Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 6 April 2016

The SMM observed a slightly lower number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In Luhansk region the situation remained relatively calm, with a low number of ceasefire violations recorded. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, and facilitate and monitor repair works on the water supply system in Slovianoserbsk. The SMM followed up on a report of shelling in Kominternove. The Mission visited two border crossing points in areas not controlled by the Government. It encountered freedom of movement restrictions on both sides of the contact line.*        

The SMM continued to record a high number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, but slightly fewer compared to the previous day.[1] The areas between “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) and government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) remained the most kinetic in Donetsk region. Positioned on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata, between 10:32 and 15:23hrs, the SMM heard 99 undetermined explosions, 40 single shots and at least 40 bursts of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1.5-7km north-north-east, north-north-west, north-west, west, west-south-west, south-west and south-south-west of its position. Whilst in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 62 explosions assessed as caused by artillery (122mm) and mortar rounds (82 and 120mm), heard 16 impacts of mortar rounds (82 and 120mm), 11 impacts of artillery rounds (122mm), four impacts of rocket propelled grenade rounds, four impacts of an automatic grenade launcher, along with 56 single shots of small-arms and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km east, north-east and south of its position.

Whilst at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) between 09:06 and 16:09hrs, the SMM heard 55 undetermined explosions, eight impacts caused by unknown ammunition, 34 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and five single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 3-8km north-north-east, north, north-north-west and north-west of its position.

Positioned in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds or 73mm cannon and multiple bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, between 20:54 on 5 April and 00:15hrs on 6 April, at unknown distances, south and south-east of its position. While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), during the evening of 5 April, the SMM heard, within 20 minutes, 12 outgoing anti-aircraft rounds along with small-arms fire 2-3km south-east of its position. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), during the evening hours of 5 April, the SMM heard, within less than 30 minutes, five outgoing anti-aircraft rounds, saw and heard four anti-aircraft airbursts and heard intermittent bursts of small-arms fire all 500m north-west of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) also recorded on 5 April three undetermined projectiles flying at an unknown distance, from south to north at 19:34hrs, from south-west to north-east at 19:43hrs and from north to south at 23:11hrs. Between 19:43 and 22:52hrs it recorded six explosions assessed as caused by outgoing rounds, 16 impacts caused by unknown ammunition, one undetermined explosion, four single shots and four bursts of small-arms fire at locations north-east and east.

In Luhansk region the situation remained relatively calm with a low number of ceasefire violations recorded, most of them assessed as live-fire training in areas outside of the security zone. Whilst in the northern outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one impact assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round 10km south of its position.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited some “DPR” permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were present.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted one towed howitzer and one tank near “DPR”-controlled Karlo-Marksove (39km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, in government-controlled areas the SMM observed: seven tanks near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk) and five mortars near the training area in government-controlled Dmytrivka (41km north of Luhansk). In non-government-controlled areas the SMM observed approximately 35 tanks near “LPR” training areas Uspenka and Myrne (23 and 28km south-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 42 self-propelled howitzers (24 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm; 18 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 21 towed howitzers (15 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; six D-20, 152mm) and eight Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm). The SMM noted that 46 self-propelled howitzers (34 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm; 12 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 24 towed howitzers (18 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm; six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm), three anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm), and two Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were missing.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed: six towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near government-controlled Vodiane (17km north-west of Donetsk); two artillery pieces each being towed by one military-type truck in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) travelling west. Also in violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers near “DPR”-controlled Karlo-Marksove.

The SMM observed the presence of other hardware within the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed three multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicles (MT-LB) near Karlivka. Two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Luhanske (60km north-east of Donetsk), two ACVs near Opytne (12km north-west of Donetsk) and three ACVs near Avdiivka were spotted by the SMM long-range UAV. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two ACVs in the vicinity of Krymske (43km north-west of Luhansk) on 5 April. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC, BTR-70), one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV, BMP-1) near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve; two BTRs, one anti-aircraft weapon (possibly ZPU-4) towed by a military-type truck in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city; one BMP-1 and one military–type truck at the “LPR” checkpoint south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). Fifteen ACVs were spotted near “DPR”-controlled Karlo-Marksove and three ACVs were spotted in the wider area of Yasynuvata by the SMM long-range UAV.

