Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 July 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw damage to houses from shelling in Khreshchatytske.
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including over 40 multiple launch rocket systems in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines near Pisky, some for the first time, and craters in Lozove.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Luhansk city. SMM unmanned aerial vehicles continued to experience signal interference, assessed as due to jamming.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 450), compared with the previous reporting period (about 280 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), and areas south-south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 250), compared with the previous reporting period (about 85 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).  

Damage to houses from shelling in Khreshchatytske

On 10 July, in the central part of Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a crater (1.5m in diameter) in gravel soil on the eastern edge of Pervomaiska Street, assessed as recent and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west-north-west. About 4m east of the crater, the SMM saw that a wooden fence was partially blown away. About 20m west of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 10 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw three east-facing windows covered in plastic and one shattered south-facing window, as well as at least 15 marks on an east-facing wall, all assessed as recent and caused by shrapnel. At a summer kitchen attached to the house, the SMM saw that two north-facing windows were each missing one panel and were covered with plastic sheeting. About 30m south-south-east of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 9 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw shrapnel damage (a hole and two marks) on a north-facing outer wall, and a damaged west-facing window (partially shattered glass with a hole in the frame).

About 50m south-south-east of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 8 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw at least eight holes (5-15cm) in the roof, as well as broken glass panels on the ground under a recently-repaired north-facing window and a shattered rear window of a car parked next to it, all assessed as recent and caused by shrapnel. A resident of the house (man in his fifties) told the SMM that he had been at home when he heard explosions on the morning of 8 July. Two additional residents of the neighbourhood (a man in his thirties and a woman in her fifties) separately told the SMM that they had been at home on the morning of 8 July when they had heard explosions.

About 80m east-north-east of 9 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw another crater (2mx2m) in a cultivated vegetable garden along with a fuse tunnel and shrapnel in it, assessed as recent and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west-north-west. About 100m south-west of the crater, at an inhabited one-storey house at 6 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw a crater (2m x 2m) in a cultivated fruit garden, assessed as recent and caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west. About 6m north of the crater, the SMM saw more than 50 holes and marks on the south-facing wall of the house, all assessed as caused by shrapnel, and, about 4m north-east of the crater, the SMM saw that the corner of a concrete barn had collapsed and that roof panels on the south-west corner of the barn roof had been blown off. A resident of the house (man in his sixties) told the SMM that he had been at home in the early morning of 1 July when he had heard explosions. About 50m north-east of the crater, at an inhabited single-storey house at 8 Radianska Street, the SMM saw a broken west-facing window of a barn and three holes (3cm x 4cm) in the south-facing wall of a shed, all assessed as recent and caused by shrapnel. About 5m south of the crater, at an inhabited one-storey house at 5 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw more than 40 holes and shrapnel marks on a north-facing wall and window, and saw that a fruit tree about 1m south of the crater had been ripped out of the ground.

About 260m south-east of 5 Pervomaiska Street, the SMM saw a crater (1.5x1.5m) in soft soil with a fuse tunnel and shrapnel in it, assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from the west-south-west. About 3m east of the crater, the SMM saw cut branches of a tree, assessed as caused by the blast. About 15m south-east of the crater, at an inhabited two-storey apartment building at 12a Parkova Street, the SMM saw a shattered north-facing window, three shattered south-facing windows, and cut branches on a tree about 20m east of the crater, assessed as caused by shrapnel. In a field west-north-west, the SMM saw at least three recent craters assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from an undetermined direction. On the same day, at a building of the armed formations in Khreshchatytske, the SMM saw about ten people filing claims for damage to their property and collecting plastic sheeting and other materials to cover damage.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 10 July, inside the disengagement area, between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps on the broken part of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw seven members of the armed formations, all of whom were wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. On the evening of the same day, at the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, three of whom were officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). [2].

On 11 July, inside the disengagement area, about 200m south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers cutting trees about 100m west of the road. Also inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw five Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, including three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC, along with two civilians, measuring sections of the path north of and on the broken bridge. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that they were taking measurements for a possible shuttle service that is planned to carry “impaired” civilians from the broken bridge to the EECP north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At the same time, the SMM saw two members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, standing at the southern edge of the broken part of the bridge about 20m south of the aforementioned group and at least seven others in the area between the former forward position and the checkpoint south of the bridge. In front of the former forward position of the armed formations south of the wooden ramps, the SMM saw a man in military-type clothing with a white armband and blue helmet.

