Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 July 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Civilians were injured due to shelling in Novhorodske and Pikuzy.
• The SMM saw fresh craters near Naberezhne and Lozove.
• A mini-UAV was lost near Bohdanivka after experiencing signal interference.
• The SMM saw anti-tank mines near Veselohorivka and unexploded ordnance between Popasna and Pervomaisk as well as near Orlivka.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs and the operations of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled Novoazovsk and Zaichenko. *

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 370 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions (about 125), were recorded at southerly and north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk); at south-easterly and southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol); and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 165), compared with the previous 24 hours (400 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including all the explosions, were recorded at easterly and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured due to shelling in Novhorodske

At a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (78 years old) with bandages on his head and lower part of his back. The man told the SMM that on 6 July, while standing outside his house at 241 Stakhanovska Street in Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk), he had heard a loud explosion and subsequently noticed shrapnel injuries to his head, neck and spine. He added that his vegetable garden is located next to positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Medical staff told the SMM that the man was admitted on the evening of 6 July with shrapnel injuries to his head and spine. The police also confirmed to the SMM that the man had been injured by shrapnel and that it had opened a criminal investigation.

Man injured due to shelling in Pikuzy

On 17 June, the Mission followed up on reports of a man injured by shelling on Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). At a single-storey house on 49 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a man (in his eighties) with burns on his back and saw that his house had no roof and that two north-north-west-facing windows were covered by tarpaulin. The man told the SMM that he had been at home on 10 June when the roof of his house had been hit by a round of a weapon and that it caught fire and burned down.

Fresh craters near Naberezhne and Lozove

On 6 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, in real time, at least six impacts in a field, assessed as probably being caused by 120mm mortar rounds, at locations about 80-150m north, north-west and south of positions of the armed formations near Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 20 fresh craters in a field about 3km north-west of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), close to positions assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

Mini-UAV lost near Bohdanivka

Positioned in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM conducted a mini-UAV flight, which experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming. During the flight, the SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (Kozak) assessed as belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) south of the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

At the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations, all of whom were wearing blue armbands with “JCCC” written on them[2]. About 1km south-south-east of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area, the SMM saw that some concrete blocks had been moved and placed in between two sets of three containers at the parking lot about 50m south of the Prince Ihor Monument (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 July 2019).

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1km east of its western and about 800m north of its southern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On 8 July, positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.[4]

On the evening of 7 July, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 1-2km in easterly directions, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the night of 7-8 July, positioned at the northern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions, about 250 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire as well as 15 bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire, all at an assessed distance of 5-10km in easterly directions, all assessed as outside of the disengagement areas but within its 5km periphery.

On 7 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a spool wire stretched across road T-1316 about 350m north of the armed formations’ checkpoint at the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, as well as two red mine hazard signs placed on each side of the spool wire (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 2 July). The same UAV also spotted seven fresh craters, assessed as probably caused by mortar rounds, on the abovementioned road about 1km south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 1km north of its southern edge, between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and positions of the armed formations. It also spotted an anti-tank mine (TM-62) about 200m south of the crossroad between the aforementioned road and the railway line, inside the disengagement area (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas 8 JulyThe SMM saw an anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) in the western outskirts of Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) and a transloader near Kasianivka (22km north of Mariupol);
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) and two transloaders near Kalynove (65km south-west of Donetsk).

7 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K37) near Petrivske (61km south-west of Donetsk).

8 July

The SMM saw:

• four tanks (three T-72 and one T-64) at the railway station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk);
• two tanks (T-72) loaded on military trucks in Mykhailivka (37km north-west of Donetsk); and
• four tanks (T-72) near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region

8 July

The SMM noted that two sites were abandoned and that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

6 July

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR variant) near Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol).

7 July

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (a BRDM-2 and a BRM-1K) as well as three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) in Heorhiievka (27 south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-80) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (a BTR-4 Grom and a BMP-2) and four APCs (two BTR-70 and two BTR-80) near Avdiivka;
• nine IFVs (BMP-2) near Novobakhmutivka (government-controlled, 28km north of Donetsk).

