Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 5 April 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM continued to record a high number of ceasefire violations – fewer explosions, but more single shots compared to the previous day. In Luhansk region the situation remained relatively calm, with a single firing incident recorded. The SMM observed long lines at checkpoints close to the contact line. The Mission reached three border crossing points in areas not controlled by the Government. It encountered freedom of movement restrictions on both sides of the contact line*.

The SMM continued to record a high number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, noting an overall decrease in the number of explosions and an increase in the number of single shots compared to the previous day.[1] Whilst at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard, between 09:34 and 15:00hrs, 253 undetermined explosions, five bursts and some 1,000 single shots of small-arms fire, mostly at locations ranging from north-west to north-east at 3-7km of its position.

While at the south-western outskirts of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, between 12:15 and 15:30hrs, 44 undetermined explosions, 62 bursts and 44 single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-7km north-north-west, north-west, west and south-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, between 17:59 and 23:30hrs on 4 April, 40 explosions assessed as caused by 73mm cannon (BMP-1) and 82mm mortar rounds, and multiple bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, mostly 2-3km south of its position. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), during the evening of 4 April, the SMM heard, within 70 minutes, 12 explosions caused by mortar rounds, 79 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-6km north-west and south-east of its position. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), during morning hours, the SMM heard, within 30 minutes, at least 50 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-north-west of its position.

Whilst in the northern outskirt of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw and heard, between 10:05 and 12:58hrs, 11 air bursts caused by mortar rounds (82mm and 120mm), as well as heard 23 undetermined explosions, 300 single shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km to the north-east, east and east-south-east – the wider areas of Kominternove and Vodiane (23 and 19km north-east of Mariupol). Between 10:59 and 11:06hrs, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) also recorded at least 20 explosions caused by impacts of unknown ammunition 6-7km to the north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the situation remained relatively calm, and the SMM recorded a single firing incident which was attributable to a live-fire exercise in an area outside of the security zone. Whilst in the outskirts of government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, between 11:00 and 11:15hrs, 40-50 single shots and bursts of small-arms fire 1km to the north.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that two tanks (T-72) were missing.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 24 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 17 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm).

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), four towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). At one of those areas, armed men prevented the SMM from entering the area and allowed only two SMM monitors to inspect the weapons.* 

The SMM observed the presence of other hardware within the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicle (MT-LB) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk); one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) heading south in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city; one IFV (BMP-1) parked near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk); one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military-type truck and one IFV (BMP-1) stationary in a forested area, near an “LPR” checkpoint across the bridge from government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In the vicinity of the electric power station of the Donetsk railway station, the SMM saw for the first time two to three pieces of UXO which it assessed as artillery shells and an MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) rocket. South-west of an “LPR” checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM noted an anti-personnel mine on a road directly across from the Prince Ihor Monument.

The SMM observed the marking of mined areas within the security zone. On the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 15-20 mine hazard signs on the south-west side and another 10-12 mine hazard signs on the north-east side of the government-controlled parts of the bridge. All signs (30 x 30cm) in English and Ukrainian were placed within approximately 30m of each other. In “LPR”-controlled areas of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed two improvised mine hazard signs (green board in white printed letters in Russian).  In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed employees of the Danish Demining Group installing mine hazard signs (red printed boards placed approximately 20m of each other) along the road 50m north of  a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint.

The SMM continued to monitor other aspects of the situation affecting the civilian population. In government-controlled Hrechyshkyne (46km north-west of Luhansk), village council officials told the SMM that for the last two weeks there had been no electricity in the administrative building as they were not allowed to give any payment to an electricity company “registered” in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city. In government-controlled Pryvillia (89km north-west of Luhansk), the head of the village council also informed the SMM that electricity had been cut off in public buildings for the same reason mentioned above. He added that a water pumping station – a public company - had an intermittent shortage of electricity for the operation of the pumps since 24 March due to the non-payment of electricity bills by public institutions.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at checkpoints close to the contact line and observed long lines waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas. At a checkpoint on highway H-15 near government-controlled Marinka, the SMM observed during morning hours approximately 350 civilian cars, nine minivans and 45 pedestrians (50% male, 50% female), waiting in a queue, heading west,  and three busses and 15 minivans waiting in a queue in the opposite direction. During the early afternoon, at the same location, the SMM observed 280 civilian cars traveling towards government-controlled areas and 62 civilian cars in the opposite direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 95 civilian cars in a queue heading south-west and five trucks of an international organisation and 34 civilian cars in the opposite direction.

