Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 21 June 2016
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded over 40 explosions during the night of 20 June, while it did not record any ceasefire violations during daytime. In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded ten explosions. The Mission conducted crater analysis and observed damage to residential houses caused by shelling in six locations on both sides of the contact line. It continued to observe significant movement of weapons in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. The SMM observed long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. The Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted on four occasions in non-government-controlled areas.*
The SMM observed less ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous day. The SMM recorded 43 explosions during the night of 20 June, while it did not record any ceasefire violations during the daytime.
Whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM recorded 33 undetermined explosions 10-12km north during the night of 20 June.
During the same night, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions assessed as caused by outgoing 73mm cannon (BMP-1) rounds 2-3km south-east of its position.
During the night of 20 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM recorded six undetermined explosions 8-10km west-south-west of its position.
In the Avdiivka/Yasynuvata area, the SMM noted a calm situation with three explosions recorded from the evening of 20 June to the morning of 21 June. The SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Donetsk) recorded two explosions in the air and one undetermined explosion 3-7km south-south-east and south-south-west of its location.
The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol), facing north, recorded uncountable tracer rounds, mostly fired from west to east, which it assessed as more than 550 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and anti-aircraft-gun (ZU-23) fire. The camera also recorded 35 illumination flares (18 from west to east, four from south-west to north-east and 13 from south-south-west to north-north-east) all at an unknown distance north of the camera.
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. Of ten explosions recorded, five were attributable to live-fire exercises near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) – outside the security zone. On the night of 20 June, whilst in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 1-1.5 km east of its position. While positioned in government-controlled Toshkivka (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km south-south-west of its position.
“LPR” members continued to maintain an armed position north of the Siverskyi Donets river, at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (see SMM Daily Report 13 June). The SMM observed that the newly-constructed Ukrainian Armed Forces third fortification (see SMM Daily Report 21 June) was staffed by one armed soldier. During the night of 20 June, whilst in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as caused by rocket-propelled-grenade (RPG) fire 3.5-4km south-west of its position. In the morning, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM observed 300 pedestrians in a queue waiting to walk across the bridge towards government-controlled areas, and no queue in the opposite direction. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM observed a queue of 500-700 people waiting to enter government-controlled areas, and no queue in the opposite direction.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. On 20 June, in a residential area of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw three impact sites, which according to residents, had resulted from shelling during the previous night. The SMM conducted analysis on three craters and assessed them as caused by armour-piercing discarding sabot rounds fired from an easterly direction. The SMM observed punctured east-facing walls of an apartment building at one site, shattered windows, an east-facing partially collapsed roof and fractured walls of an apartment building, and what it assessed to be the metal core of an anti-tank gun (100mm) round lying at the second site. At the third site, the SMM saw two holes – one on an east-facing exterior wall and another on a west-facing exterior wall of an apartment building – and assessed that a projectile had pierced through the eastern wall and exited through the western wall. The SMM also observed a pool of blood inside the building’s stairwell. A medical staff of a hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) told the SMM that a woman, who had been in the apartment at the time of shelling, had sustained shattered bones and had a metal fragment removed from her hip.
On the north-western edge of “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two fresh craters and assessed them as caused by wire-guided anti-tank missiles fired from a west-north-westerly direction. The SMM saw a two-storey house with its north-west facing upper floor and roof burned out and a severed power line. Residents stated that they had heard two loud explosions the previous evening. The SMM saw fresh traces of a tracked vehicle on the street at those sites.
In Avdiivka, the SMM saw a hole in the east-facing wall of an uninhabited house, which it assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-easterly direction. The SMM also observed damage to east-facing roof and fence of the house, and minor damage to a neighbouring inhabited house. Residents of the latter house told the SMM that they had heard two loud explosions seven minutes apart on the previous night.
On 20 June, in government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw five fresh craters in an open field and assessed them as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an easterly direction.
In government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), in the field close to a location near Ukrainian Armed Forces positions, the SMM saw 30 fresh craters and conducted analysis on eight of them. It assessed them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from an easterly direction.
In “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), the SMM conducted analysis on a fresh crater on an asphalt road 5m from an inhabited house, concluding that it had been caused by an automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS) round fired from a northerly or a north-north-westerly direction.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were present, and noted additional weapons.
Beyond the withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM observed two tanks (T-64) loaded on trailers, travelling east near government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons as foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in government-controlled Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM noted that one site was abandoned with nine Addendum-regulated tanks (T-72) missing, as observed for the first time on 14 March.
Beyond the withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) together with other hardware including seven stationary Addendum-regulated tanks (T-64) near government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). Later in the day, the SMM observed four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and two tanks (T-64) at the aforementioned location and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on trailers travelling south-east near Rubizhne. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present told the SMM that the presence of military hardware was due to a routine rotation of their units.
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone. In government-controlled areas: the SMM saw one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-4) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) on 20 June and the SMM saw one infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska. In “LPR”-controlled area, the SMM observed one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a stationary military-type truck near Smile (32km north-west of Luhansk) on 20 June.
Further to an initial enquiry of 14 June, which remained unanswered, on 21 June the SMM again asked the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) for assistance in responding to three incidents, in which an SMM foot patrol came under small-arms fire north-east of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) on 27 May (see SMM Spot Report 27 May), and the SMM loss of all communication with two long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) on 27 May and 2 June (see SMM Spot Report 27 May and SMM Spot Report 3 June). The SMM reminded the JCCC of its obligation under the Addendum to the Package to Measures of 29 September 2015 to ensure rapid response to cases of impediments to monitoring and verification by the SMM.
The SMM continued to observe long queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a government checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a queue of 400 civilian cars, ten buses and 750 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and a queue of 285 civilian cars and 70 pedestrians waiting to travel in the opposite direction. The SMM noted that 40-60 vehicles passed every hour. At a checkpoint on the south-eastern edge of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 300 civilian cars waiting to enter government-controlled areas. Several travellers (men and women, different age groups) told the SMM that they had been waiting four hours to pass the checkpoint, complaining about the absence of toilets, potable water and a medical point.
In “LPR”-controlled Khriashchivka (22km east of Luhansk), the SMM observed for the first time two improvised mine hazard signs (made of metal panel, located 8-10m apart each other, stating “Mine” in Russian) at the entrance of a walkway along the Siverskyi Donets river. In Vesela Hora, the SMM saw an anti-personnel mine laid on roadside, where the SMM saw civilian cars passing through.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
- In the southern part of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske, armed men stopped the SMM and did not allow it to proceed into the centre of the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), armed men did not allow the SMM to enter a military-type compound and asked the SMM to leave the location immediately. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (53km north-east of Mariupol), armed men denied the SMM access to a military-type compound, referring to the absence of their “superior”. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- In the vicinity of Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk), armed men demanded that the SMM leave immediately the area, where it saw forward positions.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.