Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the period between the evenings of 1 and 2 January. The SMM followed up on a report of a shelling and observed an impact site. The Mission continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, but its access remained restricted.* The SMM observed the placement of mine hazard signs on the non-government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared with the period between the evenings of 1 and 2 January, including about 70 explosions, mostly in the areas of Svitlodarsk, Horlivka and the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle.

On the evening of 2 January, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the Mission heard four explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm), six shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), 15 bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, and two bursts as well as six shots of small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east.

The same evening, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 45 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 54 bursts of small-arms fire 4-6km west-south-west and west during a period of two hours. On 3 January, while in the same location, the Mission heard 17 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of an undetermined weapon: ten were 4-6km west-south-west, four were at unknown distances south-west, and three were 5-7km south-west. The SMM also heard three bursts of small-arms fire 5-7km south-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for more than five hours, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an outgoing artillery round 1km west, as well as 11 undetermined explosions, 12-15 airbursts assessed as rounds of anti-aircraft (ZU-23, 23mm) cannon, and intense heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km west and north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions, four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and four shots of small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-south-east and south.

On 3 January the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from east to west, nine tracer rounds in flight from east to west, and ten explosions assessed as impacts of an undetermined weapon, all at an unknown distance north-north-east of the camera.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the period between the evenings of 1 and 2 January. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions more than 5km north-west.

The SMM followed up on a report of a shelling and observed an impact site. On 31 December an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed three craters in a cemetery on the eastern edge of government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) assessed as one or two week-old impact sites of 120mm mortar or 125mm artillery rounds. (See SMM Daily Report 30 December 2016.) One crater lay about 45m from a house. South of the bridge near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), in an “LPR”-controlled area, the Mission observed a small, fresh impact site assessed as caused by a light weapon from an undetermined direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that no disengagement activities or demining would take place that day. In non-government-controlled area south of the bridge, north-east of the Prince Ihor monument, the SMM observed a senior Russian Federation Armed Forces representative of the JCCC and “LPR” members with demining equipment placing mine hazard signs along more than one kilometre of a dirt road in the disengagement area.

The SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines at the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission crossed from government-controlled to “LPR”-controlled areas and back again, noting a calm situation.

The SMM observed a calm situation in the Petrivske disengagement area, and no demining or fencing off of mines. Armed “DPR” members insisted on escorting the Mission to the SMM camera location.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum. The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that 14 mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and 12 tanks (T-72, 125mm) remained absent.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-1) on a transporter travelling west near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and two stationary APCs (MT-LB) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the removal of five previously observed anti-tank mines on the non-government-controlled side of the Shchastia bridge (20km north of Luhansk) by five unarmed “LPR” members. A sixth previously observed mine was no longer present. (See SMM Daily Report 2 January 2017.)

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. In “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission saw two fire trucks parked in front of the remains of a burnt house from which smoke was issuing. Local residents said the house had been destroyed by an electrical fire early that morning, and that the house’s sole resident, a man aged about 80, had died.

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line, in sub-zero temperatures. At a checkpoint near government-controlled Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed about 120 civilian vehicles and 80 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas and five buses queuing in the opposite direction. At the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 300 pedestrians queuing to enter government-controlled areas, and about 100 pedestrians queuing in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the Mission observed about 400 pedestrians queuing to walk toward government-controlled areas, and about 20 queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM observed that minor repairs had been made to a handrail on one of the wooden ramps at the broken section of the bridge, and salt had been laid to improve footing. At other entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line, the Mission observed shorter queues.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was unable to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present said he could not assist in ensuring the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel north on a road leading to a summer cottage area (inside the disengagement area) from the Prince Ihor monument in “LPR”-controlled areas south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to the threat of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel into the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area using secondary roads on the government-controlled side as Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC told the SMM they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the possible presence of mines in those areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side, as an armed “LPR” member said there had been no further demining activities in these areas. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske, the SMM was unable to travel west toward the disengagement area, as an armed man told the SMM that no demining had been conducted. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint did not allow the SMM to travel from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) to government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), saying they lacked orders to do so. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel south from the Shchastia bridge, as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from travelling from government-controlled Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk) to government-controlled Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) due to the presence of a roadblock. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• In Petrivske, an armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint stopped the SMM, saying an escort was required. After nearly 15 minutes, another armed member arrived and escorted the Mission to the SMM camera location.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.