Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 7 November 2016

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded an increase of ceasefire violations compared with 6 November, including the use of multiple-launch-rocket systems. The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with 6 November in Luhansk region. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling on both sides of the contact line and followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Krasnohorivka. It continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its movement in all three areas.* The SMM monitored the withdrawal of weapons and observed the presence of weapons in violation on both sides of the contact line. It monitored a border area currently not under government control.  

The SMM recorded an increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on 7 November, with approximately 648 explosions and over 315 projectiles observed compared with 230 explosions and 130 projectiles recorded until the evening on 6 November.[1] Most violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle as well as Horlivka and Shyrokyne.

During the evening and night of 6-7 November, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 37 undetermined explosions, 84 projectiles fired from north to south, 76 projectiles fired from south to north and five flares, and two airbursts, all at locations 2-6km south-east. On 7 November, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 15 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons at locations 2-4km east-south-east. On the same day, the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions, three outgoing explosions of mortar rounds (unknown calibre), five bursts of heavy-machine-gun and 18 bursts of small-arms fire all at locations 3-6km east, east-south-east and south.

On 7 November, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 71 undetermined explosions, 12 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and 22 single shots of both heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well 46 minutes of continuous uncountable and overlapping undetermined explosions and bursts and single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at locations 1-6km south, south-west, west and north-west.

During the evening hours of 6 November, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions, 21 bursts of heavy-machine-gun as well as six bursts and 12 single shots of small-arms fire approximately 2-4km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position. On 7 November, while in Svitlodarsk the SMM heard one undetermined explosion approximately 3km south-east. Positioned in government-controlled Luhanske, (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 46 undetermined explosions, ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun and four bursts of small-arms fire, as well as three explosions assessed as caused by outgoing automatic-grenade launcher  rounds at distances 2-4km south-east of its position.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) during the evening hours of 6 November, the SMM heard 168 undetermined explosions, five explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, 23 explosions assessed as caused by outgoing 120mm mortar rounds, six explosions of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon rounds (73mm), four explosions of automatic grenade launcher rounds, one explosion of recoilless gun rounds (SPG-9, 73mm), 42 shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon rounds (30mm), 77 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and 48 bursts of small-arms fire, all 4-10km west-south-west. During the day on 7 November, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and one explosion assessed as an impact of a 152mm artillery round, all at locations 4-9km south-west.

During the evening of 6 November, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions approximately 8-12km north-west.

During two hours on the evening of 6 November, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, while facing north-east and starting with three undetermined explosions and 21 bursts of direct tracer fire from south-south-east to north-north-west, another 18 undetermined explosions, 15 indirect rocket-assisted projectiles assessed as multiple-launch-rocket-system (MLRS) rounds fired from south-west to north-east and 15 subsequent explosions assessed as MLRS round impacts, 110 indirect rocket-assisted projectiles assessed as MLRS rounds fired from south-east to north-west and 110 subsequent explosions assessed as MLRS round impacts, 55 bursts of direct tracer rounds (in sequence: 16 from north-east to south-west, 14 north-north-east to south-south-east, 12 from south-east to north-west,  nine from north-west to south-east, and four from north-east to north-west), as well as 140 direct tracer rounds (cannon) from south-west to north-east and south-east to north-east, all at undetermined distances.

In government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions, four explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (unknown calibre), three explosions assessed as caused by outgoing mortar rounds (unknown calibre), 15 outgoing automatic grenade launcher rounds, at least 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun  and continuous bursts of small-arms fire from distances approximately 5-7km south-east and south-south-west.

In “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard and felt an undetermined explosion within 100-150m east of the SMM vehicle as it was traveling south.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard continuous firing assessed as possibly caused by MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) for 60 seconds, 12 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from an unknown weapon and intermittent heavy-machine-gun fire at distances 5-6 km west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations including 150 explosions compared with 430 explosions on 6 November. While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) during 40 minutes on the evening of 6 November, the SMM heard approximately 60 explosions assessed as caused by outgoing artillery rounds (unknown calibre) approximately 2-5km north-west, and 60 explosions assessed as impacts approximately 10-15km west, as well as six explosions assessed as caused by outgoing MLRS rounds from 2-5km north-west and six explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS rounds at distances 10-15km west. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (57km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 explosions, assessed as caused by artillery fire (unknown calibre) more than 10km south-west of its position. Near government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as 82mm mortar impacts 2-3km south, and four explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, 30 bursts of IFV (BMP) cannon and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at distances 3-5km west.

The SMM followed up on damage from shelling and civilian casualties. At a hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with a woman (44 years old) and a man (in his twenties) who had both sustained shrapnel wounds during shelling they said had taken place during the evening hours of 5 November in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). The woman told the SMM that she had been at home after 23:30 on 5 November when she had heard outside her window a loud bang, after which she described that “the window exploded” and pieces of glass, wood and tiles had flown inside the room, which had also filled with dust and smoke. She told the SMM that shrapnel fragments had hit her arm and face and the SMM saw bandages on her wounds. 

