Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 19 May 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations. The Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including, however, more explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed damage due to shelling in Yakovlivka and Berdianske. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* The SMM monitored weapons on both sides of the contact line. The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure in Luhansk region. The SMM observed the removal of unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne. The Mission monitored four border areas currently not under government control. The SMM monitored public gatherings marking the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars near the administrative border line between Kherson and Crimea.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 310), compared with the previous reporting period (about 230 explosions).

On the night of 18-19 May, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM heard 84 undetermined explosions 8-15km north.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May the SMM camera at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded, in sequence, one undetermined explosion, one tracer round in flight from north to south, one projectile in flight from north to south, an subsequent explosion assessed as an impact, two tracer rounds in flight from south to north and one tracer round in flight from north to south, all 6-8km north-east. The camera also recorded six undetermined explosions and smoke rising, followed by aggregated totals of one undetermined explosion and smoke rising, one projectile in flight from west to east and 49 tracer rounds in flight from north to south, all 6-12km north-east.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 21 undetermined explosions, one airburst, 14 tracer rounds in flight from north to south, eight tracer rounds in flight from south to north, two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from north to south, two tracer rounds in flight from north to south, followed by aggregated totals of 26 undetermined explosions, 50 tracer rounds in flight (26 north to south, 22 south to north and two west to east) and one illumination flare in vertical flight, all 3-6km at directions ranging from east to south-south-east. The following day, the camera recorded 23 undetermined explosions 4-6km east-south-east. On the same day, positioned in Avdiivka for about two hours, the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions 2-4km east-south-east.

On the evening of 18 May, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM, in about 15 minutes, heard about 40 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds of unknown calibre 7-8km north.

On 19 May, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 58 explosions (47 undetermined and 11 assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons) and about 40 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-west to west-north-west. The SMM also heard three undetermined explosions and three shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km north.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 123 tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east at unknown distances north-east. Approximately eight hours later, the camera recorded three explosions at unknown distances north-north-east.

While in Mariupol on the night of 18-19 May, within 35 minutes the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions at unknown distances north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). On 19 May, positioned 4km south-west of government-controlled Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM, in about 30 minutes, heard five explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons 10km south-west.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of damage due to shelling. On 19 May, the SMM visited two fresh impact sites in “DPR”-controlled Yakovlivka (10km north of Donetsk). The SMM saw six fresh craters on the tarmac and grass areas of the highway H-20, near a restaurant. The SMM assessed the impacts as caused by rounds of 122mm artillery fired from a westerly direction. In the premises of the restaurant consisting of several buildings, the SMM saw shattered glass panes from almost all the windows, and that a wooden structure of the restaurant was completely destroyed and a van was heavily damaged. Inside the restaurant, the SMM saw four fresh craters assessed as caused by rounds of 122mm artillery fired from a westerly direction. The SMM also saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) assessed as a recently fired 122mm artillery round inside the car-wash building of the restaurant complex. The owner of the restaurant and several other residents of Yakovlivka separately told that shelling had occurred on 18 May at about 20:00. No casualties were reported. About 1km north of the impact sites, the SMM saw a military training site.

Following the SMM camera’s record that on the evening of 18 May two houses were on fire in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol) and that at least five people in military-style clothing were taking out materials from the houses, the SMM visited the site at Morska street and saw two freshly burnt-down houses and their two outbuildings damaged by shrapnel and fire. (See SMM Daily Report 19 May 2017.) The SMM also saw four fresh craters on the paved driveway a few metres south of the houses. The SMM assessed the impacts as caused by rounds of artillery (two 122mm and two 152mm) fired from north-easterly and north-north-easterly directions, respectively. A Ukrainian officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a resident of Berdianske (male, around 60 years old) separately told the SMM that shelling had occurred between 18:30 and 19:00 on 18 May.

In “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed two fresh craters located next to each other (one metre in between) at the northern edge of the asphalt road 300m east of an “LPR” checkpoint. One crater was about 180cm in diameter and 100cm deep; the other was about 100cm in diameter and 70cm deep. The SMM could not determine the direction of fire or weapon used.

