Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 June 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. In Sakhanka, the SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty and observed fresh damage to civilian infrastructure. It continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted at a checkpoint in Maiorsk and in Naberezhne. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas. The Mission continued to monitor the security situation around the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema. The SMM followed up on reports of an incident at a Roma community camp in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 265 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions).

On the evening and night of 7-8 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 1-4km south-east and their subsequent impacts 5-7km south-south-east, as well as about 45 undetermined explosions and about 1,400 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km east-south-east, south-east and east. On 8 June, at the same position, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 4-7km south-east.

On the evening and night of 7-8 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from west-south-west to east-north-east, four projectiles from east to west, 12 projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of 21 undetermined explosions, 85 projectiles (54 from west to east, three from east to west and 28 from north-west to south-east) and a burst of an unknown weapon, all 0.3-2km south.

On 7 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, an undetermined explosion, 16 projectiles from south-east to north-west, followed by totals of three undetermined explosions, 27 projectiles (eight from north-west to south-east and 19 from south-east to north-west) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km east-north-east. On the night of 7-8 June, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile from south-east to north-west and a projectile from south to north, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions and 12 projectiles (nine from south-east to north-west, two from north-west to south-east and one from south to north), all 1-4km east-north-east.

On the evening of 7 June, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, a projectile in flight from south-east to north-west and a projectile from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by totals of 12 undetermined explosions, 14 projectiles (four from south-east to north-west and 11 from north-west to south-east) and five airbursts, all 2-6km north-east.

On 8 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions and 165 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 4-6km south-west.

Positioned 1.6km south-south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions and a shot of small-arms fire, all 3-7km south-south-east, south-south-west and south-west.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west, and heard and saw four explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 0.7-1.5km south-west.

Positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 2-4km south-west.

Positioned in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 28 explosions assessed as rounds of an automatic grenade launcher, three undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2.5km west-north-west and west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 74 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 45 explosions).

On the night of 7-8 June, positioned in the eastern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 75km north-west of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard 30 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 10-15km south-east.

On 8 June, while in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and 12 undetermined explosions, all 4-10km north.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty and observed fresh damage to civilian infrastructure in a residential area of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). At 28 Konstitutsii Street, the SMM saw a man (in his eighties) with a blood-stained bandage on his right arm and hand. He told the SMM that on the evening of 7 June he had been outside the house when he had heard sounds of shelling and had tried to find shelter in a garage, and that after the shelling he had felt pain in his left leg and seen blood on that leg. At the address, the SMM saw a damaged south-facing brick wall of a summer kitchen 2m west of the house and 15m west of the garage. It saw traces of a blast and shrapnel damage inside and outside the kitchen. Inside the kitchen, the SMM saw a destroyed brick oven. On the ground in a yard adjacent to the kitchen, it saw kitchen utensils and ceramic and wooden boards with shrapnel damage. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction.

At 18 Konstitutsii Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the ground about 15m south-west of the southern side of a two-storey house. The SMM saw two destroyed windows on the second floor of the house, on its south-facing side. It also observed shrapnel damage to an adjacent fence, 10m south-east of the crater and shrapnel pieces on the ground. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. Two residents of the house (a woman and a man, both in their fifties) told the SMM that the shelling had occurred around 20:00 on 7 June.

At 20 Konstitutsii Street, the SMM saw two fresh craters in the ground 3m and 10m south of the southern wall of a one-storey house. The SMM saw cuts, holes and abrasions in the wall. On the eastern side of the house, the SMM saw two shattered windows. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. A woman (in her fifties) present in the house told the SMM that the shelling had occurred around 19:00 on 7 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*                                                                                    

On the evening and night of 7-8 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, five projectiles in vertical flight and six undetermined explosions, all 8-14km east-north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Inside the Zolote disengagement area, on 7 June, in a residential area on the south-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted trenches (previously observed, see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2018), military positions and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2), as well as a newly extended trench, assessed as a few days old, about 150m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area. The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a newly dug trench inside the disengagement area on its eastern edge (assessed to have been dug between 25 April and 29 May 2018) as well as an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) about 100-200m north of the disengagement area. (See SMM Daily Report 5 June 2018).

On the night of 8 June, positioned near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard 35 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-6km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 7 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area about 6km south-east of Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) as well as 16 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and seven anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) engaged in an exercise in a training area about 2km south-east of Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 7 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk). On 8 June, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) being loaded onto a flatbed trailer near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 7 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 11 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), 25 tanks (15 T-64s and 11 T-72s) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) in a training area about 2km south-east of Buhaivka and seven towed howitzers (D-30) and ten tanks (T-64) in a training area about 6km south-east of Miusynsk (see above). The same day, aerial imagery revealed the presence of ten battle tanks (type undetermined) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk), 18 battle tanks (type undetermined), 18 pieces of self-propelled artillery (type undetermined) and 18 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), as well as 56 battle tanks (type undetermined) about 4km south-east of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) and 12 MLRS (BM-21) and noted that one surface-to-air missile system (9K35), 11 MLRS (BM-21) and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 7 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) in Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 7 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR variant) near Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) and two military-type trucks (KamAZ-4310) with an antenna belonging to the TORN radio intelligence system near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 6 June 2018.)

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 7 June, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 85 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a field south of a road, 1.6km east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 5 April 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor the security situation around the DFS. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table for ceasefire violations).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored a gathering near the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk. It saw about 100 people and around 20 police and military officers present. On the site, a resident (woman, in her fifties) of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that the protest was in support of a former Head of Military-Civil Administration. Throughout the gathering the SMM observed a calm situation.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM monitored adherence to a window of silence and facilitated reportedly a transfer of funds from non-government to government-controlled areas in relation to a water utility payment.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of an incident at a Roma community camp on the evening of 7 June in a park in the Sviatoshynskyi district. According to a statement of the local police, after members of the Roma community had been requested to leave the park, park workers began dismantling the camp structures and clearing the area. The police said that a group of people wearing T-shirts with the Natsionalni Druzhyny insignia had gone to the site and had been tearing down the structures with axes and hammers while recording their own actions and preventing the park workers from clearing up the area. The police said it had launched an investigation into the incident as per Article 296 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code (hooliganism). On 8 June, the SMM visited the park and observed debris and wreckage of what it assessed used to be parts of the demolished structures, including pieces of wood, plastic, glass and rusted metal. It saw three tractors and about 35 men wearing face covers and white protective suits removing the debris and wreckage from the site.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example see SMM Daily Report of 6 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint in Maiorsk Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel told the SMM that the checkpoint was closed. The SMM left the area.
• In Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of the armed formations said they needed permission from their superiors to allow the SMM to enter the village. The SMM left the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km west of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. [3]

Other impediments:

• An SMM mid-range UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over areas near Vedenske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol).[4]
• An SMM long-range UAV experienced repeated jamming while flying over areas near Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk), Horlivka, Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), Dolomitne (non-government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), Myrne (non-government-controlled) and Bilorichenskyi (non-government-controlled, 22km south-west of Luhansk).

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.