Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 January 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region between the evenings of 29 and 30 December and in the following 24 hours compared with the previous reporting period. More violations were recorded between the evenings of 31 December and 1 January. Fewer ceasefire violations were recorded from 1 January to 2 January. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 29 and 30 December compared with the previous reporting period, followed by two days of consecutive increases from 30 December to 1 January. Between the evenings of 1 and 2 January the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations. It followed up on reports of shelling of residential areas in areas under government control. The Mission continued monitoring the three disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, but its access remained restricted.* The SMM noted some demining on the non-government-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission visited three border crossing points currently not under government control. Its freedom of movement was restricted on both sides of the contact line.* The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. Marches marking the anniversary of the birth of Stepan Bandera were observed in some cities.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region between the evenings of 29 and 30 December (including some 90 explosions), and in the following 24 hours (including nearly 100 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (84 explosions). The Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in the region between 31 December and 1 January compared with the previous 24 hours, including some 240 explosions. Fewer ceasefire violations were recorded between the evening of 1 and 2 January (some 20 explosions) compared with the previous 24 hours.

During the four-day reporting period the vast majority of ceasefire violations, including nearly 80 per cent of all explosions, were recorded in the Svitlodarsk-Debaltseve area.

During the evening of 29 December, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as caused by outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon (73mm), all 3-5km south-east. The Mission also heard eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from an undetermined weapon and one undetermined explosion 3-5km south-east. During the following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard 25 explosions (14 assessed as outgoing rounds from an undetermined weapon and 11 undetermined explosions) 5-9km south-east.

While in Svitlodarsk on the evening of 30 December, the SMM heard 72 undetermined explosions 5-9km south-west and 18 undetermined explosions 2-5km and 6-8km south-east. From the evening of 31 December to the morning of 1 January, while at the same location, the Mission heard 226 undetermined explosions: five explosions 7-10km north, 167 explosions 2-10km north-east, 10 explosions 3-7km east, 23 explosions 2-10km south-east, and 21 explosions 2-10km south-west. During the afternoon and evening of 1 January the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from IFV (BMP-1) cannon (73mm), and one undetermined explosion, all 2-5km south-west.

On 30 December, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-4km east and south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 2-7km south-west. On 31 December, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-4km west. On 1 January, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard 40-50 single shots of small-arms fire 2km north. On 2 January, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire 4-5km north-west. During the evening of 2 January the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded (in sequence) six projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west and one undetermined explosion 4-6 km east-south-east of the camera. On 2 January the SMM camera at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded 15 undetermined explosions and two undetermined projectiles from north-west to south-east, in areas 4-7km north-west of the camera.

During the morning of 30 December, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded seven tracer rounds from east to west followed by 28 tracer rounds (13 from east to west and 15 from west to east), all at undetermined distances north-north-east. Positioned in government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol) later the same day, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions 7-8km south-south-east. During the evening of 31 December the SMM camera in Shyrokyne, facing north, recorded one undermined explosion at an unknown distance.

On 1 January, positioned in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds at unknown distances south and south-west.

During the early hours of 2 January, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne recorded four rocket-assisted projectiles from west to east at undetermined distances to the north.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 29 and 30 December (two flashes) and between the evenings of 30 and 31 December (including eight explosions) compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). The Mission recorded more ceasefire violations over the following 24 hours, including 38 explosions. Between the evenings of 1 and 2 January, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.

On 31 December, positioned in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 5-10km south. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk) on the same day, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 5km north-west.

On the afternoon and evening of 1 January, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 47 explosions assessed as artillery rounds, ten undetermined explosions, 50 shots of 30mm cannon fire and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 10km south-west and west-south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling of residential areas. In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk) on 1 January, the SMM observed a destroyed concrete barn on Lenin Street next to a house that had sustained cracks to a wall and broken windows. Three women said they were in the house at the time of the shelling which they said happened at about 15:00 on 22 December. The SMM saw pieces of an artillery shell (122mm) at the site. The roof of one neighbouring house was damaged by shrapnel and windows were broken in another. On Skeleva Street the SMM observed that three houses had sustained minor shrapnel damage and had their windows broken. There was a crater about 60-80 metres from one of the houses, which was covered with snow. According to a 70 year-old male resident and a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the crater was caused by a mortar shell on 23 December.

