Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 27 June 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations  in Donetsk region compared to 25 and 26 June respectively, particularly in the southern Donetsk region. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. It conducted crater analysis in Horlivka, Troitske and Popasna. The Mission noted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM observed significantly shorter queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line at Marinka, Olenivka and Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, and facilitated repairs to essential infrastructure between Trokhizbenka and Pryshyb. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted on three occasions in non-government-controlled areas.*

The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to 25 and 26 June respectively.

During the night of 26 June, the SMM registered ceasefire violations at known hotspots along the contact line. The SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 15 explosions, 11 of which were assessed as impacts at a range of 2 to 7km east-south-east, south-east and east of its location.  

Positioned in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 10-15km north-north west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 44 explosions, 23 of which were assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds (including 15 explosions assessed as impacts) 3-6km east-south-east and south-east of its position. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions 6-12km north-north-west and west of its position and saw multiple small-arms tracer shots fired vertically 6km west of its position.  

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 42 undetermined explosions, as well as, in sequence: two bursts fired west to east, two bursts fired east to west, five bursts fired west to east, one burst fired east to west and one burst fired west to east, all at an unknown distance to the north.

During the day on 27 June, the SMM heard at least 386 explosions (70 assessed as caused by recoilless guns (SPG-9) the remainder undetermined), including 26 undetermined explosions within 15 minutes in the afternoon, as well as numerous bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an unknown distance south-east of its position in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol). Whilst in Kominternove, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions at unknown distance east and north-east of its position and four undetermined explosions at unknown distance to the west.

Whilst in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 26 explosions, including 12 explosions assessed as automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east of its position within two minutes in the morning, as well as two mortar (82mm) explosions at unknown distance west of its position later in the day.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis. In Horlivka the SMM saw the body of a deceased man (approximately 50 years old) in a house and saw a fresh crater 20cm from the west-facing wall of the house. At another house, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the west-facing wall and the west-facing part of the roof of a garden shed. The residents of the second house told the SMM that the husband of the family (approximately 30 years old) had been severely injured by shrapnel when a projectile exploded near the house. The surgeon in Horlivka central hospital confirmed to the SMM that such a patient had been admitted in the evening of 26 June and was in a stable, but critical condition.

On 26 June the SMM analysed eight fresh craters near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and assessed them as having been caused by a heavy weapon (the precise type could not be assessed, possibly artillery). For six of the craters the SMM assessed that the projectile was fired from a south-easterly direction , one was also fired from a north-easterly direction, and for one the direction of fire could not be determined. 

On 27 June, in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on allegations of shelling of the Popasna TV tower, which, according to a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), had not been in use since May 2014. No visible signs of direct impact were observed on the tower. At a location about 400m east of the tower, the SMM observed a fresh impact crater it assessed as having been caused by a wire-guided anti-tank missile (9K111 Fagot, 120mm), fired from a south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM saw: in government-controlled areas – one tank (T-64) north of government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (75km north-west of Luhansk) being transported on a flatbed truck moving west along the highway T-1306 and four tanks (T-64) on flatbed trucks, on the same road near government-controlled Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk) driving east towards Sievierodonetsk. In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM saw: six stationary tanks (T-64) in a training area in Myrne (41km south-west of Luhansk) and four stationary tanks (T-64) in a training area in “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (32km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons as foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: an anti-tank guided missile system (9M113 Konkurs, 135mm) mounted on an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in government-controlled Avdiivka; an armoured wheeled vehicle (Kraz) assessed as equipped with two 100mm anti-tank missile systems and one 40mm automatic grenade launcher north of Vrubivka (72 km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in “LPR”-controlled areas and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisits locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such a location and observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and noted that five such howitzers were missing, as first observed on 3 March 2016.

Beyond withdrawal lines and outside storage sites the SMM saw ten self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and seven anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by APCs (MTLB) stationary in government-controlled Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed significantly shorter queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At a government checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM observed 91 civilian vehicles queuing to travel to government-controlled areas and nine civilian vehicles queuing to travel in the opposite direction. At a “DPR” checkpoint in Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM noted 78 vehicles waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas and 14 vehicles queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

On 26 June, at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed no queues in either direction.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM facilitated adherence to the ceasefire and monitored on both sides of the contact line ongoing repair works to the gas pipeline system between government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk).

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) and claimed the SMM could only monitor the centre of the village. The SMM informed the JCCC and monitored in the centre of the village only.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk, 60km south-east of Luhansk) and asked to see the SMM patrol plan. The SMM did not comply, informed the JCCC and after 90 minutes left the area.
• Two armed “LPR” members denied the SMM access to areas south-east of “LPR”-controlled Pionerske (19km east of Luhansk), where the SMM had had an observation point, but allowed it to visit the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.