In Krasnohorivka, the SMM observed three fresh impacts in a residential area caused by shelling that had reportedly taken place on 5 November. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) accompanied the SMM and at the first site, the SMM observed that a projectile assessed as a 120mm mortar round had hit the north-eastern side of the roof of a house and penetrated the room. The inhabitants said there were no casualties from the incident. At the second site, the SMM observed an impact between two houses, which it assessed to be caused by an 82mm mortar round. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to nearby windows, a fence and a garage door. At the third site, the SMM observed an impact on the ground in front of the south side of a house, which the SMM assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round and which resulted in shrapnel injuries to the female resident (described above). There was shrapnel damage to the house as well as the fence and car parked nearby. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire in either case. While in Krasnohorivka, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions from approximately 3km south-west.

In “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC led the SMM to a factory, which was shelled on 6 November, according to the factory director onsite. The SMM observed 11 fresh impacts  including five impacts that damaged the factory building, assessed as possibly caused by three 82mm and two 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM saw three impacts in the yard of the factory, assessed as possibly caused by 120mm mortar rounds, and two impacts on the south-east side of the factory, assessed as possibly caused by 82mm mortar rounds. The SMM saw damaged trees outside of the building, a hole in the roof of the factory as well as damage to other parts of the roof, destroyed and shrapnel-damaged walls, and approximately 300 broken windows. All impacts were assessed as caused by rounds fired from a north-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the SMM was able to partially monitor them. It noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the areas.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that Ukrainian Armed Forces had not received an order to withdraw from the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM was unable to proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward the railway bridge as the SMM saw a mine warning sign and an “LPR” member told the SMM about the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the area.* Inside the disengagement area on the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed a stationary IFV (BMP-1).

While at an “LPR” checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk) disengagement area an “LPR” member told the SMM that the main T1316 road leading to government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) was clear of mines and UXO. The “LPR” member said that the fields and other roads within the disengagement area had not been demined and that he could not guarantee the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines and UXO in those areas.*

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), a “DPR” member told the SMM that his “commander” was not available to speak with the SMM. The SMM also noted that there was no officer from the JCCC present. Due to the absence of security guarantees, the SMM could not proceed on the road leading east to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC said that the road leading west to Viktorivka was blocked with mines and that the SMM could not pass and that he did not have any information about possible demining.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines the SMM observed three tanks (T-64) in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), one portable rocket launcher (9K132 Grad-P, 122mm) near “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka, and four pieces of towed artillery (Giatsint-B, 152mm) near government-controlled Aslanove (16km north of Mariupol).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one such site for the first time and recorded the serial numbers of 19 tanks (nine T-64 and ten T-72, 125mm).

The SMM revisited an “LPR”-controlled permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines and observed that all weapons present corresponded with the previously presented inventory list.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft gun in the security zone.[2] The SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC; type unknown) near “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy, and two APCs (type unknown) and five military-type trucks near “LPR”-controlled Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk). In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed two IFVs (BMP-1) in Stanytsia Luhanska (see disengagement section above), and two IFVs (BMP-2) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and UXO near populated areas. In the north-western outskirts of Luhansk city the SMM saw two MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rocket cases embedded in the asphalt on the road, located several metres apart.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. During the morning hours at the government checkpoint on the north side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed some 1000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and some 400 queuing to travel in the other direction. Within one hour, the SMM observed that the queues had reduced to 350 and 40 people, respectively. The SMM did not observe queues at the “LPR” checkpoint on the south side of the bridge.

The SMM monitored a calm situation while present at a border area currently not under government control near “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for approximately one hour.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

       The SMM could not proceed from the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) toward the summer houses area due to the presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.

• At the “LPR” checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an “LPR” member told the SMM that he could not guarantee the safety and security of the SMM throughout the disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) in either direction as a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.                     
• While at the south-west edge of government-controlled Katerynivka (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM could not proceed toward government-controlled Popasna due to the road being blocked by metal anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs). Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel also told the SMM that the area was mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), a “DPR” member told the SMM that his “commander” was not available to speak with the SMM. Due to the lack of security guarantees and the possibility of the presence of mines, the SMM was unable to travel west to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM not proceed east to Viktorivka as the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM due to mines on the road.

Conditional access:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), four armed “DPR” members demanded to see the national passports of the SMM patrol. One SMM member presented a national passport.  The “DPR” members took the passport along with the vehicle documents. After less than one minute the documents were returned to the SMM member and the SMM was allowed to continue.

Delay:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint in Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) an armed “DPR” member told the SMM that he did not have permission from his “superiors” to allow the SMM to pass. He allowed the SMM to pass after 20 minutes.

[1 Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.