Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 October 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions – including, however, more explosions in Donetsk region – compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas; its access remained restricted in the three areas and elsewhere, including near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance to essential infrastructure near Shchastia, Zolote, Artema and Druzhba. The Mission visited a border area not under government control. In Kyiv, the SMM again observed a protest in relation to legislation concerning local governance and reintegration of areas outside of government control in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] – including, however, more explosions (over 150) – compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions).

During the day on 6 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded two undetermined explosions 1km south.

Positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four and a half hours, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 3-5km west-south-west and west. Positioned on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata for over an hour, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions, as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east to west.

Positioned on the south-western edge of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for five and a half hours, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire 2-6km south-east and south. On the afternoon of 6 October, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded, in sequence, an airburst and an undetermined explosion, 3-6km east-south-east.

On the evening of 5 October, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 70 undetermined explosions 6-8km west-south-west, as well as heavy-machine-gun fire, mostly 4-5km south-east.

The same evening, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun fire 5-10km north-west. On the afternoon of 6 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 5-7km west and small-arms fire 1-2km west-south-west.

On the morning of 6 October, positioned over 3km east of “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 40-50 shots of small-arms fire 100-200m west.

On the night of 5-6 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, a tracer round in flight from west-south-west to east-north-east, one undetermined explosion, four tracer rounds from east-south-east to west-north-west, an undetermined explosion, seven tracer rounds from west-south-west to east-north-east, and eight tracer rounds from east-south-east to west-north-west, followed by a total of 20 tracer rounds (14 from east-south-east to west-north-west, six from west-south-west to east-north-east), all at unknown distances north. On the morning of 6 October, the camera recorded an explosion assessed as an impact 400m north-north-west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (two explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (39 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the late evening of 5 October, while on the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned on 6 October near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM met with two Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and two “LPR” members to express concern over the disabling by laser of the SMM camera in a non-government-controlled area south of Stanytsia Luhanska near the Prince Ihor monument on 4 October. (See SMM Daily Report 6 October 2017.) One of the “LPR” members apologised for the incident and told the Mission that the matter would be looked into and the perpetrators disciplined accordingly.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that ten tanks (T-64) were still missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 5 October an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-variant) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-variant) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk); on 6 October, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) on a stationary military truck near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) travelling east near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), five stationary IFVs (three BMP-1, two BMP-variant) and a stationary APC (BRDM-2) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), and a stationary APC (BRDM-2) near Zolote.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the thermal power plant in Shchastia, the water pipeline between Zolote and Popasna, the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), and power lines near government-controlled Druzhba (45km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. During 30 minutes at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw six cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates) and 15 trucks carrying wheat (all with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting in queues to exit Ukraine, and one truck with a covered cargo area (Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. Four men (in their forties) from among the drivers of the 15 trucks in queues to exit Ukraine told the Mission that they had been waiting for four days to exit.

In Kyiv, the SMM again monitored a gathering near the national Parliament building. (See SMM Daily Report 6 October 2017.) The Mission saw about 250 people (over 80 per cent men, young to middle-aged), some of whom carried flags of the Right Sector, National Corps, and Svoboda. About 1,000 law enforcement officers were present. The gathering ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• Armed persons at a checkpoint west of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) stopped the SMM and did not allow it to proceed, citing ongoing “military activities” nearby. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 46 minutes the SMM was allowed to pass the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed report for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.