Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 15 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near Berezivske. The SMM observed military positions and a recently extended trench inside the Petrivske disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, near Starolaspa and Zolote-2/Karbonit, and again near Zaichenko. The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Sopyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical water infrastructure in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including a similar number of explosions (about 105), compared with the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 14 August, the SMM camera east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 31 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 4-6km east-north-east.

During the evening and night of 14-15 August, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 66 projectiles in flight, 21 muzzle flashes, a burst and an illumination flare, all 2-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-east.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, 73 projectiles in flight, three of which were assessed as rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), three bursts, two illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 0.1-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-east.

During the same evening and night, the SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded seven explosions assessed as airbursts, eight undetermined explosions, 83 projectiles in flight, an illumination flare in vertical flight and six muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the evening of 14 August, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-7km north-north-east.

On 15 August, positioned in Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 9-10 km south, assessed as live-fire training outside the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 14 August, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a 40m-long extension of a trench (not visible in imagery from 7 July 2018) which protrudes 5m into the disengagement area from its northern edge 300m from its eastern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. It spotted again military positions approximately 1km south from the area’s northern edge and 1.9km east from its western edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018.) The UAV also again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in four rows on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 170m north of the Petrivske disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 10 July 2018).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) north of Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 11 August the presence of 30 tanks (types undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); five tanks (types undetermined), seven probable self-propelled howitzers (or mortars) and a towed howitzer (or mortar) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); and 23 tanks (types undetermined) and 25 pieces of towed artillery (types undetermined) in a training area near Myrne.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region outside government control whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and a recently extended trench in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (a BTR-70 and a MRAP) near the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). On 14 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a recently dug trench, about 200m in length, near a road 1.5km north of Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

On 14 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted that over half of the total number of residential buildings in the Chyhari area of Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk) had been either destroyed by impacts of rounds from undetermined weapons or burnt down by fire. In Chyhari, the same UAV spotted several military positions consisting of networks of trenches connecting houses as well as underground bunkers. The UAV also spotted two destroyed minibuses (with a capacity of approximately 20-30 passengers) outside two burnt-down buildings. (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 June 2018 and SMM Daily Report 27 June 2018.)

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to a water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); water distribution infrastructure near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), Zolote and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk); and to a water channel junction near Stanytsia Luhanska.

On 14 August, the SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 27 cars (15 with Russian Federation, eight with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. At the same time, it saw 39 cars (17 with Russian Federation, 16 with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates,) and a minibus (with “DPR” plates and about 15 people on board) exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), from where the SMM has been receiving reports on civilian casualties.
• At a checkpoint 2km north-east of Starolaspa (non-government controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “an ongoing exercise of troops”.
• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Zolote2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk), the SMM was not allowed to pass after it had refused to disclose the nationalities of the patrol members to two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the disengagement area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six bursts of small-arms fire where the UAV was flying, 1.7-2km north-west of the SMM’s position, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV safely and departed the area.
• An SMM long-range UAV experienced multiple losses of signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over areas near Novopelahiivka (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Donetsk) and near Khartsyzk (non-government controlled, 26km east of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.