Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 7 December 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a number of ceasefire violations, including the use of Addendum-proscribed weapons. It noted partial compliance in relation to the withdrawal of prohibited weapons from the security zone.  The SMM continued monitoring and facilitating repairs of critical infrastructure. The SMM observed the developments regarding the restoration of power supply to Crimea. The SMM’s freedom of movement was restricted*.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions[1]. Positioned 6km north-west of Donetsk – between 8:05 and 13:30hrs[2] – the SMM heard 33 explosions, most of which were assessed as consistent with mortar fire accompanied by bursts of small-arms fire, 8-10km to the west-north-west and west. The SMM recorded explosions and small-arms and light-weapons fire in several other locations along and close to the contact line, most of which were assessed as live-fire exercises at known training grounds.

The SMM continued following up on reports of shelling on 5 December allegedly resulting in the death of a woman in a stretch of land between Ukrainian Armed Forces positions to the north and “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”) positions to the south in the village of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), which is located immediately north of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 6 December 2015). On 6 December, the SMM visited the Horlivka central morgue to follow up, but there was no relevant medical staff available to speak with the SMM. On 7 December, the SMM returned to the Horlivka central morgue, where the head of the morgue confirmed the death of a 37-year-old woman. He stated that autopsy results showed that the woman had died because of gunshot wounds. He added that forensic investigation would be carried out in Donetsk city. Outside the morgue two women (one in her sixties, one in her thirties), approached the SMM and said that the woman had been their colleague. They said the victim had tried to call an ambulance, but the ambulance could not reach her because of security considerations; the ambulance service confirmed the latter to the SMM. The SMM also followed up on allegations of shelling in the area of government-controlled Krymske (43km north-west of Luhansk) during the night of 6 December. The SMM visited a number of settlements on both sides of the contact line and heard contradicting accounts of events. As the SMM did not see impact craters, it was unable to confirm the allegations.

The SMM continued to observe Ukrainian Armed Forces presence in the government-controlled villages of Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), and a smaller presence in Pyshchevyk, 2km to the south (see SMM Daily Report 4 December 2015 and SMM Daily Report 6 December 2015). The SMM also observed the building of defensive positions. There were also what appeared to be new mine warning signs in the fields east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces positions and south of Pavlopil.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited the “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites, the locations of which corresponded with the withdrawal lines. All previously recorded weapons were present. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, the SMM continued to observe the rotation of equipment withdrawn to the site of which the SMM had previously been informed. The SMM found that eight tanks were missing.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. “DPR” members have yet to provide the requested inventory of heavy weapons and locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons, as requested by the SMM on 16 October. Members of the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) had provided the SMM with an inventory of heavy weapons, their serial numbers and the locations at which they are said to be stored, as requested by the SMM. The Ukrainian military authorities had earlier provided an inventory list of military equipment featuring weapons systems as well as their serial numbers, but not the locations where the weapons are to be permanently withdrawn to.

The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

At such Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed 17 towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). At one area, the SMM could not account for four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint, 152mm). Eight tank destroyers (MT-LB, 9P149) fitted with a radio guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) previously recorded there were missing.

The SMM also observed a number of Addendum-related weapons located at a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area, namely, 21 tanks (T-64). Ten tanks (T-64) previously recorded there were missing.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire and facilitated on-going repairs to critical infrastructure close to the contact line. In “LPR”-controlled Raivka (16km north-west of Luhansk), the water company finished the instalment of an electric transformer at the pumping station (see SMM Daily Report of 4 December 2015). The chief of the repair crew informed the SMM that the repair was complete and the electric company was to connect the transformer to the main electric line. At the checkpoint one kilometre west of government-controlled Hirske (62km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed repair works on the partially damaged electric power line between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk). An UkrEnergo representative told the SMM that continuing the works closer to the contact line required further permission from the headquarters of the Anti-Terrorist Operation. In the “LPR”-controlled area of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed no people queuing at the “LPR” checkpoint. At the first government checkpoint, the SMM observed approximately 300 people who were queuing to enter government-controlled areas.

On 6 December in Odessa, the SMM monitored the weekly commemoration at Kulykove Pole, scene of the events of 2 May 2014. SMM observed 60 anti-Maidan activists (aged 30 to 70, predominantly female). At a distance of 30m from that group, the SMM observed six pro-Maidan activists (aged 18 to 40, all male). The SMM also observed 15 uniformed police officers standing in small groups across the square and 50 National Guard officers behind the nearby trade union building. The commemoration ended without incident after 90 minutes.

The SMM followed up on reports of resumption of power-supply through one of the pylons damaged by explosions in the vicinity of the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. At the site of damaged pylons near Chaplynka (90km south-east of Kherson), the SMM saw no activists or police officers. The SMM noticed hazard signs attached to a wire (reading “Mines” in Cyrillic), running from the tent formerly occupied by the activists to the pylons. The power line appeared repaired, but the SMM did not hear the sounds characteristic of operational high voltage power lines. The SMM contacted the press service of the Ministry of Energy who said that the power supply had not been reinstated as some pending issues remained to be resolved. According to the UkrEnergo website, the Kakhovka-Titan power line was operational in the evening, but technical failure on the other side of the boundary line occurred and prevented the reconnection.

On 7 December, in the vicinity of Dnepropetrovsk city the SMM noticed that three previously operational checkpoints in the vicinity of Dnepropetrovsk, namely Partizanske (4km north-west of Dnepropetrovsk), Dniprodzerzhynsk (5km west of Dnepropetrovsk) and “Memorial Bull” (5km south-west of Dnepropetrovsk), had been either removed or appeared abandoned.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas adjacent to the international border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• Soldiers at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Starohnativka (53km north-east of Mariupol) stopped the SMM and informed it that there was a trench across the road and that further travel was impossible.

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM in Oktiabr (“DPR”-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) and held the SMM for 20 minutes before allowing it to pass.

Conditional access:

• In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was stopped and told it had to be escorted by “DPR” members. The SMM was then escorted.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] All times are in Eastern European Time unless otherwise specified.