Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 January 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Damage to a house in Chermalyk and small-arms damage to a hospital in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and observed newly dug trenches inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access in all three disengagement areas continued.*

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Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in south-westerly and westerly directions of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including at least 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and north-north-west of Kadiivka (non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk). Positioned in Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 31km west of Luhansk), the SMM also heard at least ten outgoing explosions and salvos of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and ten explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS rockets, all at an assessed range of 5-10km south (assessed as live-fire training exercises outside the security zone but with the weapons being in violation of withdrawal lines).

Damage to a house in Chermalyk and small-arms damage to hospital windows in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

In Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at 25 Nikitina Street a man (in his sixties) showed the SMM eight holes in a south-south-east-facing external wall of his single-storey house. The SMM could not assess if the damage was fresh, the type of projectile(s) that caused the holes or the direction of fire. The man told the SMM that he had been at home with his wife during the afternoon of 23 January when he had heard impacts on his house.

At a functioning hospital on the south-western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed holes and broken glass in two windows on a north-north-west facing wall (one on the first floor and one on the third floor). The SMM assessed that the two holes and broken glass were caused by small-arms fire. Staff at the hospital told the SMM that they had discovered the damage on 23 January.

Disengagement areas[2]

Inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), on 24 January an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recently-dug trench about 200m south of the northern edge and about 500m west of its eastern edge, and another recently-dug trench about 150m south of its northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.   

On 25 January, positioned on the south-western edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 50 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-2.1km south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of an undetermined weapon and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 5-5.5km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

25 January

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) being transported north on a truck  near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk),
• an anti-tank guided missile system (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) on the north-western edge of Chermalyk.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas:

25 January:

The SMM saw:

• four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk), one loaded on the train platform and three lined up to be loaded,
• three self-propelled mortars (2S9) on trucks, five self-propelled mortars (2S9) loaded on railway flatbeds and three self-propelled mortars (2S9) on a railway ramp, all at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas:

25 January:

The SMM saw:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons storage sites:

A heavy weapons permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region:

25 January:

• seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

25 January

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) north-west of Chermalyk;
• an APC (BTR-60) being towed near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-60) being towed near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs

In north-eastern Sopyne (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), next to a transformer station and an antenna (about 30m tall) assessed as for telecommunications, the SMM observed two mine hazard signs affixed to a fence. The signs were red, with “Danger Mines” written in Russian in white lettering. About 3km north of Lyse (non-government-controlled, 22km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a mine hazard sign for the first time, written in Russian and placed about 2m north of the road.

SMM facilitation of maintenance works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one minivan (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine as well as two cars (one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates) and two passenger buses (route marked in Russian as Moscow to Donetsk) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some of the SMM cameras.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.