Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 October 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region between the evenings of 29 and 30 September compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 30 September and 1 October the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous 24 hours. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded similar numbers of ceasefire violations between the evenings of 29 and 30 September and between 30 September and 1 October compared with the previous reporting period. While in government-controlled Kriakivka the SMM heard small-arms fire and two explosions nearby and immediately left the area. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere.* The SMM assessed impact sites in Dokuchaievsk and in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city. The Mission visited two border areas not under government control. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident at an ammunition depot in Kalynivka, Vinnytsia region.

In Donetsk region between the evenings of 29 and 30 September the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 56 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). Between the evenings of 30 September and 1 October the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 13 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the night of 29-30 September the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions and three tracer rounds in flight from west to east, followed by totals of five undetermined explosions, one explosion assessed as an impact, 73 tracer rounds from east to west, three from west to east, 25 from south to north, 11 from south-west to north-east, and one from south-east to north-west, all at undetermined distances north. On the night of 30 September–1 October the camera recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions, ten tracer rounds in flight from east to west and six tracer rounds in vertical flight, followed by totals of five undetermined explosions, 106 tracer rounds from east to west and 12 from west to east, all at undetermined distances north.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 29-30 September the SMM recorded two undetermined explosions and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south and south-east. Positioned at the same location on 30 September, the SMM recorded seven undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east.

On 30 September, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 2-3km west and north-west. Positioned on the south-western edge of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations between the evenings of 29 and 30 September, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (four explosions). It recorded similar numbers of ceasefire violations, including four explosions, between the evenings of 30 September and 1 October.

While in the area of government-controlled Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk) an SMM patrol heard two shots of small-arms fire 200-300m south-south-west followed by two undetermined explosions about 400m south-south-west. The SMM immediately left the area.

The SMM assessed fresh impact sites caused by gunfire in a residential area of “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk).

At 104 Lenina Street, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the south-facing wall of an apartment building and a gas pipeline in front of the building. One apartment on the fifth floor had a broken window and shrapnel marks on interior walls. The owner of the damaged apartment (a woman in her seventies) said she had been at home when the firing had started at about 21:00 on 28 September. Workers repairing the gas pipeline and several residents also said the shooting had started at about 21:00. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by 30mm rounds from a south-westerly direction.

At 106 Lenina Street the SMM saw broken west-facing windows of an apartment on the fifth floor. The apartment owner (a woman in her forties) said she had been at home with her son on 28 September when, at about 20:55, they heard something hit the building. She told the SMM they had hid in the next room until after the shooting stopped.

Near 100 Lenina Street the SMM observed damage to a tree caused by shrapnel. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by 30mm rounds from a south-westerly direction.

At 212 Lenina Street the SMM observed shrapnel damage to a gas pipeline running along the exterior of a building and to an apartment on the third floor. The SMM observed shrapnel marks on the exterior of the building between an air-conditioning unit and the balcony of a third-floor apartment and damage to the balcony and wall. The apartment owner (a woman in her fifties) said she and her husband had been at home when the shelling had started at about 21:00 on 28 September. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire but assessed the damage was caused by 30mm rounds.

At 3/2 Haidara Street the SMM observed that two south-facing windows and a west-facing wall of a house had been damaged by shrapnel. The owner (a man, aged 47) of the house said he had been home with his 75-year-old mother when the shooting had started at about 21:00 on 28 September. He said that neither of them had been injured. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by 30mm rounds fired from a south-westerly direction.

At 6 Stasiuka Street the SMM observed one entry hole in the roof and damage to the ceiling and internal wall of a house. The owner of the house (a woman in her fifties) said that her husband, son, and grandson had been in the house at the time of the incident, at about 21:00 on 28 September but that no one had been injured. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by 30mm rounds fired from a south-westerly direction.

The Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) showed the SMM an impact site at the Trudivski coal mine in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre). Four security guards in a guard house said that the area was struck on the evening of 30 September. They also showed the SMM a hole in the west-facing window of the guard house. The SMM saw fresh damage to a tree and small holes in the tarmac nearby. The SMM assessed the damage to the tarmac and tree was caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The guards told the SMM that their 52-year-old colleague had been wounded in the incident.

The SMM spoke with a 52-year-old man – a guard at the Trudivski mine – who said he had been injured when he had been felled by an explosion while at work at the mine on 30 September. He told the SMM he had sustained shrapnel wounds to his leg and had been treated at hospital.

