Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 30 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations on 29 October compared with the day before, followed by a decrease on 30 October. In Luhansk region, the SMM also recorded more ceasefire violations on 29 October compared with the day before, and a decrease on 30 October. It followed up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling in Makiivka. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* Repairs to essential infrastructure in areas east of Mariupol, enabled by SMM facilitation and monitoring of adherence to the ceasefire, were interrupted by firing in the area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines. The SMM observed a march in Lviv.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on 29 October with almost 700 explosions compared with about 300 the day before[1]. On 30 October the SMM observed a decrease, with 332 explosions recorded in Donetsk region.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 28-29 October the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-north-west and north-west. On the same night, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 23 undetermined explosions, 15 explosions assessed as impacts and 21 airbursts 4-6km east-south-east.  Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for four hours on 29 October the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 28-29 October the SMM heard over 200 explosions 10-15km north-north-east and 45 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 8-15km north-west. While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 7-10km south-east.

On the night of 28-29 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 23 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery 4-4.5km north-east and 45 undetermined explosions north-west. The camera also recorded the following (in sequence): ten bursts of cannon tracer fired from south-west to north-east; seven bursts of small-arms tracer fired from west to east; 106 bursts of cannon tracer fired from south-west to north-east; one burst of small-arms tracer fired from east to west; 16 bursts of cannon tracer fired from south-west to north-east; two rocket-assisted projectiles fired from north-west to south-east; ten bursts of small-arms tracer fired from west to east. Most of the fire from south-west to north-east assessed to have been fired from new positions about 3km north-east of the camera.

On 29 October, positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 66 undetermined explosions and bursts of small-arms fire 2-6km west and west-north-west.

On 29 October, the SMM recorded 80 explosions in areas north-east of Mariupol. At the camera site in Shyrokyne the SMM heard eleven undetermined explosions north-north-west. Positioned south-east of government-controlled Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 21 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery at 3–5km east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard at least 12 undetermined explosions and bursts of small-arms fire to the west. Positioned near government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions south-east. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Azov (formerly Dzerzhynske, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 17 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and five explosions assessed as mortar rounds in an area to the south, though strong winds made a location difficult to determine further. Near government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard four outgoing artillery rounds north-west of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds at an undetermined distance to the south.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 29-30 October the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 6-10km north and north-west.

On 30 October, positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds, two explosions assessed as impacts and small-arms fire 3-6km north and north-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) on 30 October, the SMM heard at least 180 undetermined explosions and a continuous exchange (lasting about five and a half hours) involving heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-5km north-west. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for four hours on 30 October the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations.

On 30 October, the SMM recorded 73 explosions in areas north-east of Mariupol. Positioned 2km south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske on 30 October, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions south-east followed by 16 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds north-west and 16 explosions assessed as their impacts north-east. A short time later, the SMM heard 15 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds north-west and 15 explosions assessed as their impacts north-east followed by one explosion assessed as an outgoing round north-west and one explosion assessed as an impact north-east. Positioned in government-controlled Orlivske (23km north-east of Mariupol) on 30 October, the SMM heard 23 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 8-10km south-west.

In Luhansk region on 29 October the SMM recorded over 60 explosions compared with four the previous day, followed by 36 on 30 October. Positioned at a checkpoint on the government-controlled side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area (60km west of Luhansk) on 29 October, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as mortar rounds (82mm) 3-5km west (and outside the disengagement area). Later, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions (assessed as artillery) in the space of ten minutes 8-10km west (and outside the disengagement area).

While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) on the night of 28-29 October, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions about 10km west. Later, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km west. While in Kadiivka during the day on 29 October the SMM heard 31 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 10-15km north-west.

When flying a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near government-controlled Orikhove Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) on 29 October the SMM heard approximately nine shots of small-arms fire 0.6-0.8km west of the SMM’s position, near the UAV.

Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Kruta Hora (16km north-west of Luhansk) on 29 October, the SMM heard an uncountable number of artillery explosions, bursts of heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire approximately 15km north-west over a 30-minute period. The SMM assessed that the origin of the fire was a training range near government-controlled Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk), outside of the security zone.

