Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 April 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines at a railway station in government-controlled Kostiantynivka.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted while driving on a road north of Dokuchaievsk, at a heavy weapons holding area and at a checkpoint near Zaichenko, all in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), as well as in areas south, south-east and south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). All ceasefire violations (seven projectiles) were assessed as near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see Disengagement areas).
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 2 April, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 2-4km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.
Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Weapons in violations of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
3 April
The SMM saw at least 23 self-propelled howitzers (13 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and 10 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
2 April
The SMM saw:
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) stationary on road M03 about 5km south-east of Minkivka (78km north of Donetsk) and
- three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) loaded on trucks heading east on road M03, about 4.5km north-east of Vesela Dolyna (64km north of Donetsk).
3 April
The SMM saw:
- 29 tanks (19 T-72 and ten T-64) loaded on flatbeds at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (see above) and
- a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Pryovrazhne (19km north-east of Mariupol).
Non-government-controlled areas
On 31 March, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- 12 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and
- 28 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)(for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn
At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region[3]
3 April
The SMM noted that seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
1 April
An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).
3 April
The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) within a residential area of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
1 April
An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (two BMP-1, two BMP variants and one BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).
2 April
The SMM saw seven IFVs (BMP variants) in Nova Marivka (64km south of Donetsk).
Electronic counter measure systemin non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region
On 2 April, the SMM saw an electronic counter measure system (RB-341V LEER-3) on a military truck (KamAZ-5350) near Konkove (non-government-controlled, 79km south of Donetsk), heading south on road T-0508 (in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014).
Presence of mines and a mine hazard sign
On 1 April, about 3km east of Novotoshkivske, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 64 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across road T-1303 in four rows and the remainder north of the same road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 June 2018). On 3 April, the SMM saw six anti-tank mines (possible TM-62) laid within 2m of the edge of road T-0504, about 180m south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), near previously observed mines (see SMM Daily Report 30 March 2019).
On the eastern edge of Nova Marivka, the SMM again saw a fallen tree spanning more than half of the width of a road, with a white board with “Stop! Mines” written on it in Russian, assessed as an improvised mine hazard sign.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- After the SMM refused to show its patrol plan, two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).
- An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “orders from his superiors”.
- A minivan and five nearby members of the armed formations blocked a road north of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), thus preventing the SMM from proceeding onwards. One of them told the SMM that it could not proceed due to “ongoing operational activities” in the area.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On 1 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk) and Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).[5]
- On 3 April, staff at the Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to share information related to civilian casualties, citing instructions from those in control.
[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, Maiorsk and Chermalyk were partially operational.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3]The SMM visited an area previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that such site continued to be abandoned.
[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons
[5]The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.