Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 28 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period, mostly in areas around Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport and Svitlodarsk. In Luhansk region, the SMM also recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties and shelling in Makiivka, Novokyivka, Pivnichne, Bakhmut and Ananivka. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines and was not allowed to check the serial numbers of weapons in two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas. Its freedom of movement was restricted on two occasions in “DPR”-controlled areas south of Donetsk city.*

The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including almost 300 explosions compared with nearly 800 in the previous reporting period, mostly in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport triangle and around Svitlodarsk.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 27-28 October, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west. On the same night, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded two undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east. During the day the SMM heard a total of 19 explosions while positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk): two assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (one 82mm and one 120mm), eight undetermined explosions, six assessed as outgoing recoilless gun rounds (SPG-9, 73mm), two assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, and one assessed as a rocket-propelled-grenade round; all 2-4km south-east of its position. Positioned at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 4-7km north-east and a four-minute exchange of intense heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-5km north and north-north-east, followed by a three-minute exchange of intense heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-5km north-north-west. The SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded one explosion assessed as an impact and four airbursts 5-7km north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 27-28 October the SMM heard 108 undetermined explosions and approximately 260 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-7km south-east.

On the evening and night of 27 October, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded an exchange of fire which began with 13 explosions assessed as impacts 3-4km north-north-east of its location. In the ensuing exchange the camera recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east, two rocket-assisted projectiles fired from south to north, eight indirect rocket-assisted projectiles fired from westerly to easterly directions, three rocket-assisted projectiles and 37 bursts of tracer rounds fired from east to west, two undetermined explosions, and five explosions assessed as impacts; all at unknown distances north-north-east. At various locations east of Mariupol the SMM heard 24 explosions over the course of the day: in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds at unknown distances north and north-north-east, 700m south of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) four explosions assessed as impacts at unknown distances north-north-east, 3km south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km south-east of Mariupol) three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds at unknown distances north and north-north-east and two undetermined explosions at unknown distances north-west, in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance north-north-west, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) three undetermined explosions 1.5km west-north-west and three undetermined explosions at an unknown distance west-south-west, and 3.2km north-north-east of government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) five explosions assessed as impacts 10km south-south-east (the SMM also saw, not only heard the latter).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions compared with 11 during the previous reporting period. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Khriashchivka (22km east of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2-3km north-east, in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (62km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5km south-west, in government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 10km west, and in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance south-east.

The SMM followed up reports of shelling and civilian casualties. The SMM was able to confirm six reported civilian casualties in Makiivka’s Kirovskyi district (“DPR”-controlled, 12km north-east of Donetsk). At Gazetnyi Lane 7 the SMM met an elderly woman who had sustained cuts on her face. The daughter of the victim told the SMM that she and her son had been thrown to the floor of their apartment at approximately 19:00 on 27 October by explosions that had shattered the windows of their apartment and injured her mother. The SMM entered an apartment in the same building and observed shattered windows and shrapnel damage to the walls of the apartment. A middle-aged woman told the SMM that she had been thrown to the floor by an explosion and received bruises to the forehead and other parts of her body. At the entrance of another stairwell of the same building the SMM observed shattered windows, shrapnel damage to metal pipes in front of the entrance and a large pool of blood. Local residents indicated to the SMM that a civilian man had died at this location. A woman in her fifties told the SMM that at approximately 19:00, after hearing several explosions; she had exited the building due to fear of a fire from damaged gas lines and saw her neighbour dead on the ground. The SMM assessed that a projectile had hit the north-western-facing wall of the building and left a large hole next to the main entrance, destroyed the steel support in the walls and shattered windows. Nearby, at house number ten in “kvartal Stroyitel”, the SMM observed a hole in the wall of the building and shrapnel damage to the walls of the building and shattered windows. The SMM assessed that a projectile had hit the north-facing side of the building. Based on the size, shape and position of the two impact sites (located on the two aforementioned buildings) the SMM assessed that they were caused by artillery rounds of at least 122mm fired from a north-westerly direction. An elderly female resident of the second building told the SMM that she had been thrown against the wall by a blast at approximately 19:20 on 27 October and had suffered cuts from flying glass to her left arm, leg and back. The woman and her daughter told the SMM that another woman was injured on the sixth floor of the building. The SMM was unable to proceed to the sixth floor as a section of the stairs was destroyed. At another apartment in the same building a woman told the SMM that her son (26 years of age) sustained injuries to his arms and chests from broken glass at around 19:00 the previous evening. At house number four in “kvartal Stroyitel” (located adjacent to house number ten) the SMM observed a pool of blood and spoke with two male residents who stated that a father, mother and daughter had been returning home to the apartment when an explosion had occurred. The father had died on the spot while the daughter had sustained injuries. At a hospital in Donetsk, medical personnel told the SMM that a six-year-old girl (the aforementioned daughter of the man who had died) had been delivered to the hospital at approximately 20:50 on 27 October from Makiivka. The SMM met with the girl and noted that she had shrapnel wounds to her cheek, eye, face and left ear. The medical personnel told the SMM that her left jaw was broken and that she would require surgery.

