Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 26 September 2016

The SMM recorded slightly more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including 24 and five explosions respectively (compared with 21 and one explosion on 25 September, respectively). The Mission monitored in the vicinity of disengagement areas of Petrivske, Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote and noted demining activity on both sides of the contact line. The SMM observed heavy weapons in violation of withdrawal lines and heavy artillery beyond withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The SMM monitored the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance in populated areas. The Mission was restricted in its freedom of movement, including in disengagement areas near Petrivske and Zolote.

The SMM noted an increase in ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region with 24 explosions, compared with 21 on 25 September. Most ceasefire violations were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), on 26 September the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 5-8km south-east of its position. The SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded three undetermined explosions 8-9km south-east of its location.

In “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, more than one hundred bursts and more than 60 single shots of small-arms fire 2-3km west-south-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), during the early morning hours, the SMM recorded two explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar fire and one burst and two shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-east of its location.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted more ceasefire violations, with five explosions recorded compared with one on 25 September. Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion approximately 5km north-north-east. Less than an hour later, positioned in government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and saw a large plume of smoke rising approximately 5km east, followed shortly by a second explosion 3km east of its position. Positioned at the government checkpoint north of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-west of its position.

The SMM continued to monitor and verify the disengagement process in the general areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), Pervomaisk (58km north-west of Luhansk), Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) and Bohdanivka (41km south-east of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.

In all three areas, the SMM noted a calm situation, but could not access the disengagement area between Petrivske and Bohdanivka or between Pervomaisk and Zolote.*

While in government-controlled Zolote the SMM observed seven Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel demining in the disengagement area. The SMM conducted three mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights and spotted road blocks located on the road to “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk. In Pervomaisk, the SMM saw a crane arrive and observed seven “LPR” members remove at least eight concrete blocks that were blocking the road. The SMM then travelled north on the road from Pervomaisk toward Zolote for 50m before stopping due to the presence of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, and then returned to Pervomaisk. The SMM also conducted a mini UAV flight over the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and noted a calm situation.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM could not proceed west of the village due to likely mine contamination, with the presence of a recently placed mine hazard sign in the middle of the road.* On one occasion an armed “DPR” member refused to provide security guarantees for the SMM and on another, three armed “DPR” members told the SMM that the road was mined and unsafe. During the same period, the SMM observed at least five cars with men in military-type clothing driving and six men in camouflage clothing walking past the signs in a westerly direction. The SMM also noted armoured combat vehicles in the area.

In government-controlled Bohdanivka, a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander and a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that they would accompany the SMM to the forward government position, but that they could not ensure the SMM’s security further east.* Both Ukrainian Armed Forces officers told the SMM that they did not know why the SMM was present and refused to provide security guarantees for the SMM.* At the JCCC headquarters in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces head representative told the SMM that all Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in the disengagement areas had been informed about the decision relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, an SMM mini UAV spotted one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in the centre of “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, approximately 1.1km north-east of the disengagement area, on 24 September.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas, in government-controlled areas the SMM noted: six towed howitzers (D30, 122mm) loaded on the back of six military trucks accompanied by an additional six trucks, stationary on the outskirts of government-controlled Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk); 12 pieces of towed artillery (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near government-controlled Andriivka (55km west of Donetsk); six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (T-12, 100mm) near government-controlled Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with criteria set forth in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (SA-8M3, 120mm). The SMM noted as missing six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (1 SA-8M3, 120mm and 1 SA-13 120mm), as first noted on 10 September. The SMM observed that one site continued to be abandoned, as first noted on 22 April, with 18 towed howitzers (2A65B Msta-B, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In addition to previously observed weapons, the SMM observed weapons not included in the original inventory and noted two tanks (T-72, 125mm) as missing, as first noted on 3 May.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and other hardware in the security zone. Near “DPR”-controlled Makiivka the SMM saw a Kamaz truck towing an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23/2, 23mm) driving east on H-21 road. An SMM mini UAV spotted one armoured personnel carrier (APC; MT-LB) and three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-2) in various locations inside “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, but outside the disengagement area on 24 September. On the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw two amphibious engineering vehicles with ramps, which are used for laying sea mines. In government-controlled Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed one Ural truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top and a loaded military truck mostly covered in canvas. 

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) near populated areas. Approximately 500m south of “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol), a male civilian showed the SMM the tail fin of what it assessed to be an unexploded 82mm mortar shell, located near a road. In government-controlled Keramik (28km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a military compound with a number of improvised wooden mine hazard signs on which “Mines” was written in Russian in red lettering surrounding the perimeter of the compound. In government-controlled Prymorske (13km east of Mariupol), the SMM spoke with two male residents who lamented the danger as a result of the presence of sea mines in the vicinity of nearby Pionerske, saying that many residents rely on fishing in the area for income (see 22 September SMM Daily Report). While near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed that the previously reported UXO (120mm mortar) on the road had been removed (see 25 September SMM Daily Report). In Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk), a female resident told the SMM that she crossed through a forested path between Novooleksandrivka and government-controlled Popasna (69km north-west of Luhansk) on 25 September and that she had to avoid tripwires and other signs of mines along the pathway.  

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 25 September, at the entry-exit checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka (22km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a 1,200m long queue of cars waiting to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas. The SMM noted that in one hour the queue moved forward less than 400m. On 26 September, at the north-easternmost “DPR” checkpoint in Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 102 vehicles in a standard queue and 54 vehicles in a “vulnerable categories” queue, waiting to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas.

On 26 September in the morning  at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed approximately 1,000 pedestrians queuing to travel in the direction of government-controlled areas and approximately 80 pedestrians queuing to travel in the opposite direction. At the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 250 people lining up to enter government-controlled areas and about 100 people lining up to travel in the other direction. By the afternoon, the SMM observed that there was no queue in either direction on the “LPR” side of the bridge, and approximately 40 pedestrians queued on the government-controlled side of the bridge. The SMM observed that the wooden ramp extended across the broken portion of the bridge was made slippery by the rain, making it more dangerous for pedestrians to cross.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works on essential infrastructure and demining. In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM monitored demining activities of 2km of the railway line from the Popasna railway station in an easterly direction. The SMM continued to monitor on both sides of the contact line near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) to enable repairs and water pump maintenance at the Shchastia power plant.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate                                                                             

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments—which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied access to the SMM at a heavy weapons storage site stating that the SMM could not enter with the commander’s approval, but refused to disclose the commander’s whereabouts. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was not able to reach the disengagement area of Petrivske. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that he did not know why the SMM was present and could not facilitate security guarantees for the SMM to proceed.
• On two separate occasions in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM was prevented from continuing to the disengagement area due to the presence of a warning sign reading “Danger! Mines!” located in the centre of the road. On one occasion an armed “DPR” member refused to provide security guarantees for the SMM and on another occasion, three armed “DPR” members told the SMM that the road was mined and unsafe. During the same period, the SMM observed at least five cars with men in military-type clothing driving and six men in camouflage walking past the signs in a westerly direction. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the government checkpoint at the northern end of the closed crossing route near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM could not proceed further to cross the contact line due to likely presence of mines and booby traps. The SMM saw mine hazard signs along the road. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that he could not guarantee its security from a likely danger of mines and UXO. The SMM flew a mini UAV from that location and spotted two roadblocks in “LPR”-controlled areas, at the closed crossing route between Pervomaisk and a government-controlled part of Zolote. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further along the closed crossing route between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled Zolote due to concrete blocks as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.