Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 24 July 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.
- Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of fresh craters inside and near the Zolote disengagement area.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled Vidrodzhennia and near Lysychansk.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (32), compared with the previous reporting period (35). The majority of the ceasefire violations, including almost half of the explosions, were recorded in areas north-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north-north-east of Stepne (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On 24 July, the SMM saw a truck crane, a truck and five personnel of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine driving from the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) into the disengagement area and stopping at the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) (all later left the disengagement area). Near the former forward position, the Mission saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).[2] It also saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) - two near the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge and three near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 22 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of about 30 recent craters inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk): about five located about 1.2km north of its southern edge and 1.2km west of its eastern edge, about 15 located 800m north of its southern edge and 1.7km east of its western edge, and about ten located near its southern edge and about 2km west of its eastern edge. The imagery also revealed about 20 craters located outside of the disengagement area 100-500m west of its western edge. Outside the disengagement, the same imagery revealed the presence of five probable armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the disengagement area (all not seen in imagery from 7 July 2019). On 22 July, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), about 50m north of the disengagement area.
On 24 July, positioned 500m north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 17 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west, assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.
On the same day, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
23 July
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) parked between houses in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).
24 July
The Mission saw two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites
Non-government-controlled areas
19 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 13 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 20 July 2019).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
24 July
The SMM noted that:
- 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were present and
- a towed howitzer (2A36) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing for the first time, and four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing.
Weapons permanent storage site
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region
24 July
The SMM noted that 28 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) remained missing.
Indications of military, military-type and other presence in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
21 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new earthen bridge over a trench about 200m east of the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska.
22 July
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) (see above).
Aerial imagery available the SMM revealed the presence of five probable ACVs near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Zolote disengagement area (see above).
23 July
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an ACV and four IFVs (BMP-1) near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and a trench extension running from north to south for about 100m about 2km east of Zalizne (not seen in imagery from 31 May 2019).
An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).
24 July
The SMM saw:
- five IFVs (BMP-2) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) and
- an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
21 July
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed a new 75m-long trench extension running from east to west, east of road P-22 about 1km south-east of the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (not seen in imagery from 7 July 2019).
23 July
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- an ACV near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk) and
- eight ACVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).
Fresh craters near Svobodne
On 21 July, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of eight fresh craters in a training area near Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 7 July 2019).
Mines near Olenivka and demining activities near Novomykhailivka
About 2km south-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-20 near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission again saw two anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in the median between road lanes. Next to the mines, it saw a mine hazard sign with “Danger, Mines” written in Russian and English.
The SMM saw four SES personnel with metal detectors conducting demining in fields east of road O-0531 about 4km north of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk).
SMM facilitated and monitored a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict
The SMM monitored the security situation in both government- and non-government-controlled areas to support a transfer of persons convicted before the conflict from non-government- to government-controlled areas across the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to electrical infrastructure near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), and to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report of 20 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”.
- At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- A mini-UAV flight experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming while flying near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.