Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 5 May 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM noted a high level of violence in Donetsk region, with more than 230 explosions recorded; while it noted a low level of violence in Luhansk region, with four explosions recorded. It observed the presence of weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. The Mission continued to observe civilians travelling across the contact line in both directions. On both sides of the contact line, the SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on several occasions.*

In Donetsk region, the SMM noted a marked increase in violence compared to the generally low number of ceasefire violations reported since 2 May, especially in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) where the SMM recorded the majority of the 230 explosions.[1] On the night of 4 May, positioned in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 210 undetermined explosions and 580 bursts of heavy-machine gun fire 4-10km south-east and south of its position.

Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and 21 single shots of small-arms fire 3-10km north and north east of its position. Whilst at government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 2-4km east-north-east of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions (assessed as impacts, two caused by recoilless-gun (SPG-9) rounds and two by automatic-grenade launcher rounds), and one undetermined explosion, all 5km south-east and south-south-east of its position.

During the night of 4 May, the SMM camera positioned south-west of government-controlled Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 15 rounds of undetermined indirect fire (in directions from north-east to south-west, south-west to north-east, and from south-east to north-west), three undetermined rocket-assisted projectiles (one fired from north-east to south-west and two from east to west), and six bursts of undetermined tracer fire north-east to south-west, all within an hour around midnight.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a low number of ceasefire violations. Whilst 500m north of the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 700m east of its position. Whilst 1.5km south of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 400m north-east and one shot of small-arms fire 400m north-west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Bolotene (21km east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-4km east of its position.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed that all weapons previously recorded in this site were present.  

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed seven tanks (T-72) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed five mortars of undetermined type and calibre at the “LPR”-controlled Myrne training area (28km south-west of Luhansk) and 27 tanks (T-64) at the training area in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (32km south-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: in “LPR”-controlled areas, seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), and seven surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) in Luhansk city.

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM visited such locations and observed: 35 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 11 anti-tank guns (MT-12 “Rapira”, 100mm). It noted that 23 towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 18 Giatsint-B, 152) were missing, the latter were absent from three abandoned areas, two as noted on 6 April and one as noted on 8 March.  

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and other hardware within the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted: one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-60) and one light armoured vehicle (BMP-2) in Karlivka (26km north-west of Donetsk) and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Ptyche (28km north-west of Donetsk). In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM noted: seven APCs (BTR-80) and seven infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs; BMP-2) in Luhansk city. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two armoured vehicles near government-controlled Avdiivka on 2 May, and one armoured vehicle near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) on 3 May.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM monitored the adherence to the ceasefire and the on-going repairs to the 600m water pipeline in a government-controlled part of Zolote (61km west of Luhansk). The repairs will benefit the population of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk) that is currently suffering from a shortage of running water.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at checkpoints near the contact line. On 4 May, at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Marinka, the SMM noted 207 civilian vehicles waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and 245 civilian vehicles waiting to travel in the opposite direction. The following day, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed 350 civilian vehicles queuing to travel west and 250 queuing to travel east. At another Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Marinka, the SMM observed 366 civilian vehicles, 13 buses and 200 pedestrians (60% females) waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and 215 civilian vehicles waiting to travel in the opposite direction. Later in the afternoon at the same checkpoint, the SMM noted 32 civilian vehicles waiting to travel west and none queuing to travel east. At a “DPR” checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka, the SMM observed one bus waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and 14 civilian vehicles and two buses queuing to travel in the opposite direction. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed some 1,000 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed some 250 pedestrians waiting to leave areas not controlled by the government to then cross the bridge and government checkpoint into government-controlled areas.

The SMM continued to observe demining activities and the marking of mined areas, as well as the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Near government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces explosive ordnance disposal team extracting an unexploded 122mm artillery shell. Near government-controlled Novozhelanne (32km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted six improvised wooden mine signs (three on each side of the road, 15m between each-other) with “MINE” written in faded red letters. In a residential area of “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed three UXOs - a mortar tail fin and what the SMM assessed as an artillery round (152mm) and a tank round (125mm). The SMM informed the JCCC.

The SMM followed up on reports on an explosion at a coal mine near “LPR”-controlled Maloivanivka (54km south-west of Luhansk) on 3 May. In Maloivanivka, five miners (aged 20-40) told the SMM that nine bodies had been recovered from the incident site and that seven other miners were trapped some 200m underground. The local district “police chief” in nearby “LPR”-controlled Komisarivka (61km south-west of Luhansk) confirmed to the SMM that an explosion had occurred at the coal mine near Maloivanivka. The SMM visited the mine, but the staff present refused to comment on the reported incident.

The SMM continued to follow up on the shutting down of gas supply in “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk) (see Daily Report of 27 April). The management of the state owned company Ukrtransgaz in Kyiv confirmed that the gas distribution to Pervomaisk was cut off on 22 April. According to them, this was done due to legal issues affecting the ability of the state owned company of entering into any legalized agreement or line of communication with relevant actors in non-government controlled areas. The lack of any such legal relationship could impede the company’s ability to take action during potential emergency situations. With the end of the heating season, the decision had been made to immediately cut off gas as this would have less of a negative effect on the civilian population. The management told the SMM that they would not re-open the distribution of gas to Pervomaisk.

The Chernivtsi regional deputy military commissioner informed the SMM that there was no new wave of mobilization at the moment, but the Chernivtsi regional military administration was hiring personnel on a contract basis. He said that during the first quarter of the year, the administration had contracted 249 soldiers (24 female) for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, who constitute 61 per cent of the planned quota of 400 soldiers for that quarter.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Dnepropetrovsk.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access: 

• At a government checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska, the checkpoint commander denied passage to the SMM saying that SMM must receive approval from the Ministry of Defence.
• At the “DPR” checkpoint at the south-eastern entrance to “DPR”‑controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members demanded, for the fifth time in the last three days, to see the passports of the SMM monitors and denied passage when the SMM refused to show the passports.
• At an "LPR" checkpoint in "LPR"-controlled Molodizhne (62km west of Luhansk), an armed "LPR" member denied SMM passage through the checkpoint.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint 17km south-west of Donetsk demanded, on four separate occasions, to see the passports of SMM monitors, and allowed the SMM to continue only after noting down personal details.

Delay:

• In “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), an armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM from accessing the checkpoint at the potential crossing route. The SMM informed the JCCC and was allowed to proceed further only after one hour, when his superior arrived at the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed document for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.