Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 February 2018
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Siedove near the border with the Russian Federation, in Donske and near Kreminets.* The SMM followed up on reports of an explosion in Donetsk city centre. The Mission visited two border areas not under government control. In Kyiv, the SMM observed four gatherings.
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (86 explosions).
On the evening and night of 31 January-1 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from east to west and 12 projectiles from west to east, followed by a total of an undetermined explosion, two illumination flares (one from west to east and the other’s trajectory undetermined) and 19 projectiles from east to west, all 0.5‑1.5km south.
During the day on 1 February, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five and a half hours, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and about 240 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north.
On the same day, positioned near the SMM camera at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-2km north-west, and five bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km east.
On the evening of 31 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing tank round 5-8km west, as well as about 30 undetermined explosions and about 130 shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher, anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 5-10km at directions ranging from south-west to north-north-west.
On the same evening, while in non-government-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-8km west and north-west.
During the day on 1 February, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 4-6km south-east.
In the early morning of 1 February, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded five projectiles in flight from east to west 5-8km north.
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (over 140), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).
During the day on 1 February, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 59 undetermined explosions and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 10-15km west.
On the same day, positioned on the southern edge of “LPR”-controlled Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and six bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all 4-6km south-east and south-south-west.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
During the day on 1 February, positioned 3km north of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and ten shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire, all 7-8km south-west (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4/Rodina (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-7km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
During the day on 1 February, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.
In a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) travelling north-west about 3km south-east of Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 33km north-east of Mariupol) and an IFV (BMP-2) travelling west near Roza (36km north-east of Mariupol); and aerial imagery revealed the presence on 31 January of a probable military-type armoured vehicle on the north-western edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk).
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-variant) near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk), as well as an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) and four IFVs (BMP-1) near Debaltseve.
The SMM followed up on media reports that an explosion had occurred in Donetsk city centre on the evening of 1 February. The SMM saw that the entrance to a building at 1 Pokrysheva Lane, where the explosion had reportedly occurred, was cordoned off by at least two armed “DPR” members. The Mission was unable to approach the incident site. A “DPR” member told the SMM via telephone that the explosion had occurred at around 19:00 on 1 February.
The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. At a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), for ten minutes, the SMM saw six cars (four with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and one with unidentified licence plates) exiting Ukraine, and a car (with “DPR” plates) and a van with “taxi” written on the roof (with “DPR” plates, carrying one passenger) entering Ukraine.
At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), for about one hour, the SMM saw nine cars (three with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) and four pedestrians (two women and two men, aged 30-50) exiting Ukraine, and 11 cars (three with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates), two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates, one of which was carrying about 15 passengers and marked “irregular transport” in Russian) and two covered cargo trucks (both with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.
In Kyiv, the SMM monitored four gatherings. The SMM saw a group of about 100 people (mostly women, aged 50-70) in front of a building belonging to the Ministry of Justice at 4-6 Sichovykh Striltsiv Street, as well as a group of about 50 people (mostly women, aged 50-70) in front of another building belonging to the Ministry at 73 Striletska Street. Participants of both groups were holding banners with messages critical of government officials’ position on banking. Both gatherings ended peacefully.
The SMM also saw about 100 people (all men, aged 20-40) gathered in front of the Office of the Prosecutor General at 13/15 Riznytska Street. Some of them were carrying flags of parties and organizations such as Svoboda and National Corps. The SMM heard a few speakers making remarks critical of the work of the Prosecutor General’s Office in connection to the Maidan events. About ten police officers were present. The gathering ended peacefully.
In front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street, the SMM continued to monitor the gathering. (See SMM Daily Report 30 January 2018.) The Mission saw about ten people standing outside about 40 tents adjacent to the Parliament building. It noted that a section of Hrushevskoho Street between Shovkovychna and Lypska Streets remained blocked, with entry-exit gates on either side. The SMM saw about five police officers in front of the Parliament building. The Mission did not observe any incidents during its presence.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-operation (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint north of non-government-controlled Siedove (106km south of Donetsk), near the border with the Russian Federation, three “DPR” members (two armed and one unarmed) prevented the SMM from entering the village, saying that prior permission from their superiors was needed. The unarmed “DPR” member told the SMM that it was not allowed to enter as “special operations are going on in the area”. The SMM has not been able to enter the village since late April 2017.
Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
- The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
- The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
- The SMM did not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.4
Delay:
- At a compound in government-controlled Donske (57km south of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the SMM that it was not allowed to enter due to “inspection”. The SMM informed the JCCC and after 30 minutes, following the intervention of the JCCC, the Mission was allowed to enter the compound.4 On 30 January, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer had denied the SMM access to the same compound. (See SMM Daily Report 31 January 2018.)
Conditional access:
- At a checkpoint on road H15 east of non-government-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), an unarmed “DPR” member stopped the SMM and demanded to check an SMM trailer. The SMM was allowed to proceed only after its trailer was checked. The Mission faced a similar restriction at the same checkpoint on 31 January. (See SMM Daily Report 1 February 2018.)
Other impediments:
- At an educational facility in a non-government-controlled part of Luhansk region, the principal refused to speak with the SMM without permission from senior “LPR” members.
[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of February 2018.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.