Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 18 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, most of which were concentrated in the Avdiivka/Yasynuvata area and areas north-east of Mariupol. In Sartana the SMM saw two howitzers firing five rounds and heard outgoing explosions. In Luhansk region, the SMM also recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous day. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; the SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed the presence of weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, including tanks near the contact line. It monitored two border areas not under government control. The Mission monitored long queues of pedestrians at entry-exit checkpoints in Stanytsia Luhanska. It monitored the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 546 explosions (88 of which were assessed as caused by artillery rounds) compared with the previous reporting period (over 450 explosions). Nearly 190 explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka/Yasynuvata area, and more than 270 in areas north-east of Mariupol.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 62 explosions (39 of which were assessed as caused by outgoing artillery rounds and two of which were assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds) 1-6km east-south-east and south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 71 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2-8km west to north-north-west. The SMM camera in Avdiivka also recorded 54 undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east and south-south-east.    

On the evening of 17 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 32 explosions (18 of which were assessed as caused by recoilless gun rounds (SPG, 73mm) or rocket-propelled grenade rounds) 2-4km south-east and south. The following day, positioned in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 18 explosions: 12 were assessed as artillery rounds 8-15km south-east; and five as recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds 3-4km east-south-east.

The SMM noted that the security situation in areas north-east and east of Mariupol remained volatile. The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, between 16:47 and 19:09 on 17 October, 24 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance north and north-east. The camera also recorded, between 18:29 and 18:40, nine rocket-assisted projectiles, three bursts and 38 tracers, all fired from west to east.

The following day, positioned in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 52 explosions (seven of which were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and seven as impacts of artillery rounds) at an undetermined distance north-north-west and north-east. Positioned at three different places in government-controlled Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard a total of 122 explosions, including seven explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at an undetermined distance north; 55 explosions as outgoing rounds from unknown weapons at an undetermined distance north, south-south-west and west; and 30 explosions as impacts of rounds from unknown weapons at an undetermined distance north, east-south-east and east. In addition, the SMM saw and heard two towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) firing a total of five rounds towards east 1km west-north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 41 explosions (eight of which were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds) at an undetermined distance west-south-west, west and west-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous day, including 21 explosions compared with eight explosions on 17 October. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Krynychanske (formerly Chervonohvardiiske, 42km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 15km north-north-east. While flying a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) outside the disengagement area in government-controlled Zolote-2 (61km north-west of Luhansk), at 12:35 the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire approximately 50m south-east of the SMM’s position (outside the disengagement area). The SMM landed the UAV and left the area. Positioned in a government-controlled area of Zolote, the SMM heard, between 12:54 and 13:18, two shots of small-arms fire approximately 500m north, four undetermined explosions 10-20km east, and one undetermined explosion 5km south-west of its position, and assessed all of them as occurring outside the disengagement area. Positioned at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), at 15:45 the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km at an undetermined direction (outside the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM, accompanied by the Russia Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed three impact sites. At the first site the SMM observed a completely destroyed garage 13m north of a four-storey apartment building and damage to a gas line. The SMM also saw shrapnel damage to the second floor of the building – broken windows and two holes on the wall inside an apartment. The SMM assessed the impact had been caused by a 152mm artillery round possibly fired from a westerly direction. The residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place around 22:00 the previous night. At the second site 50m away from the first, the SMM noticed a fresh crater between two apartment buildings, which was assessed as caused by a 152mm artillery round. The SMM also saw shrapnel on the north-facing facade and broken windows of the two buildings. At the third site – on a field at the side of a road the SMM saw two fresh craters, and assessed them as caused by 152mm rounds fired possibly from a westerly direction.

Around 15:00 the representative of a water supply company told the SMM that the area of a water pumping station in “DPR”-controlled Vasylivka (20km north of Donetsk) was being shelled and essential infrastructure might be damaged. The SMM followed up and informed the JCCC, which, around 15:30, informed the SMM that the situation had been calmed down. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata the SMM heard, between 13:47 and 15:14, 56 undetermined explosions 2-7km north-north-west (see above) – a general area of Vasylivka, while after 15:14 it did not record any ceasefire violations assessed as occurring in the area.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, have yet to complete this in any of the three areas. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. As a result SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

On the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM saw fresh tracks of tracked vehicle on an asphalt road around the bunker next to the southernmost government checkpoint (outside the disengagement area). The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the forward position north of the bridge and three armed “LPR” members at the  “LPR” forward position at the bridge separately told the SMM that they had heard shooting between 20:00 and 22:00 the previous night. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on the “LPR”-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area (inside the disengagement area) on four separate occasions – three occasions due to the presence of mine hazard signs or mines and one occasion when armed “LPR” members denied the SMM access.*