On 19 May, while the SMM was flying an SMM mini-UAV 1.5km south-east of “DPR”-controlled Zernove (33km south of Donetsk) with sufficient battery power, the UAV’s control tablet suddenly showed a loss of power and the UAV descended rapidly into a cultivated field about 200m from the nearest hard-surface road. The SMM located the UAV and saw it having landed in an upright position. The SMM, however, was unable to reach the location due to security restrictions. The SMM assessed that no outside interference had occurred. The SMM informed the JCCC and requested that it facilitate recovery.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM noted a calm situation while monitoring the disengagement areas near government-controlled Zolote and “DPR”-controlled Petrivske.

A Russian Federation officer of the JCCC and “LPR” members facilitated the recovery of an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with which the SMM had lost contact in Stanytsia Luhanska in April 2017. (See SMM Daily Report 14 April 2017.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site and continued to observe that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted, on 17 May, a surface-to-air missile system (assessed as 9K37) consisting of six or seven pieces near government-controlled Tsarivka (41km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 18 May, the SMM observed an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) stationary on 5th Liniia Street facing south about 3km north-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The same day, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with unknown equipment mounted on its rear roof loaded on a flatbed trailer near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in the southern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 19 May, the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-2) transported on a low-loader moving north on a road 3km south-west of Popasna.

On 19 May, the SMM saw for the first time a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on road T1309 in the southern outskirts of government-controlled Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk). About five armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were present at the checkpoint and were controlling vehicular traffic, while around ten unarmed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were setting up the checkpoint.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to enable repairs to the Mykhailivka (34km north of Luhansk)-Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) power line in “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

In “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk), on 19 May the SMM observed an “LPR” demining team remove a piece of UXO, assessed as a tail fin of 82mm mortar, from the asphalt on the road leading to the Zolote disengagement area.

The SMM monitored four border areas currently not under government control. At the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), in about an hour, the SMM saw 40 civilian vehicles (24 with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation, and one with Georgian licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian licence plates (carrying about ten passengers), one minibus with Ukrainian licence plates (carrying about ten passengers), and about 25 pedestrians in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also observed 78 vehicles (48 with Ukrainian licence plates, 16 with Russian Federation licence plates and 14 with “LPR” plates) in the parking lot.

At the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes the SMM observed 23 cars (18 with Ukrainian licence plates, four with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one bus with Ukrainian licence plates exit Ukraine. Two cars (both with Ukrainian licence plates) entered Ukraine during this time.

During the course of 45 minutes’ monitoring at the border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 38 commercial trucks and eight cars exit Ukraine (three trucks had Belarusian licence plates, four trucks had Russian Federation licence plates and the remainder, including the cars, had Ukrainian licence plates). The SMM observed two cars enter Ukraine, both of which had Ukrainian licence plates. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM observed no one enter or exit Ukraine.

On 18 May, the SMM monitored public gatherings near the administrative border line between Kherson and Crimea. In the city of Henichesk (176km east of Kherson), the SMM monitored a gathering near the city square attended by about 300 people, mainly Crimean Tatars from surrounding areas. The SMM saw some 100 police officers and twelve Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel (unarmed) present. The SMM also noted a group of three men in camouflage attire and green berets as well as around 30 young Crimean Tatars, some of whom were masked and in camouflage attire. Kherson region’s high-ranking officials and Crimean Tatar activist leaders participated in the event and gave speeches.

Later the same day, at an event held near and at the crossing point of Chonhar (167km south-east of Kherson), the SMM observed about 300 people (mixed gender, all ages), an extensive police presence of approximately 100 police officers (unarmed) outside the crossing point and an increased number of armed border guards inside the crossing point. The SMM saw the so-called Asker-mobile group, with a cargo truck with metal plates welded to its exterior, attempting to proceed inside the crossing point towards the bridge that divides Kherson region and the Crimean Peninsula, which was subsequently blocked by the border guards’ off-road vehicles about 50m from the bridge. A group of about 25 people, including high-ranking officials of the Kherson region and Crimean Tatar regional Mejlis, then walked towards the bridge; once the group crossed the bridge’s halfway mark, guards on the other side of the bridge stretched razor wire across the road and with two military trucks stopped the group’s advancement two-three metres from their position. After 35 minutes of rallying on the bridge, during which the group sang the Ukrainian anthem several times, raising the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar flags on the flagpole located at the mid-bridge point, they proceeded back and soon vacated the crossing point. The gatherings then ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the Mission’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that that he could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said no demining had taken place and that the road south of the bridge remained mined. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR”-members denied the SMM access to a compound at the Butovska mine 3km south of Yasynuvata, which the SMM was visiting to follow up on media reports about shelling in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.