At the city morgue in Makiivka a man told the SMM that two bodies were delivered to the morgue at approximately 21:00 on 27 October. According to the man, a post-mortem analysis revealed that the cause of death in one case (from house four in “kvartal Stroyitel”, see above) was trauma to the head and neck, and in the other case (at seven Gazetnyi Lane, see above) shrapnel injuries to the chest area which had damaged internal organs. The SMM observed the bodies and noted that visible injuries to the bodies coincided with the description provided by the man.

Approximately 1.5km south of “LPR”-controlled Novokyivka (26km east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a crater, which it assessed to be three to four days old, a few meters from the side of the road. The SMM assessed the impact as caused by an anti-tank guided missile (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) fired from a northerly direction.

In government-controlled Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed broken windows and shrapnel damage to the fence of a house. The head of the city administration told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 27 October and a resident confirmed that the shelling had taken place at 06:50 on 27 October.

Medical personnel at a hospital in government-controlled Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that an injured person had been brought to the hospital from the Maiorsk entry-exit checkpoint on the morning of 26 October. According to the medical personnel, the man, who had a pre-existing disability (deaf), suffered a shrapnel wound to his knee caused by an explosive device while walking from “DPR”-controlled Horlivka towards government-controlled areas after the last “DPR” checkpoint.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The Armed Forces and armed formations, obliged under the Decision to remove or fence off explosive objects and ensure safety and secure access for the SMM to the disengagement areas, were observed doing so in one of the three areas. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), tasked by the Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group on mine action of 3 March 2016 to carry out the overall co-ordination of demining work and repeatedly tasked to contribute to rapid response to impediments to monitoring by the SMM, during the reporting period was observed doing so in one of the three areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.

On the “LPR” side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM was restricted from travelling towards the railway bridge due to the presence of mine hazard signs on the road and the lack of security guarantees. The SMM did not observe any sign of disengagement on either side of the bridge. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present near the bridge told the SMM that there were no plans to proceed with disengagement or with demining that day.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the road to “DPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) would be cleared of mines. The SMM observed as demining work commenced along the road. Shortly after 12:30 the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the government-controlled section of the road leading south to Pervomaisk had been cleared of mines. Similar security guarantees regarding the “LPR”-controlled section had already been provided in previous weeks. Shortly after, the SMM travelled south to north through the disengagement area, from the “LPR”-controlled section to the government-controlled section.

In “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), the SMM was unable to travel on the road west of Petrivske due to the presence of mine hazard signs and the lack of security guarantees.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line the SMM observed 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near government-controlled Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk) and four multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside of assigned areas, the SMM observed, in government-controlled areas 18 tanks (T-72) travelling to Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) railway station and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and at least ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Druzhkivka railway station (72km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM noted as present four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM noted as missing six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm; first noted as missing on 2 May 2016) and 59 towed howitzers (41 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, two first noted as missing on 22 September 2016, 24 in April and May 2016 and 15 missing for the first time; and 18 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm, noted as missing since 8 March and 6 April 2016). The SMM observed that five such areas were abandoned, two for the first time. In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) but was not allowed to approach the weapons and verify their serial numbers.*

The SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed as missing 77 tanks (30 T-72 first noted as missing on 2 July 2016, ten T-72 and six T-64 first noted as missing on 31 March 2016, and 31 T-72 noted as missing for the first time) and six mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm; first noted as missing on 31 March 2016). The SMM noted 17 tanks (T-64) as present for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC; BRDM-2) in Stanytsia Luhanska (outside the disengagement area) and four IFVs (two BMP-1) and two APCs near Mariupol. In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at a checkpoint south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB) in Kalynove (59km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed what appeared to be three fake mortar tubes in a field approximately 800m from “DPR”-controlled Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk). They were unprotected and had neither ammunition nor mortar plates.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint at the southern edge of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area, an “LPR” member told the SMM that its safety in surrounding fields and areas off of main roads was not guaranteed due to the possible presence of mines/UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• While near the “LPR” checkpoint on the south side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM attempted to access the road towards the railway bridge but could not proceed due to the presence of mine hazard signs and lack of security guarantees. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not able to proceed on the road west of Petrivske due to the presence of mine hazard signs and the lack of security guarantees. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and armed “LPR” members present at the respective checkpoints on both sides told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was not allowed to approach weapons to verify serial numbers at two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas.
• The SMM was stopped by an armed man at a “DPR”-controlled checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk) and prevented from proceeding into the village. The SMM did not enter the village and travelled on towards Bila Kamianka.
• Armed men stopped the SMM 700m east of “DPR”-controlled Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and prevented it from proceeding west toward the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• The SMM was stopped by armed men at a “DPR” checkpoint at the south-western outskirts of Donetsk city and instructed to join a queue of approximately 50 civilian cars. The patrol continued via an alternative route and informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.