Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed impact sites in Horlivka. The SMM recorded an explosion inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas; it was also restricted again near Zaichenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of agreed withdrawal lines in Bezimenne. The SMM observed long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and maintenance to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka and to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema, as well as demining in Pishchane.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100).           

On the evening of 25 September, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-west and south.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, a muzzle flash and 16 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 0.5-4km south, south-south-west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded five undetermined explosions and about 150 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), all 2-4km east-north-east and east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 September, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded about 30 projectiles in flight (mostly from north-north-west to south-south-east) 2-4km south-east and south-south-east as well as a muzzle flesh 2-4km south-south-west.

During the day on 26 September, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and about 40 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km north, south-west and west.

Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km north, west, north-west and north-north-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (34 explosions).

During the day on 26 September, positioned 2km south-east of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 7-9km south-east.

The SMM observed impact sites in Horlivka. At 13 Nansena Street in Horlivka’s Shakhta Haharina neighbourhood, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the west-north-west-facing outer wall of a two-storey apartment building. The SMM also saw a west-north-west-facing shattered window on the second floor of the same building. The SMM saw a crater in a yard about 25m west-south-west of a two-storey apartment building at 11 Nansena Street. The SMM could not assess the weapon used or direction of fire. A group of residents in the same area (two women and four men) told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 23 September.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 26 September, positioned about 250m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned about 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire 300-500m north-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and four shots of small-arms fire 2-3km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.  

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five tanks (three T-64 and two T-72) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside government control in Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that five tanks (three T-64 and two T-72) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicle[3] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In a government-controlled area, on 26 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) about 1km west of Shumy (41km north of Donetsk) and  an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk). On 26 September, the SMM saw an APC near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and two amphibious transporters (PTS-2) in a compound in Luhansk city. At an airfield in the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city, the same UAV spotted a recently flattened field surrounded by berms, assessed as a newly built shooting range and part of a training area (inside the security zone). At about 100m south-east of the shooting range, the SMM UAV also spotted a man, assessed as a member of the armed formations.   

While conducting an SMM mid-range UAV flight near Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw, in a field approximately 200m south of its position, a group of five people wearing balaclavas and unidentified uniforms (two of them had a flag of the United Kingdom attached to the arm), launching an unmarked UAV flight. The SMM saw that they recalled the UAV after about a minute. The same group of people approached the SMM and asked in Russian to see identification of the SMM patrol members. The SMM did not comply with the request. About an hour later, at the same location, the SMM observed an unmarked UAV flying north to south at an altitude of about 300m above the SMM’s position.

The SMM observed the presence of mines. On 22 September, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines (AT-62) in a field about 4km south-east of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report of 17 July 2018.)

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure, including demining, to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka, and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM saw that a demining team had removed anti-tank mines from an area between road H15 and the entrance to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Stanytsia Luhanska and near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. A representative of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine told the SMM that demining activities in Pishchane (government-controlled, 22km north of Luhansk) were completed on 26 September.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians travelling across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. On 26 September, at a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, at 09:45 the SMM saw about 1,200 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queuing in the opposite direction. Approximately two hours later, the SMM saw about 1,000 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 50 people queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 50 minutes, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and seven with “DPR” plates), ten covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), two minibuses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw 16 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation and five with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck with Russian Federation licence plates entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 September 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (one visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superior” and “poor road conditions”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.