In the morning, at the EECP north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, on three occasions, the SMM saw about 500-600 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 150-300 people queuing to exit. Also at the EECP, the SMM saw a crane, two military trucks, an excavator, a welding machine, and three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers building a concrete reinforcement structure.

On the morning of 10 July, positioned near the Prince Ihor Monument about 250m south-east of the disengagement area’s south-eastern edge, the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west. On the same morning, positioned inside the disengagement area about 90m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1.5-2km east. On the morning of 11 July, positioned inside the disengagement area about 250m south of its northern edge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-4km south-west. All of the above were assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 10-11 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east and nine projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

On 11 July, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight at the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km north-north-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area and aimed at the mini-UAV, which was flying about 1.3km north-north-west of the SMM’s location. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

During the day on 11 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 July

The SMM saw:

• two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) mounted on armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on the north-eastern outskirts of Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Bokovo-Platove (54km south-west of Luhansk);
• eight MLRS (BM-21) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk);
• 13 MLRS (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

10 July

The SMM saw:

• three self-propelled howitzers (probable 2S1) north of Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk) and
• four self-propelled howitzers (probable 2S1) and two tanks at the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk).

11 July

The SMM saw:

• an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Pokrovsk;
• five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Rodynske (59km north-west of Donetsk); and
• at least 30 tanks (T-64) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 38 tanks (T-72), five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and nine towed mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk);
• 18 towed howitzers (types undetermined) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk);
• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 15 towed anti-tank guns (MT-12) near Bokovo-Platove (see above);
• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), 12 towed howitzers (D-30) and ten tanks (T-64) in a training area near Miusynsk (see above);
• 28 tanks (T-72) and a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in a training area near Ternove; and
• ten tanks (T-72) near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

9 July

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two probable APCs (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

10 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (BTR-80) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol).

11 July

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Novhorodske;
• two APCs (MT-LB) and an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• three APCs (MT-LB) near Krasnohorivka.

Presence of anti-tank mines and a crater near Pisky, fresh craters near Lozove

On 9 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least ten probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a single line running from north-west to south-east in a field about 2km south-west of Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), as part of a larger group of about 90 previously observed anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same UAV again saw 40 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across both lanes of road M-04, about 500m south of the aforementioned mines.

The same UAV also spotted for the first time a crater assessed as caused by a probable 120mm mortar round, with a probable tail fin visible in the center of it, in a field about 3km south-west of Pisky (not visible in imagery from 27 June 2019). Additionally, the same UAV spotted for the first time about 20 craters assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds in a field about 3km north-west of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 27 June 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the repair of a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to facilitate the maintenance of a water tower near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Additionally, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to support the crossing of a telecommunications vehicle containing spare parts for repair works from government-controlled areas to non-government-controlled areas.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour and a half, the SMM saw 15 cars (one with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as seven with “DPR” plates) and 12 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) entering Ukraine, and 28 cars (nine with Ukrainian, one with Armenian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 12 with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates), two buses (with “DPR” plates), and three pedestrians (two men and one woman, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.

Security situation along the Black Sea in the Kherson and Mykolaiv regions

On 9 and 10 July, the SMM observed a calm situation along the Black Sea coast between Bilozerka (31km west of Kherson) and Ochakiv (79km west of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining activities in the area.” At the same time, the SMM saw civilians crossing the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a compound of the armed formations in non-government-controlled Luhansk city, two members of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing no permission granted from superiors.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after about 25 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 10-11 July, an SMM long range-UAV experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, on three occasions while flying over areas near Fashchivka (non-government-controlled, 61km south-west of Luhansk), Vedmezhe (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Donetsk) and Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), as well as signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Druzhba (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).[6]
• On 11 July, while conducting a mini-UAV flight inside of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and just north of its southern edge, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On 11 July, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, on three occasions while flying over Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and on one occasion while flying over Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.