Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 9 and 10 February compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 10 and 11 February compared with the previous 24 hours. Small arms were again fired near an SMM patrol and toward an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it observed a calm situation in all three. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Siedove near the border with the Russian Federation and in Styla.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Styla and Donetsk city. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure near Pervomaisk. The Mission visited two border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 400) between the evenings of 9 and 10 February, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). Between the evenings of 10 and 11 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 9 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, three projectiles in flight from west to east, three projectiles from east to west, two undetermined explosions and a projectile in vertical flight, all 0.5-1.5km south. The following day, the same camera recorded 29 undetermined explosions, 68 projectiles in flight (12 from east to west and 56 from west to east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.5-1.5km south. In the early morning of 11 February, the camera recorded six undetermined explosions and 22 projectiles in flight (13 from west to east and nine from east to west), all 0.5-1.5km south.

On the evening of 9 February, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 51 explosions (34 assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, 15 assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons, one assessed as an outgoing mortar (82mm) round and one assessed as an outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) round), all 4-8km south-east. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions (20 assessed as outgoing artillery (152mm) rounds, eight assessed as outgoing artillery (undetermined calibre) rounds, two assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons and the remainder undetermined), all 6-7km north and north-east. On the evening of 10 February, while at the same location, the SMM heard three explosions (two assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and one assessed as the impact of an artillery (122mm) round) and over 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-4km south. The following day, from the same location, the SMM heard 56 explosions (12 assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds, five as outgoing IFV (BMP-1) cannon rounds, nine as outgoing recoilless gun (SPG‑9, 73mm) rounds and the remainder undetermined), five shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire and about 20 bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-8km south, south-east and east.

On 10 February, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard about 160 undetermined explosions 10-15km south-west over a 21-minute period. The same day, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 132 undetermined explosions and 69 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-west and 16 undetermined explosions 2-3km south and south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 50) between the evenings of 9 and 10 February, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). Between the evenings of 10 and 11 February, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On 10 February, positioned west-south-west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions 13-18km west as well as bursts of IFV (BMP-2) cannon and heavy-machine-gun fire 3-7km west.

Small arms were again fired toward an SMM UAV (see SMM Daily Report 10 February 2018 and SMM Daily Report 7 February 2018). While flying a mini-UAV near Klishchiivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) on 10 February, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire emanating approximately 500m north-west of its position, from the area above which the UAV was flying. The SMM assessed that the shots had likely been aimed at the UAV; it landed the UAV, which was undamaged, and departed the area. Imagery taken by the UAV later revealed several tents adjacent to a trench system and three people, one of whom can be seen aiming an assault rifle at the UAV.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 10 and 11 February, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

On 10 February, approximately 3-4km east of Petrivske (non-government-controlled), the SMM observed three freshly excavated trenches, three cylindrical objects assessed as possible propelling charges and a wooden crate likely used for storing and transporting rockets of multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in areas outside of government control, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) travelling west near Styla (34km south of Donetsk)* on 10 February and a stationary tank (type undetermined) in Donetsk city on 11 February.

In government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM saw four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed south on 11 February.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 53 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (four 2B9M Vasilek, 82mm, and three M120-115 Molot, 120mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 10 February, the SMM saw a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Petrivka (27km north of Luhansk), an APC (MT-LB) near Kyrylivka (26km north-east of Mariupol) and three APCs (BTR-80) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol). The following day, the SMM saw four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), an IFV (BTR-4) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Ozerianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Near non-government-controlled Petrivske on 10 February, the SMM saw an APC (BTR‑60).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of anti-tank mines and mine hazard signs in the security zone. Between Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (non-government-controlled, formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed approximately ten surface-laid TM-62-type anti-tank mines, at least one of which consisted of a TM-62M body with a plastic MVP-62 fuse. Near Panteleimonivka (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time a square yellow sign with “MINES” written on it in Russian in red letters.

On 10 and 11 February, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Mykhailivka-Almazna high voltage power line near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour on 10 February, the SMM observed seven cars, two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 67 pedestrians exiting Ukraine as well as 16 cars, three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates), a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), and 11 pedestrians (four men and seven women) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for half an hour on 11 February, the SMM observed eight cars (four with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates; two with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and 13 cars (five with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with undetermined licence plates; four with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 10 February, while the SMM was observing a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) travelling through Styla (see above), a dark green Kamaz truck with white-on-black licence plates blocked a junction in front of an SMM patrol. The driver of the truck, a man in military-style attire, told the SMM that he had been ordered to prevent the SMM from proceeding for ten minutes.

• On 11 February, at a checkpoint north of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 106km south of Donetsk) near the border with the Russian Federation, three armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from entering the village, saying that they were “under orders” not to let the SMM pass. The SMM has been prevented from entering the village since late April 2017.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 10 and 11 February, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]

• On 10 and 11 February, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

• On 10 and 11 February, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4

• On 10 and 11 February, the SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC on both occasions.4

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of February 2018.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.