In government-controlled Roty (66km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed that the walls and roofs of three houses (one on Vokzalna and two on Poliova Street) had been damaged by shrapnel. According to a resident aged in her fifties, shells landed in the yards of these houses. The SMM also observed broken windows and shrapnel damage to another house on Poliova Street. The residents, a family of three (including a two-year old), told the SMM that they were at home at the time of the shelling but were not injured. The walls of another house on the same street had been damaged by shrapnel and its windows broken.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access to all three areas remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* The SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in Zolote or Petrivske during the reporting period.

On 31 December inside the Zolote disengagement area the SMM observed fresh tracks from a large truck leading from government-controlled Katerynivka.

Throughout the reporting period, the SMM observed a calm situation in the Petrivske disengagement area.

On the evening of 30 December the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded eight flashes, three of which were assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 31 December the SMM observed the arrival of “LPR” members with demining equipment, armed “LPR” members and Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC to the non-government-controlled side of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM saw the demining team start their activities on the path leading to the railway bridge and summer houses. After about 90 minutes the team returned and then left the area. On 31 December, a Russian Federation Armed Forces representative of the JCCC gave the SMM documents regarding demining in the area. On 2 January the SMM was unable to proceed the full length of the path to the summer cottage area due to the threat of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

On the same day the SMM observed recent damage to the wall of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)-operated shelter on the non-government controlled side of the bridge. The damage was consistent with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) impact. The SMM observed the stabilizing fins of an RPG next to the container. It assessed that the fire had been from a north or north-eastern direction.

On 1 January the SMM observed fresh damage on the “LPR”-controlled side of the bridge and remnants of an IFV (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon round and an RPG.

On 2 January the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded one impact in an “LPR”-controlled area (outside the disengagement area) close to the Prince Igor monument.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside assigned sites, in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 210mm) on a trailer heading north near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk) on 30 December.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: 12 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad 122mm), four of which were observed for the first time; 31 self-propelled howitzers (ten Gvozdika, 122mm; and 21 Akatsiya, 152mm); 20 towed howitzers (18 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm; and two D-30 122mm). The Mission noted the following weapons absent: 59 self-propelled howitzers (49 2S1 and ten 2S3), two 2S1 for the first time; three towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm); 33 anti-tank guns (30 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm and three D-44, 85mm); four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm); and 35 mortars (2B11 Sani 120mm). The SMM also noted that three sites remained abandoned and the following weapons missing: 19 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) (as first noted on 28 February, 27 May and 21 July 2016).

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted as absent 14 mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm), seven anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm), and 46 tanks (T-64), one of the tanks for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: six IFV (BMP), one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR) and one tracked armoured recovery vehicle (T54-55 chassis), all stationary in Luhanske on 29 December; two stationary APC (BTR) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) on 30 December; three stationary APC (MT-LB) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a stationary military truck near Artema (26km north of Luhansk) on 31 December; one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun and one IFV (BRM-1K), both stationary near Zolote (outside the disengagement area); and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military truck heading west near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 1 January; three APC (MT-LB) – one stationary, another heading south-east and the third heading north – near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk); and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a military truck heading west near Troitske on 2 January.

In areas outside government control the SMM observed one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a stationary military-type truck near “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk) on 31 December.

On 2 January the SMM observed six anti-tank mines on the non-government controlled side of the Shchastia bridge placed across the eastern (northbound) lanes. On 26 December the SMM had observed “LPR” members remove anti-tank mines from the road and had received papers with general information on demining (see SMM Daily Report, 27 December 2016). The SMM informed a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC who said the mines had been placed there by mistake. After a two hour wait, a demining team arrived and began to de-activate the mines.

The SMM visited border areas not controlled by the Government. At the pedestrian border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for 30 minutes on 31 December the SMM observed that no “LPR” members were present and that no pedestrians crossed. At the “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk) border crossing point on 2 January in the course of 50 minutes, seven vehicles (four with Ukrainian license plates, two with Russian license and one with a “DPR” plate) queuing to exit Ukraine and two passenger buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates) leaving. Seven pedestrians crossed into Ukraine and three crossed in the other direction. On 2 January the SMM observed that the pedestrian border crossing point at “LPR”-controlled Krasnodarskyi-1 (54km south-east of Luhansk) was abandoned but observed a car leave two people at the crossing point.