The SMM followed up on reports that two Ukrainian border guards were killed in a mine blast near the border with the Russian Federation. The commander of a border guard unit stationed in government-controlled Harasymivka (38km north-east of Luhansk) told the SMM that on 28 September two border guards (aged 24 and 30) had been killed in a mine blast near the railway station in Illienko (27km east of Luhansk), about 1km west of the border with the Russian Federation. The State Border Guard Service Office in Starobilsk (85km north of Luhansk) also told the SMM that two border guards had been killed.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 September the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded one undetermined explosion and ten projectiles in flight (three from north to south, one from north-west to south-east, the rest undetermined) 3-10km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the night of 29-30 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska recorded one shot of small-arms fire about 2.3km south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area and one shot of small-arms fire 350m south-west of the camera, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the night of 29-30 September the SMM camera in a non-government-controlled area south of Stanytsia Luhanska near the Prince Ihor monument recorded two projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) or recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire and one shot (outgoing) followed by a subsequent explosion (impact) 2.2km north-north-west of the camera, all assessed as inside the disengagement area (all were also recorded by the SMM camera in the government-controlled part in Stanytsia Luhanska).

On the night of 28-29 September the SMM camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from east to west and one flare in vertical flight 2-3km south-west (both assessed to be inside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas the SMM observed 18 stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) on 1 October.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas on 1 October the SMM observed that one storage site continued to be abandoned and that 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) were absent.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 30 September the SMM saw a stationary military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM-2) near Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) and a stationary APC (BRDM-2) with a mounted automatic grenade launcher (AGS-variant) near government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) travelling in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 30 September and three stationary APCs (MT-LB) near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) on 1 October.

On 30 September the SMM observed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (quad-copter, white colour) west to east near “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) flying from west to east. Also on 30 September, the SMM observed a mini-UAV flying from south to north-east in government-controlled Zolote-4.

Residents in Pikuzy gave the SMM a letter – also addressed to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross – that outlined the difficulties faced by the residents (such as the lack of gas supply). At a meeting in Novoazovsk (“DPR”-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) where this letter was discussed, Pikuzy residents said that the village would be safer if “DPR” armed men were not in Pikuzy; the SMM observed two armed men in the village.

The SMM observed, for the first time,  unexploded ordnance (UXO) that it assessed as the tail of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rocket (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) embedded on the shoulder of the E-40 road 3km south of “LPR”-controlled Fabrychne (10km south of Luhansk).

The SMM again facilitated and monitored clearance of mines and UXO, co-ordinated by the JCCC, of the M03 road between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve. Following the removal, the SMM could use the road to travel between the towns.

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. During the course of about an hour at the border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 16 cars (eight with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates), one bus (Ukrainian licence plates, with around 25 passengers) towing a second bus (Ukrainian licence plates, no passengers), and 19 pedestrians (six men, 13 women) enter Ukraine. The SMM observed a queue of 20 cars (14 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates), one bus “Sverdlovsk–Rostov-on-Don” (with Russian Federation licence plates, around 20 passengers) and 25 pedestrians (ten men, 14 women, one child) queuing to exit Ukraine.

During the course of about an hour at the Izvaryne border crossing point (52km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed the following vehicles enter Ukraine: 22 cars (16 with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates), three buses (Ukrainian license plates, one marked “Luhansk-Moscow” with 30-35 passengers, one marked “Pervomaisk-Moscow” with 35-40 passengers, one marked “Moscow-Luhansk” with at least 45 passengers; all signs in the Russian language), and one covered cargo truck (Ukrainian licence plates). About 50 pedestrians (about equal numbers men and women) entered Ukraine. In the same period, the SMM observed 27 cars (20 with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates), five covered cargo trucks (all with Ukrainian license plates), two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates, each with 30-35 passengers; one marked “Rovenky-Kyiv” line and one marked “Kyiv”, in the Russian language) and 40 pedestrians exit Ukraine.

On 29 September, the SMM visited Kalynivka (230km north-east of Chernivtsi) and observed a calm situation following the explosion at an ammunition depot on 26 September. (See SMM Daily Report 29 September 2017.) The SMM heard an explosion 1.5km south of its position which corresponded to the location of the ammunition depot. In the village of Pavlivka, about 2km north of the depot, the SMM saw damage to the roofs of about 20 houses and that one house had been completely destroyed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 1 October Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a compound in Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 30 September the possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing the road leading west from Petrivske. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• On 30 September and 1 October the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times. 
• On 30 September and 1 October the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.
• On 30 September and 1 October the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.
• On 30 September and 1 October the SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC both times.

Conditional access:

• On two occasions on 1 October armed men stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and searched SMM vehicles, before allowing its passage.  

[1] Please see the annexed report for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.