Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 19 January 2017

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the SMM observed more explosions, but all were assessed as part of live-fire exercises outside the security zone. The SMM continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* Beyond the disengagement areas, Ukrainian Armed Forces denied SMM access near Pikuzy.* The Mission observed weapons missing from permanent storage sites. The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints. The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities in Lobacheve and Peredilske (Luhansk region), and repairs to water pipelines in Zolote. The SMM visited one border area currently outside of government control. The SMM continued to monitor the situation along the administrative boundary line between mainland and Crimea.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 41 explosions compared with nearly 100 in the previous reporting period.[1] While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) in the evening hours of 18 January the SMM heard 23 explosions of which ten were assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire 4-6km east-south-east and south-east, six as outgoing mortar and artillery rounds 6-7km south-east, six undetermined, and one impact of an artillery round 6-7km east-north-east.

The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, during the day, two undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east of the camera. The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations during the night of 18-19 January in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka or in Donetsk city centre.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in the early morning hours, in sequence: 25 tracer rounds in flight from west to east, three undetermined explosions, and 13 tracer rounds from east to west, all at undetermined distances north and north-north-east of the camera.

Positioned in areas north-east of Mariupol the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-7km south and south-west, and two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons followed by what was assessed as their respective impacts 3-5km south-west of “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), as well as five undetermined explosions at undetermined distance north-north-east and east of  the SMM’s position 2.3km south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (23km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded 58 explosions (24 in the previous reporting period). All were assessed as part of live-fire exercises at training areas outside the security zone: 30 explosions assessed as artillery rounds and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) and 28 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) said that no disengagement or demining would take place on that day.

The Mission observed a calm situation in the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. While at the camera site in Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member arrived and remained present throughout the SMM stay but did not answer any questions on demining.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30) in government-controlled Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk); 12 tanks (T-64 and T-72) static at a training area near Uspenka and three tanks (T-64) lined up in firing position at a training area near Myrne.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). The SMM observed as missing 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), as previously noted.

The Mission revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the relevant withdrawal lines and noted as absent 39 tanks (T-64), as previously noted, and 13 mortars (ten 2B9, two BM-37 and one 2B14 82mm), including three absent for the first time.

North of “DPR”-controlled Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM saw a mobile jamming communication system assessed as R-330ZH “ZHITEL”.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints. At a checkpoint in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 96 vehicles and about 60 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 32 vehicles and about 60 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that the average checking time to cross to government-controlled areas was 15-18 minutes per car and around 13-15 minutes for cars travelling in the opposite direction.

At 08:00 at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the SMM observed some 1,000 people queuing to cross towards government-controlled areas. The SMM saw a woman in her sixties carried on a stretcher by ambulance staff from the parking lot to the checkpoint to receive medical assistance. The SMM also observed a coffin driven to the checkpoint to then, as told by people present, be carried over to government-controlled areas. At two heating facilities, one near the checkpoint and another near the parking lot further south, hot tea and coffee were being served. At 09:25 around 900 people were still waiting to cross towards government-controlled areas and 20 were queuing in the opposite direction. At 12:20 the 900-people queue had dropped to about 150. The SMM observed no improvement to the wooden ramp on the bridge, which continued to be difficult to walk on, especially for the elderly. No queues were seen at the government checkpoint north of the bridge.  

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. In government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw the controlled detonation of a mortar (82mm) shell by Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers. While at the site, the SMM heard one shot of small-arms fire 200m south.

In government-controlled Peredilske (24km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed ten Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC examining an unexploded multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-30 Smerch) missile, assessed as not a recent one, that was stuck in the ground at the side of the road. They said that the UXO could not be detonated as it was too close (less than 200m) to residential houses and gas pipelines, adding that it would be removed after the snow melted.

In a government-controlled part of Zolote the SMM monitored maintenance work and repairs of a water pipeline.

In “DPR”-controlled Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, 23km north of Donetsk), residents told the SMM that the village had been without electricity for almost ten days due to damaged power lines from shelling in “DPR”-controlled Kruta Balka (16km north of Donetsk) on 9 January.

The SMM asked the JCCC for an update on its co-ordination of mine clearance along several roads with a view to removing long-standing restrictions to the freedom of movement of SMM monitors and other civilians (See SMM Daily Report 19 January). The JCCC offered no evidence of co-ordinated mine clearance. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said that the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued demining efforts close to the contact line, but that sometimes they were impeded by lack of security guarantees from the other side. He added that complete demining could only be carried out after full implementation of the ceasefire. A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer said that “DPR” members would provide an update of the situation.

At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 1km west of Pikuzy on the T0519 road, the commander denied the SMM access further east to Pikuzy, citing the presence of anti-tank mines on the road. The SMM saw the mines. An officer of the JCCC present made no effort to facilitate SMM access. Later the Ukrainian Armed Forces General of the JCCC told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not demine that or other roads as long as ceasefire violations continued and “ammunition was brought in across that part of the border currently not controlled by the Government”.

Tasked by the OSCE Permanent Council, the SMM should have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine to fulfil its mandate. In addition, all signatories of the Memorandum have stipulated that all mines and other explosive devices in the security zone should be removed while the JCCC is tasked by the TCG Decision on Mine Action to co-ordinate demining, and to contribute to rapid response to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification, as stipulated in the Addendum to the Package of Measures.

The SMM visited one border area currently not under government control. At the pedestrian border crossing point in Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) the SMM saw, as noted before, that no “LPR” members were present. During a one-hour stay, the SMM saw two women (in their fifties) enter Ukraine. Three other people (two women and a man, age 50-55) said that they were going to the Russian Federation for shopping and to visit relatives.

The SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing points near Chaplynka and Kalanchak (77 and 67km south-east of Kherson, respectively) along the administrative boundary line between mainland and Crimea. About 100km south-east of Kherson, the SMM saw one MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present told the SMM that the area had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel through the Zolote disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side due to the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed from Petrivske west to government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) due to a road block and mine hazard signs present. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) denied the SMM further travel towards government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), claiming that the road was mined and that the SMM required permission from Ukrainian Armed Forces headquarters to pass. In response to SMM question if access on foot through a safe passage could be ensured, they referred the SMM to higher authorities. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the Mission that it could not assist in ensuring the SMM’s safety if it travelled east from Bohdanivka towards Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk).
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 1km west of Pikuzy on the T0519 road, the commander denied the SMM access further east, claiming that anti-tank mines were on the road. The MM saw the mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.