Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• It observed ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM spotted a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near residential houses in government-controlled Chabanivka.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Bezimenne and Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (32), compared with the previous 24 hours (23 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), southerly and easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and southerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations compared with the previous 24 hours. All ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).                                             

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM observed that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) and of the armed formations immediately south of the broken section of the bridge, both inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), continued to be dismantled.

On 25 August, the Mission saw a senior member of the armed formations accompany the delivery of a blue container (dimensions 3m x 5m x 2.5m) with a door and at least three windows to a location 40m south of the broken section of the aforementioned bridge. The SMM observed that the container was empty and that “JCCC” was painted on it. [2]

On 26 August, the Mission saw at least 20 deminers of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, some equipped with metal detectors, as well as eight members of the Stanytsia Luhanska Forestry Service, conducting demining activities and cleaning vegetation west of the road about 300m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. It observed four members of the SES operate a crane and a dump truck and remove three concrete slabs from the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

The Mission saw at least 11 members of the armed formations continue to dismantle their former forward position south of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge by removing tyres, sandbags, ammunition crates and wooden logs from the position and throwing them to an area east of the bridge. South of the aforementioned former forward position, the SMM saw at least seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. It also again observed the aforementioned blue container 40m south of broken section of the bridge (see above).

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the night of 25-26 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded four projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east and two illumination flares at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

24 August

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) about 40m from civilian houses and about 150m from a school building in Chabanivka (66km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

25 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB-M) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk);
• two APCs (BTR-80) in a military compound in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• five armoured combat vehicles (ACV) under camouflage netting near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• three ACVs under camouflage netting near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

26 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle and an ACV near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw

• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near residential houses in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near residential houses in Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk).

Train near Sukhodilsk

In the early morning hours of 26 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train consisting of a locomotive and 12 empty coal wagons moving east through the train station in Sukhodilsk (non-government-controlled, 38km south-east of Luhansk), about 20km west of the border with the Russian Federation.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a bus (number plates not visible) and two pedestrians (a woman and a man in their fifties) entering Ukraine. It also saw 34 cars (15 with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “LPR” and two with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation number plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians (eight women and seven men between 45 and 60 years old) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians enter or exit Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”.
• At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations, one visibly armed, denied the SMM passage west.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 25-26 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Stepanivka and Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).[5]
• An SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying UAV near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.6

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 23 and 25 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove, Kriakivka and Svitlodarsk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAVs’ positions.