Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 23 January 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, where it observed calm situations. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere.* The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs of essential infrastructure in Krasnyi Lyman.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 65 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 280 explosions).

On the evening of 22 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions and nearly 200 bursts and shots of heavy‑machine-gun and small-arms fire as well as three instances of uncountable overlapping bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-7km at directions ranging from east to south. On 23 January, while in the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and more than 80 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km east and south.                                                                                                                            

In continuation of the sequence of ceasefire violations recorded in the early evening of 22 January (see SMM Daily Report 23 January 2018), on the evening and night of 22-23 January the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 33 undetermined explosions, 158 projectiles in flight (98 from west to east, 59 from east to west, and one from north-west to south-east) and 11 tracer rounds in flight (all from west to east), all 0.5-1km south. The following evening, the same camera recorded two projectiles in flight from east to west followed by three projectiles in flight from west to east, all 0.5-1km south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation (an explosion); it had recorded about 230 explosions in the previous reporting period.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk). At a hospital in Dokuchaievsk on 23 January, the SMM spoke with a man (late fifties) with bandaging between his neck and left shoulder who said that on 22 January, between 16:00 and 17:00, he was in his apartment on the top floor of a five-storey residential building at 13 Vatutina Street in Dokuchaievsk when he heard a distant explosion and, along with his wife, sought shelter in their bathroom. Before reaching the bathroom, he said, he heard and saw a second explosion in his apartment, felt pain in his chest and left shoulder and saw his wife lose consciousness. The couple were subsequently brought to hospital. According to the doctor who treated them, the man was in stable condition following surgery. The SMM also spoke with the wife (late fifties), who was visibly in pain and receiving infusions. The doctor told the SMM that she had suffered shrapnel and blast wounds to her lungs and chest and had undergone surgery but remained in critical condition. The hospital’s head doctor told the SMM he had heard shelling in Dokuchaievsk starting at around 16:15 on 22 January.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw six tanks (two T‑64 and four undetermined) near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south‑west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Luhansk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw eight towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and noted as missing 26 towed howitzers (18 2A65 and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12). In a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65) and noted as missing two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). Outside a heavy weapons holding area, the SMM observed a “DPR” member chamber a round in his assault rifle, which remained hanging horizontally across his body. After an SMM patrol member explained the work of the SMM to the “DPR” member, he reapplied the safety catch of his weapon. A second armed “DPR” member then told the first “DPR” member to take the SMM patrol member’s details, in the process of which he asked to see the patrol member’s passport. The request was denied and the SMM subsequently entered the holding area and continued its activity.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site beyond respective withdrawal lines in a non‑government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted as missing ten tanks (five T-64 and five T-72), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. At the eastern edge of government‑controlled Mariupol, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP‑2). In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-80).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs works to water wells in “LPR”‑controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea. On 21 January, the SMM visited a crossing point near Chonhar (162km south-east of Kherson) and noted a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 12 January 2018.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. 
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. [3] 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of January 2018.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.