Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 9 October 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 150 and 127 explosions on 8 and 9 October, respectively, compared with 363 explosions recorded on 7 October. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations on 8 October and 47 explosions on 9 October, compared with 29 explosions on 7 October. The Mission followed up on reports of civilian casualties, an explosion and a shelling. The Mission monitored the withdrawal of weapons and saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During the reporting period the Mission could not verify the status of disengagement in the Zolote and Petrivske areas due to restrictions to its access.* On 9 October the SMM noted that no disengagement took place in the Stanytsia Luhanska area, where it also faced restrictions to its access. The Mission observed mine hazard signs and new UXO in the security zone, including near populated areas. The SMM monitored six border areas not controlled by the Government.* The SMM noted a calm situation along the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 150 and 127 explosions on 8 and 9 October, respectively, compared with 363 explosions recorded on 7 October. [1]

On the night of 7-8 October, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions at a range of 5 to10km south-south-west of its location.

On the same night, between 19:18 and 20:45, while in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eleven explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (82mm), three shots assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km south-south-east of its location. While in Horlivka (“DPR”-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) between 19:35 and 20:15, the SMM heard 36 shots assessed as outgoing anti-aircraft gun fire (ZU-23, 23mm) and nine shots assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds 4-5km south of its location.

The following day, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions, at least four shots of cannon fire and twelve shots of small-arms fire 2-10km north, west, and south-west of its position in Yasynuvata (“DPR”-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), within half an hour in the morning, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3km south-east of its position.

During the night of 8-9 October, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 6-8km south of its location. On the same night, while in Svitlodarsk, between 19:47 and 20:52, the SMM heard 20 explosions, 17 of which it assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 3-7km south-east and south-south-east of its location.

On 9 October, the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 33 impacts from unknown weapons, 3-5km south-east of its location. Positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions, two shots of automatic-grenade launcher, twelve shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) cannon (30mm), and more than 200 bursts of small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire, all 2-5km west of its position.

Positioned in Berdianske (government-controlled, 18km east-northeast of Mariupol) the SMM heard within 30 minutes around noon on 8 October ten undetermined explosions and shortly thereafter, within 20 minutes, 25 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, all 1-1.5km north of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol) on 9 October, the SMM heard 13 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds (calibre undetermined), approximately 2km south-west of its position.

On the night of 7-8 October the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded an exchange of fire, including four undetermined explosions, which began with seven tracer bursts from west-south-west to east-north-east, followed by two single tracers of direct fire from east-north-east to west-south-west and further exchange of fire for about 90 minutes, at an unknown distance north and north-east of its location. On 8 October, the camera recorded one airburst at an unknown distance north-east of its location in the early afternoon. In the evening, it recorded four shots of direct tracer fire (two fired from west to east and two from north-west to south-east, in sequence) at an unknown distance north-east of its location.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations during the day on 8 October. In the night hours of 8 October, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions, approximately 5km north-west of its location, and seven undetermined explosions, 10km at an undetermined direction, within 30 minutes. During the day on 9 October, positioned in government-controlled Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of an explosion, shelling, and civilian casualties. The SMM continued to follow up on an explosion in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk (see SMM Daily Report 6 October 2016). On 5 October a “DPR” member present at the scene of the explosion told the SMM that he did not consider the explosion the result of shelling. On 7 October, the SMM spoke to a resident, who said that the large explosion he had heard in the morning of 5 October had been caused by a truck transporting ammunition exploding in the vicinity of the Kalmius railway station. According to the interlocutor, the explosion had been caused by errors in the transportation of the ammunition and had led to the deaths of six “DPR” members.

On 8 October, accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM visited five impact sites in the vicinity of Oleksandrivka (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). Residents of the affected areas told the SMM that shelling had occurred between 22:00 on 7 October and 01:30 on 8 October. At the first site, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the garden to the west of a house and four blown-out west-facing windows. At the second site, the SMM saw that a west-facing roof and wall of an outhouse had been punctured by what seemed as shrapnel. Three east-facing windows on an adjacent structure had also been blown out, while a gas can next to the structure was perforated by shrapnel and appeared to be leaking gas. At the third site, the SMM saw one damaged west-facing window. At the fourth site, the SMM saw damage to a north-facing window and, at the fifth site - signs of an impact north of a house.