While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov) on the night of 29-30 October, the SMM heard 21 explosions (assessed as artillery) about 10km west-south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) on 30 October the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions about 5km south-east. While in “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard two explosions 5km west.

The SMM followed up reports of shelling and civilian casualties. In the Kirovskyi district of “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed ongoing repairs to the damaged roof of a three-storey building at Kokinaki Street no. 73. A woman working in a store nearby told the SMM that at about 18:40 on 27 October 2016 she had heard six explosions. Contrary to reports in local media, the woman had not been injured in the shelling. At Mikroraion Stroitel no. 10, a male resident told the SMM that at around 19:00 on 27 October he had heard four explosions, was thrown against a wall and sustained cuts from flying glass. At Gazetny Pereulok no. 7 three civilians, reported to have been injured, told the SMM that they had in fact not been injured. In their apartment the SMM observed broken windows and holes in the walls. The SMM did not observe any damage at Heroev Stalingratsev Street. Staff at Hospital no. 1 in Makiivka told the SMM that no injured civilians had been admitted on 27 or 28 October.

In “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk the SMM observed three fresh craters. Two impacts were found next to residential buildings and another was seen in a field, which the SMM assessed to have been caused by artillery shells (152mm) fired from a north-westerly direction. No injuries were reported. In the presence of a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and assembled media, the SMM observed that the walls of nearby houses were damaged by shrapnel and windows were broken. Gas and electric lines were damaged and the SMM observed that there was no gas or power utilities were out. In nearby “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk) two women and armed “LPR” members separately told the SMM that they had heard explosions in the area of Pervomaisk at around 23:30 on 28 October.

An armed “LPR” member in Kalynove told the SMM that there had been an exchange of fire between “LPR” members and the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the nights of 28-29 and 29-30 October. At a checkpoint in nearby government-controlled Popasna, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier also told the SMM that there had been firing on the night of 29-30 October. The SMM saw, for the first time, one unexploded mortar (120mm) embedded in the road next to a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, assessed as fired from an easterly direction. At another Ukrainian Armed Forces position west of Popasna, an officer from the JCCC showed the SMM three craters. Two craters on the road were assessed as caused by artillery (122mm) with a third impact (next to the road) likely caused by mortar (120mm), all of which were assessed as fired from an easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, were not observed doing so in any of the three areas. The JCCC, tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, was not observed doing so in any of the three areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

The SMM did not observe any disengagement in any of the three areas on 29 and 30 October.

On the side not controlled by the government of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), mine hazard signs on the road and the lack of security guarantees prevented the SMM from monitoring in the area of the railway bridge on 29 and 30 October. Positioned just outside of the disengagement area on 30 October the SMM saw a Ural truck full of logs and transporting three “LPR” members outside the disengagement area, heading north in the direction of an “LPR” checkpoint. On the government-controlled side, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC told the SMM that no disengagement or demining would take place on 30 October.

The SMM continued to face freedom of movement restrictions in the disengagement area between government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).*      On 30 October the road from government-controlled Zolote-3 to “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk was blocked with anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) and concrete slabs. On 29 October at a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area the SMM was prevented from accessing surrounding fields and areas away from main roads, as an “LPR” member told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed. The SMM was not able to proceed on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km north-west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM contacted a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC who said that access was blocked and did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), mine hazard signs and the lack of security guarantees from “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling on the road west out of the village. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) along the north side of the disengagement area, because, he said, the road had still not been demined. 

