44 from east to west, three rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east, four from east to west, two tracer rounds from south-east to north-west, one undetermined explosion and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all at unknown distances north.
During the day on 17 August the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three explosions assessed as impacts 3-4km north-east.
Positioned about 3km north-north-west of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar round 1km north-east.
Positioned for about one hour in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (former Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an outgoing mortar round 500m-1km south-west.
Positioned for about one hour and a half 2.6km south-east of government-controlled Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds and one explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round, all at unknown distances south-east.
Positioned for about one hour in government-controlled Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 51 explosions (23 assessed as outgoing, 11 as impacts and 17 undetermined), all 2-6km east-north-east and six bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire at an undetermined distance east-north-east.
Positioned for one hour and twenty minutes 1.7km south-west of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard and saw two explosions, assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 5km north-north-east.
In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions).
On the evening and night of 16-17 August, while in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, three explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, six undetermined explosions, eight outgoing explosions of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire, four shots of IFV (BMP-2, 30mm) cannon fire, about 70 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, 25 bursts of anti-aircraft (ZU-23, 23mm) cannon fire and 15 undetermined explosions of rocket-propelled grenades, all 4-6km south-east.
During the day on 17 August, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Yuzhna Lomuvatka (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 10km west-south-west.
The SMM followed up on media reports of damage in residential areas. At 14 Chervona Zirka Street in the Trudivskyi area of Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city, the SMM saw fire damage to the roof, kitchen, garage and sanitary facilities of the house. The SMM could not establish whether the fire was caused by shelling. A neighbour told the SMM that the fire had occurred at about 14:45 on 15 August.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
On the evening of 15 August, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded seven projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.
On 17 August, positioned at the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.
Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM observed, in government-controlled areas, one tank (T-64) on a flatbed trailer in Lyman (110km north of Donetsk) on road T0514 heading south-west towards Sloviansk (95km north of Donetsk). In areas not under government control, the SMM saw three tanks (type unknown) moving at a possible training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed 13 tanks (six T-64 and seven T-72) were missing; of those, seven tanks (one T-64 and six T-72) were noted as missing for the first time. At the site, the SMM also assessed that some stamped serial numbers had been scratched out and replaced with painted numbers.
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 17 August, the SMM saw: two ACVs (BTS-4), both with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on top, and four IFVs (BMP-2) stationary in Novoselivka Druha (36 north-east of Mariupol); two IFVs (one BTR-4 and one BRDM) and one automatic grenade launcher stationary in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk). Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 16 August of six armoured personnel carrier (APCs) (two BTR-variant and four MTLB) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).
In areas not under government control, the SMM saw one APC (MTLB) on a flatbed trailer in Kadiivka (former Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) heading south-west. Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 15 August of one APC (MTLB) in Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to observe presence of mines, mine hazard signs and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Aerial imagery available to the SMM continued to reveal the presence on 16 August of about 40 anti-tank mines on the road just south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia. (See SMM Daily Report 8 August 2017.) On 17 August the SMM saw again (see SMM Daily Report 11 August 2017) an unexploded mortar (120mm) round on road E58 between “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM continued to observe about 50-60 mine hazard signs (standard red signs with “Caution, Mines!” written in English and Ukrainian) in a field next to road E97 about 2km north-west of the Kalanchak administrative boundary line crossing point in Kherson region.
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia, the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), water wells in “LPR”-controlled Yashchykove (46km west of Luhansk) and the Karbonit-Zolote water pipeline in government-controlled Zolote.
The SMM monitored the situation of civilians queuing to walk across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. On 17 August at an “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at 07:35 the SMM saw about 150 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and about 400 people in the opposite direction. On the same day at 10:30 at the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw about 600 people queueing to enter government-controlled areas and about 30 in the opposite direction.
The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.
Denial of access:
Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
- The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
Conditional access:
- An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM at a checkpoint at the southern outskirts of “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and allowed the SMM to pass only after checking the trunks of its vehicles. The SMM informed the JCCC.
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational; both the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station and the SMM camera in Avdiivka were not operational between 21:16 on 16 August and 07:45 on 17 August.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.