On 8 October, in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the outer, north-east-facing wall of a house, which was freshly patched with cement, a north-east-facing window pierced, and the walls of a room possibly damaged by a ricocheting bullet. The SMM also observed a round hole in the adjacent garage wall. The owner of the house said it had been hit at approximately 22:00 on 7 October.

On 9 October, the SMM followed up on reports of shelling and civilian casualties in “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM saw 19 fresh craters and assessed that at least 14 of them had been caused by recoilless gun rounds (SPG) fired from a south-westerly direction, while at least one had been caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from the same direction, the tail fin of which was visible in the crater. The SMM saw ten houses damaged (shrapnel damage to roofs, windows, walls and gates) and residents told the SMM that two residents (women, 67 and 56 years) had been wounded. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 8 October between 13:30 and 18:00. At the hospital in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) medical personnel told the SMM that the casualties had been admitted on 9 October, one of the women had shrapnel wounds, while the other had more serious wounds to her chest and stomach, which required surgery.

On 9 October, in Novooleksandrivka (67km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the roof and walls of an abandoned farm. In the yards of two houses, the SMM saw two craters it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds and saw broken windows at both houses, which the owners said had occurred two nights before. In Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a fresh crater in a yard in a residential area and shrapnel in its vicinity, and observed minor damage to the gas pipeline and the overhead electrical cables nearby. The surrounding houses had shrapnel damage to the north-facing walls and broken windows. Those inhabited houses were no more than 25m from the crater. Residents told the SMM that the impact had happened on the night of 8 October. The SMM saw ongoing repairs to the power lines and was told by residents that the gas pipe had already been fixed.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to attempt getting full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) through patrolling and remote observation, as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access was restricted in all three disengagement areas,* but the SMM was present on both sides of the contact line in all three areas, on both days, and able to monitor some parts of the disengagement areas, including through the use of mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

On 8 October, at the government-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the disengagement process would begin on 9 October, but orders had not been received on the time. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC then showed the SMM the railway bunker (see SMM Daily Report 7 October 2016), inside which the SMM saw two armed Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers. On 9 October, at 10:57, the SMM saw “LPR” members launch one white flare round from the “LPR”-controlled area of the bridge. Senior “LPR” members and Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were present at the site. At 11:47, at the government-controlled side of the bridge the SMM saw about 20 vehicles (with approximately 80 passengers) driving in circle in the area of the checkpoint and conducting a protest. Passengers honked their horns and displayed Ukrainian flags, along with an Azov battalion flag. The protest was peaceful and lasted for about two hours. At 11:50, the SMM was informed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the JCCC that no disengagement would happen on 9 October. A senior “LPR” member then told the SMM positioned at the “LPR”-controlled side of the bridge that a notification letter concerning the “LPR” readiness to disengage on 10 October at 13:00 will be handed over to the SMM. The SMM was not able to access the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area) from either side of the contact line due to possible presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO).* The SMM noted that the wooden ramp at the broken part of the bridge remained in poor condition.

On 8 October, at the Zolote side of the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that no information about demining activities in the area had been provided to him. The SMM did not observe any demining activity throughout the day. At the Pervomaisk side of the disengagement area, but outside the area itself, two armed “LPR” members told the SMM no information was available regarding demining activities or the opening of the crossing route. The SMM noted that no Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were present throughout the day. The SMM continued to see mine hazard signs to the north, south and east of the new “LPR” checkpoint at the edge of the disengagement area. The SMM also saw that the concrete barrier to the right of the checkpoint, aside the road, had been removed. Armed “LPR” members at the checkpoint told the SMM again that five days before the area on the “LPR” side had been demined along 1km up to the contact line, to the cemetery in Pervomaisk, on both sides of the road.