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in government-controlled Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) moving south from government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); one anti-tank guided missile system (9K111, Fagot, 120mm) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), and a self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system (2k22 Tunguska, 220mm) near government-controlled Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas the SMM observed 29 tanks (T-72) at government-controlled Kostiantynivka train station; and twelve self-propelled artillery (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), six self-propelled artillery (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten anti-tank guns (MT12 Rapira, 100mm) each towed by an APC (MTLB), six anti-tank missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S) mounted with an anti-tank missile launcher (9K114, 130mm) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) loaded on carriages at a railway station in government-controlled Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm). The SMM observed that the following weapons continued to be absent: ten self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), missing since 19 September; 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), missing since 19 May; 30 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), missing since 13 August; four surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm), missing since 13 August, and three anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) missing since 6 April. Three holding areas continued to be abandoned, with the following weapons missing: eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), one surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm), 19 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone.[2] In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) with a 73mm cannon moving north in the direction of Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) on 29 October; an armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-70) stationary in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk) on 30 October; an IFV (BMP-1) stationary in Stanytsia Luhanska on 29 October and three stationary IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BRDM) on 30 October; an IFV (BMP-1) at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint close to the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska on 30 October; an APC (BRDM-2) stationary in Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk) on 29 October; a stationary APC (MTLB) in Artema (26km north of Luhansk) on 29 October; a stationary APC (MTLB, SNAR-10) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) on 30 October; an IFV (BMP-1) near Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk) on 30 October; an APC (BTR 80) near Orikhove-Donetske on 29 October; three armoured vehicles (including one BMP-2, one likely a BMP-2) stationary in Popasna on 30 October; three IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna on 30 October; one IFV (BMP-1) on a trailer heading south towards Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) on 29 October; and one stationary APC (MTLB) near Shchastia on 30 October.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In an area east of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, “DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and south of “DPR”-controlled Patriotychne (35km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire so that workers could repair high-voltage power lines that were damaged by recent shelling. The SMM observed three fresh impacts, two of which had damaged the power lines, and assessed them to have been caused by artillery (122mm) fired from a west-north-westerly direction. An hour after repair works had started, the SMM heard explosions assessed as outgoing rounds south-east of its position, and all those present left the area given the security concerns. After JCCC officers arranged another window of silence, the SMM and the repair team returned to the site, but had to leave within 30 minutes when explosions were heard 1.5km west-south-west. The repairs were not completed.

The SMM monitored three border areas not controlled by the government. Positioned at the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 39 covered trucks, 68 cars, two buses and one minibus and waiting to leave Ukraine. Over 35 minutes of monitoring at the Ulianivske pedestrian border crossing point (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw one man entering Ukraine. At the Krasnodarskyi-1 pedestrian border crossing point (56km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed - over a period of 30 minutes - two people exiting and three entering Ukraine. At the nearby Krasnodarskyi-2 pedestrian border crossing point (57km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed - over 20 minutes of monitoring - 13 people entering and one person exiting Ukraine.

On 29 October the SMM monitored a “march for justice” in Lviv in support of “political prisoners” and against “dictatorship laws”. The march was organized by the Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People's Self-Defence, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Svoboda youth wing “Sokil”, White Croats and C14. Around 130 people took part and some carried flags of their organizations and the national flag. The SMM observed some of those marching carrying tyres and petrol bombs, which they set aside and did not ignite. Two police vehicles accompanied the marchers along with seven police officers (five men, two women). The event passed off peacefully. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 29 October a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) on the road to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), because, according to him, the road was mined.
• On 29 October and 30 October, while near the “LPR” checkpoint on the south side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a sign warning of the presence of mines prevented the SMM from proceeding to the railway bridge and surrounding area on four separate occasions. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 29 October the SMM was prevented from travelling on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Popasna (69km north-west of Luhansk). A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC told the SMM that the road may be mined and did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.
• On 29 October the presence of anti-tank obstacles (“Czech hedgehogs”) and concrete blocks prevented the SMM from travelling between government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer from the JCCC told the SMM that the road was blocked.
• On 29 and 30 October at a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area the SMM was prevented from accessing surrounding fields and areas off of main roads, as an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that its safety there was not guaranteed due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 29 and 30 October the SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from both sides. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. On 30 October, the SMM observed that the road was blocked with concrete slabs, in addition to being blocked with barbed wire. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 29 October Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in government-controlled Novozvanivka, did not allow the SMM to closely observe a covered military vehicle that was partly visible from the road. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel then told the SMM to leave the area.
• On 30 October the SMM could not travel on the road west out of Petrivske due to the presence of mine hazard signs and the lack of security guarantees from “DPR” members. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 30 October the SMM were prevented from travelling between government-controlled Zolote-3 and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk due to concrete barriers blocking the road and signs warning of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC officer on the ground, who did not assist the SMM.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.