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In populated areas of “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (18km north-west of Luhansk), along the Siverskyi Donets River, the SMM observed for the first time five anti-tank mines marked with sticks with plastic bottles on top.

The SMM followed-up on reports of shelling. In “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) the acting “head” of the village reported that his house, located on the south-east edge of the village, was damaged by sniper fire at 15:00hrs on 4 April. He stated that the house was hit by three bullets. The SMM confirmed and assessed that the first bullet hit the gate of the garage and the roof of the vehicle parked inside, the second bullet hit the outside wall of the house while the third bullet passed through the window, hit the wall of the living room and recoiled hitting a table. The SMM assessed that the bullets came from a north-western direction. The SMM observed “DPR” trenches approximately 70 meters north-west of the house.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the water pump station in “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (29km north-west of Luhansk) which will provide water to Slovianoserbsk, “LPR”-controlled Zymohiria (29km west of Luhansk), and “LPR”-controlled Alchevsk (40km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM monitored from both sides of the contact line while the repairs were being conducted by the Luhansk water company.

The SMM continued to observe long queues towards government-controlled areas at checkpoints close to the contact line. At the government-controlled checkpoint at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) bridge the SMM observed at 12:45hrs approximately 400-450 civilians waiting to cross into government-controlled areas. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoints on highway H-15 near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed approximately 400 civilian cars (with Ukrainian licence numbers) and 14 buses heading towards government-controlled areas. In the afternoon hours, at the same checkpoints, the SMM observed approximately 300 civilian cars and four buses (all with Ukrainian licence plates) heading west, while 245 cars were travelling in the opposite direction. Approximately 55 pedestrians were lined up heading east (the majority over the age of 50 years and 60 per cent women).

The SMM visited areas close to the border not controlled by the Government. At the “LPR”-controlled Krasnodarskyi-1 border crossing point (57km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed 14 civilian cars (eight with Ukrainian licence plates and six with Russian Federation licence plates) queuing in front of the border crossing point. During a 30-minute period the SMM observed three pedestrians crossing into the Russian Federation and ten people (among them three children who, the SMM heard, were returning from school) entering Ukraine. The SMM spoke with the pedestrians entering Ukraine and learned that a bus takes the schoolchildren on a daily basis to and from the border crossing point. The children then walk across the border into the Russian Federation. At the “LPR”-controlled Krasnodarskyi-2 border crossing point (56km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed three civilian cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) parked near the border crossing point. During a 30-minute period, the SMM observed four pedestrians crossing into the Russian Federation and one crossing into Ukraine.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement and other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Near “LPR-controlled Nyzhnia Harasymivka (56km south-east of Luhansk), an “LPR” “border guard” stopped the SMM and said it was not allowed in the area. He then escorted the SMM out of the area.

Delay:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces serviceman delayed for 45 minutes the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol) in order to verify the presence of prohibited weapons in the security zone.

Conditional access:

• The SMM was delayed for 70 minutes at a “DPR” checkpoint on the eastern outskirts of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata. Even though the JCCC was informed, the SMM was granted passage, conditioned with accepting to be escorted by “DPR” “military police”.

• At a “DPR” checkpoint near Debaltseve, armed men demanded to see national passports of the SMM monitors. Even though the JCCC was informed, the SMM could proceed after 30 minutes, only after showing passports or copies of the passports.

Other impediments:

• On 5 April the SMM long-range UAV sustained continuous and sporadic jamming of its Global Positioning System (GPS) while flying over government-controlled areas in the vicinity of Avdiivka and west of Donetsk airport.

• On 6 April the SMM long-range UAV experienced jamming of its GPS while flying over the area near the contact line between Lozove (54km north-east of Donetsk) and Nyzhnie Lozove (61km north-east of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.