Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 May 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and damage to houses caused by gunfire in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk, Pikuzy and Kalynove.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining activities and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas near Oleksandrivske, Zaichenko and Novoazovsk, as well as near Voznesenivka, at a border crossing point close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv and Kharkiv, the SMM monitored gatherings of mothers of deceased and missing soldiers.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 200), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-west, west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east, south and south-south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and in areas south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), including about 140 explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-4km south of the DFS.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 10 and 11 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 725 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, as well as the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), including over 260 explosions of artillery rounds, and in areas north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Fresh craters and damage to houses caused by gunfire in residential areas of Dokuchaievsk, Pikuzy and Kalynove

On 11 May, in the western outskirts of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) at 7 Telmana Street, the SMM saw a hole in the west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house and, beneath the roof, another corresponding hole in the west-facing outer wall of the same house. The SMM assessed the impacts as fresh and caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a north-westerly direction. A resident (a man, aged 40-50) of the house told the SMM that he had been inside the house when shelling had occurred in the area at around 18:15 on 9 May.

On 11 May, at 43 Akhmatovoi Street, on the north-eastern edge of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to the west-facing outer wall, consisting of innumerable holes, and to a west-facing metal door of a one-storey house, as well as a shattered west-facing window. It also saw that the edge of the west-facing side of the roof of the same house had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by the explosion of rounds of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fired from a westerly direction. A resident of the house (a woman, aged 70-80) told the SMM that she had been inside the house with her sister when she had heard explosions in the area at around 17:00 on 7 May.

On 11 May, in the eastern outskirts of Kalynove, the SMM saw four fresh craters along a 50m-long section of a road running parallel to the north-north-eastern edge of a cemetery. The SMM saw an additional fresh crater about 50m south-west, inside the grounds of the cemetery, and saw that two gravestones next to the crater had sustained shrapnel damage. The SMM assessed all the aforementioned damage as fresh and caused by rounds of weapons with a calibre of at least 120mm (it could not assess the direction of fire).

About 100m east of the cemetery, the SMM saw that the panes of two west-facing windows of a barn located 25m from a one-storey house at 3 Klubna Street were missing and covered with plastic sheets, and that glass shards were scattered on the ground beneath them. A resident of the house (a woman aged 50-60) told the SMM that she had been inside her apartment when shelling had occurred in the area on the morning of 10 May.

At 4 Klubna Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-facing metal fence 1m north of a one-storey house. At 5 Klubna Street, it saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-facing slate fence about 1m north of a one-storey house, as well as four shattered panes in two windows (two north-facing panes and two west-facing panes). At 6 Klubna Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a south-facing metal gate about 3m south of a one-storey house.

About 100m north-north-east of the latter house, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the side of a road and, about 20m south-east, another fresh crater in a field, as well as shrapnel damage to trees near it. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by rounds of weapons with a calibre of at least 120mm (it could not assess the direction of fire). About 90m east of the craters, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a west-facing metal fence about 1m west of a one-storey house at 2 Kuibysheva Street. At 8 Kuibysheva Street, the SMM saw the shattered pane of a south-facing window and glass shards scattered on the ground beneath it.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 11 May, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 40 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west; it could not assess if they were inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). During the evening of 11 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight and a muzzle flash at an assessed range of 2-5km east-south-east and south-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area). The same camera also recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery).

During the day on 12 May, positioned on the southern edge of Zolote, the SMM recorded ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-4km north, north-north-east and north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery).

On 11 and 12 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

11 May

The SMM saw:

• a stationary surface-to-air missile system (9K33, Osa) in Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) and
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) heading south-west on road M03, about 5km east of Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

12 May

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) about 3km south-south-east of Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) about 1km south-west of Vedenske (90km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region

10 May

The SMM noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and that 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing. 

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

8 May

An SMM-mini UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) within a residential area of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

10, 11 and 12 May

The SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and five IFVs (two BMP-1 and three BMP variants) in a compound on the eastern outskirts of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

10 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a 50m-long trench network system in a field about 3km north-north-west of Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 April 2018).

11 May

The SMM saw:

• a military-type truck (Ural) with a mast-mounted cellular phone jamming system atop on the south-western outskirts of Horlivka (simultaneously, the SMM lost its connection to the Vodafone telecommunication network for about two hours, until it reached a different location about 2km east) and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance

On 12 May, accompanied by an armed member of the armed formations, the SMM saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the carriageway of road T0519 close to Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), about 200m north of the nearest houses.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure and demining

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, as well as to enable demining activities by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine in fields near Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 11 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour and 20 minutes, the SMM saw 59 cars (six with Ukrainian and 35 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 18 with “DPR” plates), 27 covered cargo trucks (23 with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and 11 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (eight with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 50 passengers on board entering Ukraine.

On 12 May, while at the same border crossing point for about one hour and ten minutes, the SMM saw 78 cars (14 with Ukrainian and 39 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 25 with “DPR” plates) and 30 covered cargo trucks (21 with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as eight with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw eight cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and about 50 passengers on board and seven pedestrians (mixed age and gender) entering Ukraine.

On 11 May, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw three pedestrians (a man and a woman aged 20-30 with a child) entering Ukraine and one pedestrian (a woman aged 50-60) exiting Ukraine. On 12 May, while at the same border crossing point for about 40 minutes, the SMM did not observe any cross-border traffic.

On 12 May, while at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” plates and two additional cars whose licence plates were not visible) and four pedestrians (a woman aged 30-40 and three men aged 16-20) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (four with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation, one with Georgian and one with Polish licence plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and 57 pedestrians (mixed age and gender) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

SMM monitored gatherings of mothers of deceased and missing soldiers

On the occasion of annual commemorative events organized by the mothers of deceased and missing Ukrainian soldiers, coinciding with International Mother’s Day, the SMM monitored gatherings of about 250 people (mostly women aged 50-70) in Kharkiv on 11 May and about 300 people (mostly women aged 50-80) in Kyiv on 12 May.   

Resumption of long-range UAV flights

On 11 May, the SMM resumed its long-range UAV flights, which had not been conducted since 19 April, after an SMM long-range UAV crashed in an area near the contact line in Donetsk region (see SMM Spot Report of 19 April 2019).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 12 May, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• On 12 May, on two occasions at a checkpoint on road E58 in the northern outskirts of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westward to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) and southward to Novoazovsk, citing “orders from their superiors”.  
• On 12 May, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), citing “orders from superiors”.
• On 12 May, at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that “it had seen enough” and asked it to leave the area immediately.
• On 12 May, a member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (see above).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delayed:

• On 12 May at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 18 minutes of waiting.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.