The SMM visited areas close to the border not controlled by the Government. At the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 15 civilian cars (nine with Ukrainian licence plates and six with Russian Federation licence plates), five buses and 25 trucks (24 with Ukrainian licence plates and one with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. During a one-and-a-half-hour period, the SMM observed 27 civilian cars (11 with Russian Federation licence plates), three trucks, one bus and 20 pedestrians crossing from the Russian Federation into Ukraine. A truck driver in his fifties, who was queuing to cross into the Russian Federation, told the SMM that waiting times varied from one hour to one and a half days. At the border crossing points in Ulianivske (62km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM did not observe any traffic. An armed individual tried to persuade the SMM that it should not be there and refused to communicate further without the permission of his “superiors”. At the Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) border crossing point, the SMM observed three civilian cars (all with Ukrainian licence plates) and one bus waiting to cross into the Russian Federation.

At the eastern outskirts of Chonhar (162km south-east of Kherson), in the wider area of the Administrative Boundary Line between Kherson and Crimea, the SMM observed 10-15 Crimean Tatar activists in a fenced area with four to five tents, where construction work was on-going, including the erection of wooden posts, placing of barbed wire and digging of trenches. Ten meters away from the entrance to the fenced area, two female activists dressed in black uniforms (one of them known to the SMM as an Asker member) told the SMM that it was not allowed to stop in the area. Another activist in camouflage clothing and a balaclava told the SMM that the SMM vehicle was blocking their “firing positions”. The SMM saw at least two men armed with what appeared to be automatic rifles and wearing camouflage clothing and balaclavas. Outside the fenced area, it also observed two police cars and an unmarked car (sport utility vehicle) – parked on the roadside outside the area – which appeared to be carrying personnel in military-type gear.

In Ptycha (148km north-east of Lviv), the SMM followed up on media reports about a roadblock that took place on 30 March, when members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) blocked the road E40 (Kyiv-Chop) for several hours demanding the police to obstruct Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) members from entering the village church (see SMM Daily Report 15 January). Meanwhile, parishioners of UOC-KP had announced that they would again block the road on 5 April, but the SMM did not see a roadblock. In front of the church the SMM saw two police cars and six police officers. In the area of the church the SMM noted a calm situation and saw 20 elderly women divided in two groups (according to a police officer, 15 persons were parishioners of UOC, while five were parishioners of UOC-KP). The head of the village council, confirming to the SMM the roadblock on 30 March, added that around five parishioners of UOC were inside the church at all the times.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Conditional access:

• At a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area, armed men prevented the SMM from entering the area and allowed only two SMM monitors to inspect the weapons. 
• In the morning hours, at a “DPR” checkpoint near Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), armed men demanded to see national passports of SMM monitors, and the content of the trunks of the SMM vehicles, including personal belongings, luggage and medical bags, before allowing the SMM to proceed further to the east.
• In the early afternoon, at the same “DPR” checkpoint, armed men demanded to see the content of the trunks of the SMM vehicles, including luggage. After this inspection, they allowed the SMM to proceed to the east.

Delay:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), armed men demanded to see national passports of the SMM monitors and technical documents of the SMM vehicles, which the SMM refused to show. Thirty minutes after checking OSCE IDs, they allowed the SMM to proceed.
• At a checkpoint in the vicinity of government-controlled Mykolaivka Druha (55km north-east of Donetsk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel delayed the SMM for 32 minutes.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.