Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 31 July 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw a fresh crater and unexploded ordnance near civilian properties on the western edge of Pervomaisk.
• An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted military hardware in the Petrivske disengagement area.
• An SMM mid-range UAV spotted anti-tank mines, some for the first time, near non-government-controlled Nyzhnie Lozove and Pikuzy.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of power lines and the drilling of water wells.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske and near the border with the Russian Federation, all in non-government-controlled areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (43) compared with the previous reporting period (eight explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions, were recorded in areas north-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-easterly and north-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, all explosions (24), as in the previous reporting period (26 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Raivka (non-government-controlled 16km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh crater and unexploded ordnance near Pervomaisk

The SMM saw for the first time an 82mm mortar tailfin embedded in the middle of road T-0504, about 200m from the closest civilian properties on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). About 7m north, in a field, the Mission also saw a crater assessed as fresh. It could not assess the type of weapon used and direction of fire.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Outside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw a civilian vehicle belonging to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine with three deminers on board entering and stopping at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). Inside the area, the Mission saw eight members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them)[2] between the southern part of the broken section of the bridge and the parking area south-south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 31 July, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[4]

On the same day, positioned near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons[5]

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

31 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

31 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 11 tanks (types undetermined), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 13 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a training area near Miusynsk.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[6]

At a heavy weapon holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

31 July

The SMM noted that 30 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

30 July

The SMM noted that four MLRS (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and 12 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) were present and 33 MLRS (BM-27) and 32 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were missing.

At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

31 July

The SMM noted that three MLRS (BM-21) were present and 20 MLRS (BM-21) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

30 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB), about 50m north of residential houses on the eastern outskirts of Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).

31 July

The SMM saw:

• seven IFVs (BTR-4) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-60) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) close to residential houses and a school in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as a trench digger (type undetermined), an armoured medical evacuation vehicle (MT-LB S) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) in the eastern outskirts of the city.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (types undetermined) near Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk) and
• an ACV near Petrivske.

Mines, some spotted for the first time near Nyzhnie Lozove and Pikuzy and mine hazard sign near Kodema

On 27 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 200 anti-tank mines in a field west of road M-03, about 2kmwest-south-west of Nyzhnie Lozove (non-government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk). Approximately 300m north-east of the road, the same UAV spotted 200 anti-tank mines (about 175 for the first time and 26 previously observed). All the anti-tank mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted that nine out of the previously observed 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) across road T-0519, about 50m south-west of the forward position of the armed formations in the south-western outskirts of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) were burnt out.

On 31 July, on the south-western edge of Kodema (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), about 150m south of  residential houses, the Mission saw for the first time two rows of bricks (3m in length) blocking the eastern lane of the road. On the western side of the road, the SMM also saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (with “Mines” written in Russian and Ukrainian) as well as wooden stakes covered by black plastic bags placed on the same road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), an assessment and repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka.

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 31 July, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (with “DPR” plates) and four pedestrians (three men and a woman) entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw three trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “an ongoing operation” in the area.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On six occasions, on the evening and night of 30-31 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over government- and non-government controlled areas of Donetsk region.9
• On six occasions, two SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk).9
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).[8]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] In the SMM Daily Report of 30 July 2019, four weapons were reported as missing at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region. At the visited site, all previously observed weapons were actually present.

[6] The SMM visited areas holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. One such site appeared to be abandoned.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.