Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 15 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 14 and 15 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and the same number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; its access remained restricted in all three areas.* It was also restricted in areas of Donetsk region outside government control, including again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, and in Horlivka.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Novozvanivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). About 70 per cent of all the ceasefire violations occurred in areas south-east to west of Svitlodarsk. Between the evenings of 14 and 15 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 19 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 13-14 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east and south. During the day on 14 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east.

On the evening of 13 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 14 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and seven projectiles from north-west to south-east, followed by a total of 106 projectiles (83 from south-east to north-west and 23 from north-west to south-east) and 20 undetermined explosions, all 2.5-5km east-north-east. On the night of 14-15 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion and seven projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by a total of three undetermined explosions and eight projectiles (seven from south-south-east to north-north-west and one from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 2-5km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 13-14 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from east to west and two projectiles from west to east, followed by a total of 22 projectiles (11 from east to west and 11 from west to east), all 1-5km south.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations, including two explosions, more than the previous reporting period in which no ceasefire violations were recorded. Between the evenings of 14 and 15 July, the SMM recorded the same number of ceasefire violations as in the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early morning hours of 14 July, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 4-5km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 15 July, the SMM saw the tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), assessed as recent, in a field 2.5m east of a road about 100m north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ forward position near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area.

In the early morning hours of 14 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from east to west and an undetermined explosion, both 6-9km south-east and south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the night of 14-15 July, the same camera recorded two undetermined explosions and a burst from an undetermined weapon, all 0.5-6km east, south-east and south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 15 July, positioned in the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a black car with military licence plates and three men in military-style clothing inside, exiting the disengagement area.

On 14 July, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske for an hour, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 37 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 1-5km south-south-west and west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 15 July, positioned in or near all the disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, on 13 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw three tanks (T-64) near Velyka Novosilka (74km west of Donetsk) on 14 July and  a tank (type undetermined) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk) on 15 July.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.* In government-controlled areas, beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) present. It noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21), eight towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novozvanivka and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka, six IFVs (five BMP variant and one undetermined) near Zolote, two ACVs (type undetermined) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). Also on the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk). On 14 July, the SMM saw a stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Zolote-2 (62km west of Luhansk), a stationary IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and a stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 15 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina, an APC (BTR variant) near Zolote-2, and an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-CH) near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 13 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a military-type truck (KamAZ-4310) with an antenna assessed as belonging to the TORN radio intelligence system parked next to a civilian property near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk). On 14 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk). On 15 July, the SMM saw a stationary IFV (BMP variant) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) in a residential area in Dovhe.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire on 14 and 15 July. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

On 14 July, the SMM noted 50-60 unarmed Ukrainian Armed Forces members and two military trucks and two military cranes that were being used to repair a broken bridge south-west of Popasna on road T0504. (See SMM Daily Report 12 July 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report of 13 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 15 July, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing security reasons. The SMM saw several vehicles, with people in military-type clothing inside, pass through the checkpoint.
• On both 14 and 15 July, at a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing orders from superiors not to let the SMM through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 14 and 15 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC[4] on both occasions.
• On 14 and 15 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC5 on both occasions.
• On 14 and 15 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• On two occasions on 15 July, armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage through a checkpoint in Horlivka only after inspecting the SMM vehicle trunks.

Delay:

• On 14 July, Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region after the SMM patrol members refused to show their national passports. The SMM informed the JCCC and then was allowed to access the area 25 minutes later.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.