On 9 October, no Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the JCCC were present throughout the day at the Pervomaisk side of the disengagement area. The SMM was not able to proceed further from either side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route due to possible presence of mines and UXO.*

The SMM noted a calm situation in the vicinity of the Petrivske-Bohdanivka disengagement area on 8 and 9 October. The SMM saw some mine hazard signs, which it had previously noted as not present, were again put up (see SMM Daily Report 4 October 2016). In the village the SMM observed fresh tracks (consistent with military tracked vehicles) on the asphalt road. At noon on 8 October, the SMM saw two armed “DPR” members in military-style attire coming from the direction of the disengagement area, each carrying a sniper rifle. On the same day, accompanied by Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC, the SMM attempted to enter the disengagement area from the government-controlled side. However, a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC did not obtain security guarantees from the “DPR” “commander” in the area. The former JCCC officer also did not assist in ensuring security for the SMM to travel on the road towards Petrivske, due to the presence of mines at the road, as previously reported. The SMM, accompanied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officer, attempted to visit the Ukrainian Armed Forces unit withdrawn from the disengagement area, but was denied access by the officer in charge. On 9 October, the SMM noted that no Russian Federation Armed Forces JCCC officers were present to assist in ensuring security for the SMM to access the disengagement area.* Positioned on the road west of Petrivske, the SMM spoke to a resident who said that the night had been quiet and there were only eight families and a couple of single pensioners still living in the village. In Bohdanivka, the SMM was again prevented from accessing the disengagement area along the road towards Petrivske as no Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC was present to assist in ensuring security for the SMM.* The SMM continued to be prevented from verifying disengagement as it did not have full access to the disengagement area.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 8 October the SMM saw seven multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad,122mm) on the outskirts of Soledar (79km north-east of Donetsk) and eight MLRS (BM-21 Grad,122mm), at the eastern entrance of government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk. On 9 October, the SMM saw three tanks (T-64B) on flatbed trucks 2km south-east of “DPR”-controlled Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk) travelling north-west on the T0509 road and one self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery system (2S6, Tunguska, 220mm) transported on a trailer near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites the SMM observed six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and one towed howitzer (possible D-20, 152mm) on road T0515 moving in the direction of government-controlled Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk, respectively).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: 21 anti-tank guns (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM noted as missing one anti-tank gun (2A29/MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), as first noted on 24 April 2016. The SMM also visited for the first time two new areas, based on information received by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, where the SMM noted for the first time 31 towed howitzers (13 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; and 18 2A36, Giatsint-B, 152mm) but the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present prevented the SMM from recording the serial numbers of the latter weapons.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles [2] in the security zone. The SMM saw in government-controlled areas: near the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge: one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-3) mounted with a heavy machine-gun (30mm) moving north and four infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs; BMP-2) parked in the yards of civilian houses, all inside the disengagement area; one IFV (BMP-2) stationary by the wall of a house, outside the disengagement area. Also in government-controlled areas the SMM saw two APCs (BTR-3) each mounted with a heavy machine-gun (30mm) near a checkpoint in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and one APC (MTLB) near Shchastia; and one APC (BTR-60) in Teple (30km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine hazard signs near populated areas. Near the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the H20 road north-east of Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw for the first time a used rocket-propelled grenade tube and a possible live round of a hand-held grenade launcher. Both pieces of UXO were located in immediate proximity (5 and 2m respectively) to a long queue of civilian cars, with the second piece located in the central reservation of the H20 highway. In Pionerske (government-controlled, 14km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that mine hazard signs, which it had seen there on 3 October, were no longer present, although the red and white tape was lying on the ground. On 9 October, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw two 122mm projectiles, installed as if prepared for a remote detonation. The SMM continued to see that the area parallel to the path leading to the ferry crossing point in Zhovte was contaminated with mines and UXO. The SMM saw that the condition of the three painted wooden mine hazard signs previously observed had deteriorated and they were less legible.