At the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route the SMM monitored both sides of the disengagement area and noted a relatively calm situation, although the SMM recorded several ceasefire violations around the disengagement area (all outside the disengagement area). Due to the lack of guarantees that the area had been demined, the SMM could not proceed through the potential Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route from either side.*

The SMM was not able to proceed from the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske towards the disengagement area as “DPR” members did not ensure safety and security for the SMM and the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* Although a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC was present in government-controlled Bohdanivka, he could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel towards the east to Petrivske via the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) along the north side of the disengagement area. The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road (see SMM Daily Report 11 October 2016) had not been removed.* The SMM noted a calm situation in areas of Petrivske and Bohdanivka, where it did not observe any ceasefire violation or movement of forces or hardware. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) each towed by a military truck and three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) each loaded on a flatbed truck in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk) on 17 October; one anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by a stationary military truck in Donske (57km south of Donetsk) on 17 October; six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at the train station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); and a convoy consisting of five tanks (T-64) each loaded on a trailer heading north-north-west in Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk); and two towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) firing in Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded three tanks (undetermined model) moving from 2-3km south-east of its location towards Avdiivka further north.  

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed at the train station in government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk): one stationary tank (T-64) on 17 October; and the following day 11 stationary tanks (T-64) and another two tanks (T-64) each loaded on train platform approaching the train station. 

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed that all weapons previously recorded as withdrawn to that site were present.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon, [2] and UAVs in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMD-2) heading north, four stationary IFVs (two BMD-2 and two BMP-2), three IFVs (BMD-2) heading north, and five IFVs (BMP-2) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) towed by a military truck heading north, all near Avdiivka; and two stationary armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-3) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk. In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw two stationary APCs (MT-LB) near “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM spotted on 15 October the presence of one armoured vehicle near “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and two armoured vehicles near “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km east of Mariupol). At a checkpoint in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw four Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel with one UAV on the ground nearby. The commander present told the SMM that they were conducting UAV flights. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded two UAVs flying from north to south at locations 4-6 km south-east.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At 07:00 at the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed approximately 1,200 pedestrians queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no queue in the opposite direction. Two hours later the SMM noted the number of people in the queue had increased to approximately 1,500 pedestrians, while 100 pedestrians were waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At 09:30 at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 350 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 300 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. 

The SMM observed a calm situation in two border areas currently not under government control. At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk) the SMM saw three commercial trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. An armed “DPR” member refused to speak with the SMM. At the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 70 cars and eight commercial trucks (the majority of the vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing towards the Russian Federation.  

The SMM monitored the situation along the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea. The SMM noted a calm situation at the crossing points near Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Chonhar (67, 77 and 163km south-east of Kherson, respectively) and in adjacent areas. On 17 October on Cape Kutara (125km south-east of Kherson) the SMM observed for the first time that the border guard watchtower was not staffed (see SMM Daily Report 25 August 2016).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On four separate occasions the SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska (inside the disengagement area). The SMM was not able to proceed further to a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge) as it observed a mine hazard sign east of the parking lot near the “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the bridge. At the T-junction of a road leading west from the Prince Ihor monument with the road leading north towards the river, the SMM once again saw an anti-personnel fragmentation mine (MON-90) attached to the trunk of a tree and an unarmed warhead (a part of a BM-21 rocket) on the ground at the side of the road, which prevented the SMM from proceeding further north. The presence of a mine hazard sign at the side of the same road leading west prevented the SMM from proceeding further west. On the road leading to the north from the abovementioned location two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM and told it to leave the area immediately. The SMM could not access the narrow path east of the parking lot at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and therefore did not proceed to a summer cottage area (neighbouring to the railway bridge) because the armed “LPR” members said the area was mined and booby-trapped. On each occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further from each side of the contact line on the closed crossing route between Zolote and Pervomaisk due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) the SMM was not able to proceed west of the village towards the disengagement area as Russian Federation officers at the JCCC  could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present on the spot could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM noted that the previously observed mines on the road had not been removed. SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM did not proceed across the bridge from government-controlled Shchastia as demining activity has not taken place in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge from “LPR”-controlled areas south of the bridge to government-controlled Shchastia as an “LPR” member present at the checkpoint told the SMM that no demining activities have been conducted in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a “DPR” checkpoint at the western edge of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) armed “DPR” members did not allow the SMM to proceed further east, when the SMM declined to show its patrol plan. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.