Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 28 January 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

Between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 27 and 28 January, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations along the contact line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Sakhanka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Ozerianivka, Sakhanka and to a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region beyond government control.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Mariupol and Karlivka. The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, including 68 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (107 explosions) and more between the evenings of 27 and 28 January, including 151 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

In continuation of the sequence of ceasefire violations recorded in the early evening of 26 January (see SMM Daily Report 27 January 2018), on the evening and night of 26-27 January, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 22 explosions, 89 projectiles in flight (41 from east to west and 48 from west to east), a tracer round in flight from east to west and an airburst, all 0.5-1.5km south. The following evening, the camera recorded 69 explosions, 284 projectiles in flight (43 from west to east, 239 from east to west and two from north-west to south-east), and six illumination flares (four in vertical flight, one in flight from west to east and one of undetermined trajectory), all 0.5‑1.5km south. In the early evening of 28 January, the camera recorded eight explosions, 29 projectiles in flight (four from north to south, three from south to north, three from east to west and 19 from west to east), and 12 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, all 0.5-1.5km south.

On 27 January, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for three hours, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions (including three assessed as those of mortar shells), as well as heavy-machine-gun and small‑arms fire, all 1-8km at directions ranging from west to north. The same day, positioned at the south-western edge of Yasynuvata for two hours, the SMM heard 15 explosions, as well as 45 bursts and a shot of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km at directions ranging from west to north.

On 28 January, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata for more than four hours, the SMM heard 70 shots of small-arms fire, assessed as training 1km south-east, and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km north-west. The same day, positioned in Yasynuvata for an hour, the SMM heard and saw four explosions assessed as airbursts, as well as shots and bursts of small-arms fire, 1-5km west and north-west.

On 27 January, positioned at the south-western edge of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for over five hours, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3‑4km east and south-west. The following day, from the same position for five hours, the SMM heard ten explosions as well as small-arms fire 2-6km at directions ranging from south to south-east.

On the evening of 26 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM recorded three undetermined explosions, six shots of automatic grenade launcher fire, as well as bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small‑arms fire, 4-8km south-east. The following evening from the same position, the SMM recorded six undetermined explosions, as well as bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 3-7km east and south-east. On 28 January, while in the same location, the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 5-7km east.

On the evening of 28 January, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire, ten bursts of automatic grenade launcher fire and 30 bursts of heavy‑machine‑gun fire, all 5-7km south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 26 and 27 January, including 14 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (24 explosions) and a similar number between the evenings of 27 and 28 January, including, however, two explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. During the early morning of 27 January, while in Luhansk city, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions 8-14km north-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling in residential areas of “DPR”‑controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) and assessed five impact sites on 28 January. Approximately 3m north of a residential house at 2b Konstytutsii Street, the SMM observed branches up to 12cm in diameter of a tree had been recently severed and scorched. Six north-facing windows of the house were covered with plywood, while 2cm shrapnel divots were visible along the house’s north-facing wall at a height between 80 and 170cm. The SMM assessed that a mortar shell (120mm) had exploded approximately 1.5m above the ground upon impact with the tree. A resident of the house told the SMM that the impact had occurred at 17:30 on 24 January.

Approximately 50m north-north-east of the first impact site, the SMM observed a fresh crater on the surface of a frozen lake which did not penetrate the ice. The SMM assessed the crater as caused by a mortar round (120mm) fired from the south-south-west.

Two metres south of a residential house at 4 Myru Street, the SMM observed branches up to 20cm in diameter of a tree had been recently severed and scorched. One metre east of the tree, the SMM observed remnants of a small wooden shed that had been destroyed by an explosion. Two south-facing windows of the house were covered in plywood while several 2cm shrapnel divots were visible along the south-facing wall. The SMM assessed that a mortar shell (120mm) had exploded in the tree. The owner of the house told the SMM that the impact had occurred around 18:00 on 24 January, adding that this was the sixth or seventh time her house had been damaged by explosions.

Five metres north-west of an uninhabited house at 30 Havrylenko Street, the SMM observed a fresh crater with the tailfin of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) or IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) round sticking out. The house had been damaged on several previous occasions; as such the SMM could not discern what damage could be attributed to that impact. The SMM assessed the crater to have been caused by a round fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM observed four armed “DPR” members in military-style attire entering a nearby house.

In a field approximately 50m north of the house at 15 Lenina Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters in soil partially covered with snow. A north‑facing window of the house was covered with plywood. Two local residents told the SMM there had been shelling in Sakhanka on 27 January from 17:30 to 19:30.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the early morning of 28 January, while on the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two bursts and five shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 3km south-south-west and five shots of small-arms fire 3km south; the SMM could not assess whether they were inside or outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas on 27 and 28 January, the SMM observed a calm situation.                                                                                                                         

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government‑controlled areas on 27 January, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) stationary in Mariupol and two towed howitzers (D-20) being towed east through Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk). Some 50 minutes later from the same position, the SMM observed two towed howitzers (D-20) being towed west along the same road.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas on 27 January, the SMM saw five stationary tanks (T-72) near Mykolaivka (77km west of Luhansk); three tanks (T-72) being transported near Polkove (38km north-west of Mariupol); two tanks (T-64) in Berestove (90km north-east of Donetsk); five tanks (T-72) near Bilohorivka (87km north of Donetsk); a tank being towed near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk); and five self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (2K22 Tunguska) in a residential area of Spirne (96km north of Donetsk). On 28 January, the SMM saw four stationary tanks (one T-64 three undetermined) near Mykolaivka and two stationary tanks (type undetermined) near Spirne. In non-government-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) on 27 January.

On 27 January, the SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remain missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 27 January, the SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm), each mounted on a ZIL-131 military truck, near Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol). On 28 January, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near but outside of the Zolote disengagement area, and an anti‑aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed three new mine hazard signs near 107A Illicha Avenue in Donetsk city. The signs were red squares with a skull-and-crossbones and the word “Mines” printed on them in Russian in white letters. The signs were 1-2m behind a barbed wire fence in front of a known “DPR” compound.                                                                                             

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. On 27 January, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (three with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and nine pedestrians exiting Ukraine and 18 cars (seven with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and 11 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The same day, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic crossing the border.

On 28 January, while at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (101km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM observed eight cars (one with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a fuel tanker (with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine and nine cars (six with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 12 January 2018.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 27 January, at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area outside government control in Luhansk region, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that he had been instructed not to allow anyone into the site. After making a phone call, he confirmed that he was not allowed to permit the SMM access to the site. On a second attempt, after having contacted other “LPR” members, the SMM was allowed to enter the site.
• On 27 January, the SMM was prevented from entering “DPR”-controlled Ozerianivka (35km north-east of Donetsk) by two unarmed men wearing military-style attire.
• On 27 January, south-east of “DPR” controlled Sakhanka, two “DPR” members in military-style attire approached the SMM on foot with the safety catches of their assault rifles disengaged. After writing down the SMM vehicles’ licence plates and patrol leader’s name, they demanded that the SMM leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• Both on 27 and 28 January, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• Both on 27 and 28 January, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both days.[3] 
• Both on 27 and 28 January, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both days.[3]
• On 28 January, the SMM did not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.[3]

Conditional:

• Near non-government-controlled Horlivka, an armed “DPR” member allowed an SMM patrol to proceed only after inspecting the trunks of its vehicles.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of January 2018.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.