Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 14 November 2016

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with 13 November. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with 13 November. The Mission followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote, and Petrivske and faced restrictions of its freedom of movement in all three areas. The SMM’s freedom of movement was further restricted on two occasions in “DPR”-controlled areas north-east of Mariupol and once at a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound.* The SMM observed weapons regulated by the Memorandum in violation of the withdrawal lines in Serednoteple and Trokhizbenka. The Mission observed long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska and Horlivka. In Luhansk region the SMM visited two border areas currently not under government control. In Kyiv, the Mission observed a public gathering outside the National Bank of Ukraine.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including about 160 explosions, compared with 460 during the previous reporting period. Of these explosions nearly half were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area.

During the evening and night of 13-14 November, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions at distances ranging 8-15km north-west. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for six hours during the day on 14 November, the SMM heard 57 undetermined explosions and a ten-minute continuous exchange of small-arms fire 2-6km south-west, west and north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) during the evening of 13 November and the early morning of 14 November, the SMM heard 28 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and eight undetermined explosions, all 2-3km south-east of its position.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 5-7km south-west; and 23 undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 3-10km, south-west, west and north-west.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, including 57 explosions, compared with 52 during the previous reporting period, mainly in western Luhansk region.

Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions 10-20km south-west. Positioned 2km south-west of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) for 20 minutes, the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an artillery round 10-14km south-west.

Positioned 5km north of government-controlled Lopaskyne (23km north-west of Luhansk) for some 20 minutes, the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds 2-3km south-west, as well as 20 shots assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS) rounds and more than 70 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 4-6km south-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties. On 14 November a law enforcement official in government-controlled Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (66km north of Donetsk) confirmed information provided by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), that a man had been killed by shelling on 11 November in government-controlled Tonenke (19km north-west of Donetsk). Staff at a morgue in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka informed the SMM that the body of the man was present but that a forensic examination had not yet been conducted.

The supervisor of an electrical repair group in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that an electrical worker injured when an anti-personnel mine exploded on 13 November (see SMM Daily report 14 November) was in a stable condition but unable to see out of his left eye.

The SMM observed a fresh impact site at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint about 14km north-east of government-controlled Mariupol city centre (102km south of Donetsk). The SMM assessed that it was the impact of a 120mm mortar round fired from an easterly direction.

In “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM of bullet impacts at a JCCC observation point. The SMM observed three fresh holes on the west-facing wall of a functioning school-building which was also being used by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC as an observation point. A school official told the SMM that she had found a bullet on the ground near the entrance of the school on the morning of 12 November. The SMM saw several armed men at the school, who according to a school official, were guarding musicians from the Russian Federation who were performing for children.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. Contrary to the requirement of the TCG’s decision, the SMM noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the three areas during the reporting period.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no disengagement or demining activities would be taking place that day. The SMM observed one impact on the south-facing concrete wall of the southernmost Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, north of the bridge, and assessed it as caused by a round (from an unknown weapon) fired from a southerly direction. The same JCCC officer told the SMM that the impacts were a result of incoming fire on the evening of 13 November.

The SMM noted a calm situation in the Zolote/Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) disengagement area.

In the Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) disengagement area, armed “DPR” members told the SMM that demining in the area had not taken place.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in accordance with the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) near government-controlled Serednoteple (28km north of Luhansk) and an anti-tank guided missile launcher (9K111 Fagot, 120mm) near government-controlled Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone.[2] In government-controlled areas the SMM observed two armoured combat vehicles (BTR) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) and one armoured personnel carrier (BRDM) near Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk) and one IFV (BMP-1) near Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area). An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) loaded on a military-type truck near “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk) on 13 November.

The SMM observed the remnants of five multiple-launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad) rockets (122mm) (of an unknown age) embedded in the asphalt in the north-western outskirts of Luhansk city. The site of the explosive remnants was otherwise unmarked.

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the water pumping station near “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM observed an eight-ten person crew carrying out the repairs.

The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. On 13 November, at the government-controlled Maiorsk entry-exit checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed about 165 vehicles and 600 pedestrians waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 155 vehicles and 200 pedestrians waiting to travel in the opposite direction. Near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, early in the morning on 14 November, the SMM observed about 1,200 people waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas. The SMM noted that the poor condition (broken steps and handrails) of the wooden ramps over the broken section of the bridge continued to pose dangers to crossing pedestrians.

The SMM monitored two border areas currently not under government control. The SMM noted a calm situation at two border crossing points near Krasnodarskyi (57km north-east of Luhansk). The SMM was present in the two areas for about 40 minutes each.  

In Kyiv the SMM monitored a public gathering outside the National Bank of Ukraine organized by the political party, For Life. About 1,200 people (70 per cent elderly women) listened as a speaker accused the bank of corruption. Protestors temporarily blocked the street in front of the bank. The SMM noted that about 20-30 young men in civilian clothing, positioned at the edge of the crowd, were stopping people and asking them where they were going when they attempted to leave the demonstration. The SMM was also stopped by the men who stated they were from the “rapid reaction group” of the For Life political party. Two demonstrators separately told the SMM that they would be paid the equivalent of about USD 10 for participating in the demonstration. Up to 100 law enforcement officers were present at the site. The demonstration remained peaceful.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In “LPR”-controlled areas south of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska an SMM patrol did not travel toward the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) due to the presence of a mine hazard sign. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An anti-tank obstacle (“Czech hedgehog”) in “LPR”-controlled areas blocked the SMM from travelling west on a road south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel from a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area to government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) due to the road being blocked by concrete blocks and barbed wire. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to access secondary routes in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area as an “LPR” member told the SMM that he could not guarantee the safety of the SMM due to possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), a “DPR” member told the SMM his “commander” was not available to speak to the SMM and that demining had not taken place. The SMM could not travel west to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) due to the possible presence of mines and the absence of security guarantees. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint told the SMM that it could not travel on a road from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) to government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) as it was the policy of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to keep the road blocked. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint told the SMM that they could not guarantee the SMM’s security due to the possible presence of mines along the road between Popasna and Katerynivka. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM was stopped by armed men who said that the SMM could not proceed further due to instructions received from their chain of command. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “DPR”-controlled Nova Tavriia (25km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM was stopped by armed men who told the patrol it could not proceed due to the presence of UXO. The SMM requested the location of the UXO in order to alert the authorities of its presence. The armed men then told the SMM that they could not proceed due to sniper activity. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound in government-controlled Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.  

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.