Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 3 December 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, some of which were assessed to be training activities*. The SMM made a first visit to two heavy weapons permanent storage sites in areas of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government. Interlocutors reported difficulties in carrying out repairs to civilian infrastructure in areas near the contact line, due to security concerns.

The SMM recorded ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions[1]. Positioned at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city) between 08:30 and 14:00hrs[2], the SMM heard three explosions and multiple bursts of small-arms fire in areas 3-5km to the north.

In Luhansk region the SMM heard multiple bursts of small-arms and machine-gun fire that they assessed to be training exercises occurring at the government-controlled Trokhizbenka training area (33km north-west of Luhansk). Positioned in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Malomykolaivka (36km SW of Luhansk), the SMM heard explosions that were assessed to be from training exercises in “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (28km south-west of Luhansk).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM was unable to visit a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site due to the poor condition of the road caused by recent bad weather.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. Members of the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) provided the SMM with an inventory of heavy weapons, their serial numbers and the locations at which they are said to be stored. The Ukrainian military authorities had earlier provided an inventory list of military equipment featuring weapons systems, as well as their serial numbers. The “DPR” had yet to provide the requested inventory of heavy weapons, or locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons, as requested by the SMM on 16 October. The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though these did not all comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such holding areas and observed six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (9K51 Grad, 122mm), 18 howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 18 self-propelled guns (2A36 Giatsint, 152mm). The SMM could not reach one storage area due to the poor condition of the road and ascertain whether all six MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) remained absent from this site, as they had been since 12 July.

The SMM made a first visit to an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site, the location and inventory of which were provided to the SMM on 2 December. The site met the criteria outlined in the 16 October notification.

In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM revisited heavy weapons holding areas and observed six towed howitzers (D30, 122mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm). The wheels of five of the howitzers and three of the anti-tank guns were covered in fresh mud, suggesting they had recently been moved. Three of the howitzers were attached to trucks and loaded with ammunition. “DPR” members denied SMM monitors access to one of the areas; only two of them were given access.*

In areas beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside storage sites – the SMM observed a howitzer (D-30, 122mm) towed by a truck near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

Also in areas beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside storage sites – the SMM observed the following weapons that fall under the Addendum regime: a concentration of approximately 40 tanks (probably T-72) next to the training area near “DPR”-controlled Ternove (58km east of Donetsk); approximately ten tanks (T-64) being transported on flat-bed trucks at different times and locations around government-controlled Kostiantynivka (59km north of Donetsk); three tanks (T-64) near government-controlled Berestok (54km north of Donetsk); a tank (T-64) being carried on a trailer at the southern entrance of  “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.

The SMM monitored the presence of other hardware and military movement: a convoy of ten military-type trucks covered with tarpaulin and moving south-west from “LPR”-controlled Lutuhyne (21km south-west of Luhansk); three military-type trucks (Ural 5 ton) and four cars with Ukrainian plates carrying armed “LPR” members; on the M04 road, at a location 14km north-east of Donetsk, 20 camouflaged “DPR” members armed with AK-74 and one silenced sniper rifle, walking north-north-east.

In areas along the contact line, the SMM spoke to interlocutors about the difficulties in carrying out repairs to critical infrastructure. Near government-controlled Hirske (62km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed ongoing repair works by a private company hired by the UkrEnergo company on the damaged power line between “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (57km west of Luhansk) and government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk). A member of the repair team told the SMM that they had waited three months for permission from the Ukrainian authorities to carry out repairs and that they needed more time to complete the work. In government-controlled Hranitne (47km north-east of Mariupol), a member of an emergency services team demining the area ahead of the installation of a new power line from government-controlled Novohryhorivka (53km north of Mariupol) told the SMM that de-mining needed to be extended along the line into “DPR”-controlled areas. The SMM met with the secretary of the village council in government-controlled Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) who said that the village is without running water as demining of the area around the broken water pipe had not taken place.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation following disruption of the power supply to Crimea. In Chonhar (167km south-east of Kherson), the SMM observed five young men wearing Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor) insignia on camouflage uniforms and carrying AK-47 weapons) guarding the site of the damaged electricity pylons (see SMM Daily Report 25 November 2015).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• “DPR” members denied SMM members access to a heavy weapons holding area; only two of them were given access.

Conditional access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers at a mobile checkpoint near government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) asked the SMM to open the trunk of their vehicle enquiring if they were transporting drugs or weapons. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] All times are in Kyiv time unless otherwise specified