The SMM observed a calm situation in six border areas currently not under government control, and was limited in its access at four.* On 8 October, at the Voznesenivka border crossing point (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw 49 civilian cars queuing to exit Ukraine (41 of those had Ukrainian, six had Russian Federation and two had Georgian licence plates). In addition, 53 cars were parked adjacent the crossing point (48 had Ukrainian licence plates the remainder had Russian Federation licence plates), and six taxis. Within an hour, the SMM saw two covered cargo trucks arrive, and a bus marked “Sverdlovsk–Gukovo” with about 20 passengers. The SMM saw 14 cars enter Ukraine in that period (six had Russian Federation licence plates, eight had Ukrainian licence plates). On 9 October, at the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 32 civilian cars (18 with Ukrainian licence plates, one with “DPR” plates, 13 with Russian Federation licence plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), as well as two covered commercial trucks (both with Ukrainian licence plates), queuing to exit Ukraine. Within half an hour, the SMM saw approximately ten vehicles (five cars, two covered commercial trucks and one bus) enter Ukraine. At the Uspenka crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw one civilian vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as twenty covered commercial trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. Within one hour, the SMM saw approximately ten vehicles leave Ukraine. At the Ulianivske pedestrian crossing point (61km south-east of Donetsk) within half an hour the SMM saw one woman in her sixties exit Ukraine. At the Krasnodarskyi-1 pedestrian border crossing point (56km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw eight parked cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates). Within half an hour, the SMM saw nine people exit Ukraine and 12 people enter. At the nearby Krasnodarskyi-2 pedestrian border crossing point (57km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw one parked car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and in 20 minutes saw seven people enter Ukraine and one exit.

In the area of the administrative boundary line between the mainland and Crimea the SMM observed a calm situation. On 7 October, the SMM saw that the border guard post near Chervonyi Chaban (113km south-east of Kherson), which it had previously observed abandoned (see SMM Daily Report 5 October 2016), was again staffed and in use.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• On 8 and 9 October, in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM was not able to proceed towards the disengagement area on three occasions as Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October, in government-controlled Bohdanivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present was unable to facilitate access and thus the SMM was not able to visit the withdrawn Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and equipment in their new location. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to record the serial numbers of weapons at a holding area. 
• On 9 October, the SMM was unable to proceed east from Bohdanivka towards the disengagement area on the road leading to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) due to Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel warning it of the possible presence of mines east of their previous forward position on the road (see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2016). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October the SMM was not able to proceed from government-controlled Popasna to Katerynivka (69 and 64km west of Luhansk, respectively) (see SMM Daily Report 7 October 2016) due to the possible presence of mines on the road. On the road, south-west of Katerynivka, the SMM saw for the first time wooden obstacles, with a sign stating that vehicle traffic was allowed from 07:00 until 18:00. Above the sign there was also a new mine hazard sign. Later in the day, the SMM saw that the mine hazard sign had been removed. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October, at the junction of E-58 road with the road to Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km east-north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members denied the SMM access to a structure at the front of a roadblock, citing security concerns. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October, on the “LPR”-controlled side of the closed Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route an armed “LPR” warned the SMM of the presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October at an “LPR” checkpoint immediately south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM not to proceed further to the railway bridge (inside the disengagement area), citing security concerns, including mine contamination. The SMM saw a mine hazard sign at the beginning of the road. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 October, the SMM was not able to access the road leading to the hill west of the Prince Ihor monument in “LPR”-controlled areas south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM noted that a previously observed anti-personnel mine (MON-90) on the edge of the road was not present.
• On 8 and 9 October, the SMM was unable to enter the disengagement area on the Zolote-Pervomaisk road as the Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officer in charge of disengagement stated that no information of demining of the road had been received and he could not assist in ensuring security for the SMM.
• On 8 and 9 October, in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM was unable to proceed from the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the bridge towards the “LPR”-controlled side because Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM the area had not been cleared of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 8 and 9 October, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Shchastia bridge the SMM could not proceed towards government-controlled areas because “LPR” armed members told the SMM that the area had not been cleared of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• On 8 October, an armed “LPR” member denied the SMM access to an area beyond the first barrier at “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka border crossing point unless he noted down the SMM members’ names and ID numbers. The SMM complied and was given a temporary access card to the administrative zone, but had to sign for receiving the access cards. This is the first time the SMM faced this procedure. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 9 October, at the Marynivka border crossing point an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to the documents checking area. 
• On 9 October, at the Uspenka border crossing point an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to the documents checking area.
• On 9 October, at the Ulianivske border crossing point an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to the “customs” area.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.