The SMM monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. On 30 December the SMM monitored repairs of a section of Shypilovo-Sentianivka railway line near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). On 30 December, positioned on both sides of the contact line, in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Svitlodarsk, the Mission monitored as repairs of a power line were completed, which was confirmed by representatives of the power company. The SMM monitored repair of a water pipeline in government-controlled Avdiivka on 30 and 31 December. During its monitoring on 30 December the SMM heard two bursts of heavy-machine-gun-fire 2-3km south of its position. On 31 December, Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC told the SMM that the repairs had been completed.

A shopkeeper (female, aged about 55-years-old) in “LPR”-controlled Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk) told the SMM on 31 December that since a constant water and electricity supply have been restored to the area in recent days, living conditions have improved considerably. Supply was restored following the repair of the water pipes in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) last week, co-ordinated with the JCCC and monitored by the SMM (see SMM Daily Report, 27 December 2016).

On 1 January, the SMM observed marches marking the birthday of Stepan Bandera. In Kyiv the SMM observed a crowd of about 2,500 (men and women of different ages) who gathered in Shevchenko Park and marched to Maidan Square. Some carried torches, red and black flags and the flags of the Svoboda political party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the youth organization Sokil, Bilyi Molot, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Kholodnyi Yar and those of the non-governmental organizations, Banking Riot and Protection of Ukrainian People. Approximately 1,000 law enforcement officers were present. In Ivano-Frankivsk the SMM observed approximately 500-600 persons (mostly middle-aged or elderly men) march to a Bandera monument. In Lviv the SMM saw about 300 people (75 per cent men, mostly middle-aged and elderly) gathered at a Bandera monument. In Odessa the SMM observed about 300 people (about 70 per cent men, with an average age of around 30 years-old) march from the Shevchenko Monument to the city centre. The flags of the Right Sector, Svoboda, Sokil and the Odessa Maidan Self-defence were visible in the crowd. About 60 National Guards and 20 police officers escorted the march. Apart from a scuffle at the Odessa march, all events passed off peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such responses and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• On 30 and 31 December, and again on 1 and 2 January, the SMM was not able to access areas other than the main road in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC present said he could not assist in ensuring the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 30 December, the SMM observed three new mine hazard signs in the middle of the road south-east of an “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and did not proceed east towards a summer cottage area (inside the disengagement area). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 2 January the SMM was not able to proceed further north on a road leading to a summer cottage area (inside the disengagement area) from the Prince Ihor monument south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge as two armed men present told the SMM that the area had not been demined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 2 January the SMM was unable to proceed the full length of the path to the summer cottage area (inside the disengagement area) south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge due to the threat of mines and UXO.
• On 30 and 31 December, the SMM was not able to proceed towards the railway line from an area east of government-controlled Katerynivka (inside the disengagement area) as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had been taken place. On one occasion the SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 1 January the SMM was unable to travel further south into the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area using secondary roads on the government-controlled side as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 2 January the SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from the “LPR”-controlled side as an armed “LPR” member said they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety due to the threat from mines or UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 30 and 31 December and again on 1 and 2 January, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM noted that no demining had taken place on the road leading west towards the disengagement area, which prevented the SMM from travelling on it. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On five separate occasions on 31 December, 1 and 2 January, the SMM was prevented from travelling on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) due to the presence of anti-tank obstacles and mines on the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 30 and 31 December, and 1 and 2 January, the SMM could not proceed further south from the Shchastia bridge (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that mines remained in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 2 January anti-tank mines near an “LPR” checkpoint south of government-controlled Shchastia  prevented the SMM from proceeding further north. The JCCC was informed.         

Conditional access:

• On 30 December, in “DPR”-controlled Yenakiieve (41km north-east of Donetsk) three armed “DPR” members (two wearing police-style clothes and one military-style clothes) stopped the SMM. One of them asked to provide the driving licence and the document of the SMM vehicle before allowing them to proceed further. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 2 January armed “DPR’’ members stopped the SMM at a checkpoint 17km south-west of Donetsk city and checked the contents of an SMM trailer before allowing the SMM to pass.

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.