Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 December 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded over 60 ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violations of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a compound near Donske.*
• The Mission monitored a public gathering in Kyiv.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, about 200 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) including about 30 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and impacts of artillery and mortar fire.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions). About half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) and south-south-west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

In the late afternoon of 13 December, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1.5-4km south-east and south-south-east, 55 projectiles in flight (the majority from northerly to southerly directions) and one muzzle flash, all at an assessed range of 1.5-4km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south-south-west (all the above were assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as a projectile in flight (from north to south) at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).The following day, the same camera recorded a projectile in flight south to north at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the afternoon of 14 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

13 December

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) under camouflage netting near Dyliivka (49km north of Donetsk); and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 December

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Novyi (54km west of Luhansk).

Indications of military presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

13 December

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Dacha (53km north of Donetsk); and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Ozarianivka.

14 December

• An IFV (BMP-1) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• An IFV (BTR-4) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• four anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk);
• An armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) and five IFVs (BMP-2) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• An IFV (BMP-2) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk).

The SMM also heard the sound of rotary wing aircraft (probably helicopter) flying in areas near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk).

Demining activities

The SMM saw that a previously observed piece of unexploded ordnance had been removed from the asphalt on road H-15 near the checkpoint of the armed formations east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to damaged houses in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Public gathering in Kyiv

The SMM saw a peaceful public gathering in front of the cross outside the Parliament building. The SMM saw about 200 people (mixed gender and ages) and ten priests, assessed as members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, leading the group in prayers. The SMM also saw ten law enforcement officers and four police buses, three buses of the National Guard and four anti-riot camouflaged transport vehicles stationary nearby. The SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 11 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was denied access to a compound in Donske (government-controlled, 57km south of Donetsk) by three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers who told the SMM it could not access the facility without “permission from superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 13 December, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near non-government-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk) and Yasne (25km south-west of Luhansk). [4]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.