8 July

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) in Avdiivka;
• nine IFVs (six BMP-2, two BMP-1 and a BTR-4) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk); and
• two military trucks towing two APCs (BTR-70) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Non-SMM UAV seen in Popasna

In the morning of 8 July, while in Popasna, the SMM saw a mini-UAV flying at an altitude of 10-30m over the SMM forward patrol base (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 08 July 2019).

Presence of mines near Veselohorivka

On 4 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time at least 1,000 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) about 3km north-west of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) laid in three rows running from south-west to north-east for 900m in a field. About 400m south-west of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV also spotted for the first time at least 150 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid in three rows running from south-west to north-east, as well as, about 150m south-west of the previously-mentioned mines, another 14 anti-tank mines (TM-62), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 28 May 2019).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mine hazard sign seen between Popasna and Pervomaisk and near Orlivka

On 7 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 11 pieces of UXO as well as an improvised hazard sign on a 1.5km stretch of road T-0504 (which is used regularly by the SMM), starting at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna and finishing about 370m west of a checkpoint of the armed formations west of Pervomaisk. It spotted a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), as well as several hundred shell casings, about 60m east of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as another eight RPG-7 tailfins, one in the middle of the road, the others between 1-8m north and 1-30m south of the road. About 200m south-east of the aforementioned checkpoint, the same UAV spotted a stick (about 60cm high), assessed as an improvised hazard sign, placed in the middle of a crater, assessed as recent and probably caused by an 82mm mortar round. Additionally, about 1.3km south-east of the aforementioned checkpoint, the same UAV spotted a complete RPG-7 round on the soft shoulder north of the road, with a possibly unexploded warhead still attached (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 June 2019).

On road T-0504 about 2km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and about 100m west-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM saw again a piece of UXO, assessed as an RPG round, stuck in the ground, south of the aforementioned road facing east. About 30m east of the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as an RPG round, lying on the ground, north of the aforementioned road facing west. In front of the checkpoint of the armed formations 1.7km south-east of Molodizhne, the SMM saw ten impacts on the aforementioned road and in the field, assessed as fresh and caused by rounds of an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1, canon 73mm) and of a rocket-propelled grenade. The SMM saw for the first time a copper wire over 1km long, lying along the road between the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka and the T-junction leading north to Molodizhne, assessed to be from an anti-tank guided missile.

About 700m west of Orlivka (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time the presence of an UXO, assessed as a projectile from a multiple launch rocket system (type undetermined), embedded in the asphalt in the middle of a road leading to Umanske (government-controlled, 25km north-west of Donetsk), regularly used by civilians and the SMM.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operations of civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable assessments of a water conduit in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and land plots corresponding to a water pipeline between Petropavlivka (government-controlled, 27km north of Luhansk) and Popasna, repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna as well as to a power line between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk) and Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and continued to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). While positioned near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and facilitating the operation of the DFS, the SMM heard 33 ceasefire violations, including four undetermined explosions, assessed as near the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 29 cars (six with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Latvian license plate, as well as 15 with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, including one truck carrying timber on a trailer, as well as two with “DPR” plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plate and two with “DPR” plates) and 24 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 24 cars (four with Ukrainian, 13 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (10 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “DPR” and “LPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians (one woman in her thirties and a child) exiting Ukraine.

Protest against planned common broadcast of television programme between Ukrainian and Russian TV channels

At 21 Polova Street in Kyiv, in front of the office of a Ukrainian television channel, the SMM saw 20 people (mixed gender, aged 20-30 years old) gathering with political party flags and banners opposing the planned broadcast of a programme together with a Russian Federation television channel. Later, at the same location, the SMM saw that the gathering grew to about 400 people (mixed gender, aged 20-40 years old) and about 500-600 law enforcement officers. On the same day, at 11 Bankova Street, the SMM saw about 300 people (mixed gender, aged 20-40 years old) protesting against the aforementioned broadcast, some of them wearing clothing with insignia of the National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 29 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south into the town, citing a “special military operation in the area”.
• At a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At the entrance of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), an armed soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces allowed the SMM to proceed to the settlement after about 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On 8 July, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM was unable to recover its UAV (see above).
• In the evening of 6 July and in the early morning and evening of 7 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming. On two occasions, the same UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), assessed as due to probable jamming.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Svitlodarsk was non-operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that one such site continues to be abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.