Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 May 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
- The SMM saw for the first time anti-tank mines near Bila Kamianka and Starohnativka.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 115 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On the evening of 7 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about ten explosions (three of which were assessed as impacts) and about 20 projectiles in flight, all at an assessed distance of less than 1km.
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 135 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 7 May, while on the northern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 75 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km east-north-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On 8 May, positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.7-1km south-south-east (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).
Positioned 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk)).
Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
7 May
The SMM saw three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stationary in parking areas near the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
4 May
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 14 MLRS (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 6 May 2019).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
7 May
An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Pavlivka (51km south-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
4 May
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019);
- 12 tanks (type undetermined), seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars, 13 towed howitzers or mortars and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations in the area see above); and
- 24 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report of 26 April 2019).
7 May
The SMM saw at least five tanks (T-72) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas in Luhansk region
8 May
The SMM noted that:
- six tanks (T-72) and eight self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were present, and
- 52 tanks (T-64), three self-propelled mortars (2S9) and 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.
Weapons storage sites
At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
8 May
The SMM noted that four mortars (one 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three BM-37 82mm) continued to be missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
7 May
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-D and one type undetermined) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
- two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk), and
- three IFVs (BMP-1) in Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk).
8 May
The SMM saw:
- an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk);
- an APC (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
- an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) and four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP variant) in Popasna.
Non-government-controlled areas
7 May
An SMM mini-UAV spotted seven IFVs (six BMP-1 and one probable BMP variant) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).
Helicopter and UAV seen flying in the security zone
On 8 May, the SMM saw a military helicopter flying north to south at a low altitude about 7.5km east of Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk). It also saw an unidentified UAV (assessed as a fixed-wing type) flying in a south-easterly direction near Petrovenky (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk).
Anti-tank mines near Bila Kamianka and Starohnativka
On 7 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time 40 anti-tank mines near a road leading from Bila Kamianka (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk) to Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations. About 20m east of the aforementioned mines, the UAV again spotted two anti-tank mines. About 1.5km west of the former mines, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines (type undetermined) laid across the road and again spotted six anti-tank mines (type undetermined) about 100m west, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
On 7 May, the SMM saw for the first time a freshly dug trench and a mine hazard sign (red square with “Mines” written in Russian) about 2km south of Novokyivka (non-government-controlled, 25km east of Luhansk).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), as well as to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-east of Donetsk). The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Border area outside government control
While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw 12 cars (three with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as four “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Polish licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian (a woman, aged 20-30) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (ten with Russian Federation licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates and about 15 passengers on board exiting Ukraine.
People apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions
In non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region, the SMM observed about 50 people (mixed gender and ages) in a queue in front of a building in Antratsyt (55km south-west of Luhansk). Outside the aforementioned building, the SMM noted four pieces of paper informing about eligibility, costs and documents tied to the submission of applications for passports of the Russian Federation. Several people waiting told the SMM that there were three queues: one for receiving information about obtaining the passports of the Russian Federation, one for receiving information about obtaining “LPR” “passports” and a third for receiving “LPR” “passports”.
In non-government-controlled Donetsk city, in front of a building at 56 Aksakova Street, the SMM observed two queues of about 15 and 45 people (mixed gender and ages). People in the first queue told the SMM that they had been submitting applications for passports of the Russian Federation; those in the second queue told the SMM that they had been waiting to receive other documents valid in non-government-controlled areas, including “DPR” “passports”. In Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 15 people queuing outside a building. Six of them told the SMM that they had been submitting applications for passports of the Russian Federation.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delayed:
- At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed after about 20 minutes of waiting.
Other impediments:
- At a hospital in Donetsk city, medical staff told the SMM that it could not provide information without permission from those in control.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.