Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 11 March 2016

This report is for the media and general public.

SMM observed a sharp increase in ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the previous day. The situation remained stable in Luhansk. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons and conducted crater analysis. It continued to facilitate repair work to essential infrastructure. The SMM reached border crossing points in areas not controlled by the Government in both Luhansk and Donetsk regions. It encountered freedom-of-movement restrictions in areas not controlled by the Government, including in border areas.* The SMM observed physical confrontations at a courthouse in Odessa between Right Sector and pro-Maidan activists, and people accused of participating in 2 May 2014 clashes near the Trade Union building.

The SMM observed a sharp increase of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region.[1] Positioned in Donetsk city during the night hours of 11 March the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions and 31 single shots of small-arms fire at distances ranging from 200m-10km north and north-west of its position. While at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), between 09:13 and 16:15hrs, the SMM heard 499 undetermined explosions, 26 impacts, saw and heard 13 airbursts, and heard at least 169 bursts of small-arms, 78 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and automatic grenade launcher fire at distances of 2-10km north-north-east, north-east, north and north-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), during the afternoon and evening hours of 10 March, the SMM registered 39 explosions assessed as incoming and outgoing fire caused by rounds from an automatic grenade launcher, at least one burst assessed anti-tank gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm), and 21 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and intermittent small-arms fire at locations 2-3km south-south-east of its position. Whilst at the same location, the SMM also heard four explosions assessed as incoming and outgoing fire caused by rounds from an automatic grenade launcher, at least one burst assessed as cannon fire (BMP-1, 73mm), and 23 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and intermittent small-arms fire at locations ranging from 4-5km north-east and south-west of its position.

In the areas of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM recorded numerous ceasefire violations. Although the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) had given the SMM security assurances, firing incidents did not stop. Whilst in Yasynuvata, during a two-hour period, the SMM heard 137 undetermined explosions and multiple bursts from small arms at distances 1-7km east, west and south-west of its position. Positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 59 impacts assessed as caused by 120 and 82mm mortar fire 3-4km south and south-south-east, as well as an exchange of fire between “DPR”-controlled Mineralne (9km north-north-east of Donetsk) and the Avdiivka industrial zone (12km north of Donetsk) by intermittent small-arms and automatic grenade launcher fire. The SMM was unable to continue monitoring due to the fighting.

In Luhansk region, the situation remained relatively calm with a low number of ceasefire violations recorded. Whilst in government-controlled Troitske (69km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven explosions within ten seconds assessed as incoming artillery fire approximately 6-8km south of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 28 undetermined explosions approximately 10km south-west of its position during a four-minute period. Whilst in the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 explosions approximately 3-5km south-south-east of its position. The SMM assessed that the explosions occurred at one of the training areas located in Uspenka or “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), both outside the security zone.  

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that one tank (T-64, 125mm) was missing. At another site, it noted the presence of additional weapons, whose serial numbers were not included in the inventory list.

In violation of the relevant withdrawal line, at one such site in a “DPR”-controlled area, the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), one of which could not be verified due to a missing serial plate number.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons as foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 17 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and six towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). The SMM also noted that 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing.

In “LPR”-controlled areas beyond the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed eight howitzers in the area of Uspenka.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. In co-ordination with Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces representatives at the JCCC, the SMM monitored repair works to gas pipelines in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and repairs to electrical power lines between government-controlled Artemove (42km north-east of Donetsk) and the vicinity of the Haharina coal mine on the western outskirts of “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk). Whilst in Marinka, between 09:06 and 14:29hrs, the SMM recorded seven undetermined explosions, bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and single shots of small-arms, all at 1-5km east-north-east, south-east and east-south-east of its position. Following heavy machine-gun fire in close proximity to the on-going repair work, the JCCC relocated the repair team to a safer area and repair work continued.  The SMM also facilitated repair work on both sides of the contact line near “LPR”-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk) for an electrical repair team to conduct repairs on a high-voltage power line, accompanied by an “LPR” demining team.

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and conducted crater analysis on the “DPR”-controlled western edge of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), where it observed a crater near a house. The SMM assessed that the crater was caused by the impact of a grenade from an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17 Plamya, 30mm), fired from a north-westerly direction. The impact had not caused any damage to the house. Whilst in the village the SMM observed “DPR” members visiting houses and registering local residents.

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government* and observed a calm situation. Both in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) and Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted. The SMM observed 56 and 137 civilian cars waiting to travel into the Russian Federation at the respective crossing points. Passengers told the SMM that they expected to wait from 9 to 24 hours. At a border crossing point in Novoazovsk (53km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM noted that there were no vehicles waiting to cross the border. Whilst in Dovzhanskyi (98km south of Luhansk), the SMM observed 37 trucks (all with Ukrainian license plates) queued to cross into the Russian Federation, including 13 loaded with coal, as well as 23 passenger cars (with mixed Ukrainian and Russian Federation license plates). The SMM observed about 110 civilian cars, one large bus and 40-50 pedestrians queuing at the border crossing point in Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk) to cross into the Russian Federation.

The SMM observed construction work in preparation for opening another route for civilians crossing the contact line in government-controlled Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM saw a number of workers building a pedestrian walkway approximately 30m long and 1.5m wide, as well as making preparations in the same area for laying asphalt or cement.

On 10 March, in Odessa, the SMM monitored a district court case involving 20 people accused of participation in clashes that took place at Hretska Square on 2 May 2014. During one of the recesses, the SMM observed 20 members of the Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor) and pro-Maidan self-defence groups (all men in their twenties, some wearing camouflage) attack seven individuals - namely four male defendants, a defence attorney and two women, with pepper spray, punching two of the male defendants, in a park next to the courthouse. Twenty-five riot police moved from the courthouse to the site of the attack and defused the situation. Later, approximately 45 activists from the Right Sector, Azov Civil Corps and other pro-Maidan self-defence groups blocked the entrance to the courtroom, and a fight broke out when the defendants began entering. Fifteen police officers intervened and diffused the fight. On 11 March, the SMM observed 35 pro-Maidan self-defence activists at the courthouse, where 15 National Guard soldiers controlled the entrance to the courtroom. The deputy commander of the prevention unit of the Odessa branch of the national police told the SMM that an additional 50 police officers with riot gear and another 50 National Guard soldiers were also standing by near the court.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, and Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas alongside the border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government, and consistently demand to review SMM patrol plans.

Denial of access:

• Whilst at the non-government-controlled border crossing point in Marynivka, armed “DPR” members forcefully requested that the SMM move back 500m from the location, denied the SMM access to the passport control point, and demanded that the SMM have a “DPR” escort on the next patrol to the area. The SMM informed the JCCC headquarters in Soledar about the restrictions, but no access was granted.
• An armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access to the passport control point at the non-government-controlled border crossing point in Uspenka, citing the need for permission from “his superiors.”

Conditional access:

• At the “LPR” checkpoint south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), an armed “LPR” member requested the SMM to show its patrol plan and asked the patrol to bring a Russian translation of the document on its next patrol. After approximately three minutes, the SMM could proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.