Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 February 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations and Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staromykhailivka, at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, as well as in government-controlled Taramchuk.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (220), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 275 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south and west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), at westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and again in areas south-east, south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 53 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 300 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 24 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 25 February, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard seven undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as seven shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same day, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3]

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

The SMM saw:

24 February

• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three tanks (T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk) and
• three mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled

25 February

The SMM saw:

• a tank (type undetermined) at a train station in Pokrovsk (formerly Krasnoarmiisk, 55km north-west of Donetsk) and

• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33) near Zoria (22km north-east of Mariupol).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

24 February

The SMM noted that:

• nine howitzers (seven 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and two D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

25 February

The SMM noted previously observed weapons.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• five armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (61km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

On 23 February, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man wearing green camouflage clothing standing in front of a green sport utility vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates, apparently recording the SMM with a hand-held camera.

Recent impact craters

On 23 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 recent craters, assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, in a wooded area (non-government-controlled), about 500m south of the Zolote disengagement area.

On 24 February, an SMM mini-UAV spotted fresh damage to a house (part of its roof destroyed), assessed as caused by an artillery or mortar round, within a residential area of government-controlled Zolote. The same UAV spotted also 14 fresh craters, assessed as impacts of artillery or mortar rounds, in a nearby field (one of the craters was 2m from a house).

New mine hazard signs

The Mission saw for the first time two mine hazard signs with a “skull and crossbones” and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian placed on the south-western edge of a local road about 4km north-east from Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk). About 300m south of that location, the Mission saw for the first time a sign advising in Ukrainian how to act in case of spotting an explosive object.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water transmission lines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border area outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with "LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates, as well as one with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), three buses (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians (12 men and two women, 25-40 years old) exiting Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw five cars (two with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage on two occasions, after the Mission refused to show its patrol plan. Both times they cited “demining activities in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “military movements in the area”.
• At a checkpoint in Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing demining operations”.
• The SMM was unable to visit a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The site was locked and no personnel were present.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras at Oktiabr mine and in Svitlodarsk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.