Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 4 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM again asked armed forces and formations what orders or codes of conduct they had received following the recommitment to cease fire from 25 August, as well as instructions on interaction with the SMM. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at a heavy weapons holding area outside government control in Donetsk region.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Anadol. It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance to the Horlivka-Toretsk pipeline and a water pipe near Novotoshkivske. It continued to monitor the start of the school year on both sides of the contact line. The Mission visited a border area not under government control. The SMM monitored two gatherings in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] – including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 30) – compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening of 3 September, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km west.

On the night of 3-4 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded two tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east 4km east-south-east. During the day on 4 September, positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east.

On the evening and night of 3-4 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one tracer round in flight from east to west, two illumination flares in vertical flight, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, 15 tracer rounds from east to west, one undetermined explosion and one illumination flare in vertical flight, all at unknown distances north.

On 4 September, positioned 1km north-west of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), in ten minutes the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 2-3km south.

Positioned 3km north-east of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk), in about one hour the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2km north-east and ten explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 2-5km east.

Positioned in government-controlled Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-4km south-west and two undetermined explosions 5-7km north-east.

Positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-10km west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations – including, however, a similar number of explosions (four) – compared with the previous 24 hours.

Positioned 3km south-east of “LPR”-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1.5km south.

The SMM again asked armed forces and formations what orders they had received following the recommitment to cease fire from 25 August, as well as instructions on interaction with the SMM. Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders at checkpoints in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that they had been informed about the recommitment to cease fire and had signed documents to indicate that they understood it. They said they did not have any copies of the documents.

At a checkpoint in Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk), the commander of a Ukrainian National Guard unit showed the SMM the front page of a document which stated that a decision had been taken on a recommitment to cease fire.

In Petrivka (formerly Petrivske, 77km north-west of Donetsk) the commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit showed the SMM an order dated 28 April 2017 which detailed how the unit should interact with the SMM. In Ivanivka (59km south-west of Donetsk), the commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit said he was aware of orders that outlined interaction with the SMM but that copies were not available.

At checkpoints in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk), Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk), and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), commanders of Ukrainian Armed Forces units told the SMM that they were aware of the recommitment to cease fire. At Ukrainian Armed Forces compounds in Nikolske (formerly Volodarske, 97km south of Donetsk) and Portivske (14km south-west of Mariupol), the SMM was told that all personnel had been informed verbally about the recommitment. None of the commanders or personnel that the SMM spoke with in these locations said that they had been given any instructions on how to interact with the SMM.

In Azovske (22km south-west of Mariupol), the commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces unit told the SMM that he had been informed verbally about the recommitment to cease fire and had received orders regarding his interaction with SMM. When the SMM asked to see copies of the documents, he referred the SMM to Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) headquarters. Similarly, in Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces lieutenant colonel told the SMM that his unit had received instructions related to the recommitment, but that he could not show it to the SMM because it contained sensitive information.

In Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM spoke with Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders at two checkpoints. One said that he had been verbally informed about the recommitment to cease fire and had received instructions on how to interact with the SMM. At the other checkpoint, the SMM was told that they had signed an order related to the recommitment to cease fire and that it had already been returned to their commanding unit.

At a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound in Anadol (39km north of Mariupol) the commander of the unit told the SMM that they had been verbally informed of the recommitment to cease fire and had received instructions on how to interact with the SMM. At checkpoints on the eastern edge of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) and on road E58 near Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said that they were aware of the recommitment to cease fire.

At a checkpoint on road M03, in the northern outskirts of Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said that they had not received any orders related to a recommitment to cease fire.

In Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol), an officer at the Ukrainian Armed Forces command post said he did not wish to discuss the recommitment to cease fire with the SMM. He further explained to the SMM that they had orders to “engage infiltrators within range of their small arms when seen”.

In “DPR”-controlled Naberezhne (33km north-east of Mariupol), two armed persons told the SMM that they had been informed verbally about the recommitment to cease fire but did not know whether any written orders had been issued.

On 1 September, an armed person at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city and five armed persons in the Trudivskyi area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of city centre) told the SMM that they had been informed verbally about the recommitment to the ceasefire.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 4 September, positioned 1km south-east of the bridge south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 4km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. While in the eastern part of the town, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5km south-south-east and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4km west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines the SMM saw three stationary howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) 1km south of government-controlled Anadol (65km south of Donetsk).

Beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, near “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw three tanks (T-72) heading south.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In areas not under government control beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 11 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were again missing. At another area, the SMM observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing. The Mission was denied access to a heavy weapons holding area.*

The SMM observed unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 3 September, about 200m west of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint 3.5km east of Popasna, the SMM saw the tailfin of an 82mm mortar round protruding from the asphalt road for the first time. On 4 September, the SMM saw that it had been removed.

In Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw the tailfin of a mortar round (calibre unknown) for the first time about 2m east of a paved road next to a bus stop. The UXO was about 40m east of the nearest house, 200m east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces position and 1.5km west of an “LPR” position.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance on both sides of the contact line, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the pipeline between government-controlled Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Horlivka and to water pipes in government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the start of the school year and spoke with teachers in schools on both sides of the contact line. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM visited four schools: two in Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) and two in Yasynuvata. Directors of both schools in Makiivka and of one of the schools in Yasynuvata told the SMM that the schools were functional and had not been used by armed persons. At one school in Yasynuvata, the director told the SMM that there were only half as many students enrolled in 2017 compared with 2016. At the other school in Yasynuvata, three caretakers told the SMM that the school had closed on 1 April due to the small number of enrolled students and security risks related to recurrent damage as a result of the armed violence.

In Makiivka, both directors told the SMM that a similar number of students remained enrolled in the schools despite both schools having been damaged (one had been damaged in 2016 to the roof and windows which the director said had been caused by shelling and had since been repaired). The director of one of the schools in Makiivka said that the school had regular power cuts, while at the other school, the director said that they had adequate water and electricity.

In government-controlled areas, the SMM visited four operational schools: one in Vasiukivka (82km north-east of Donetsk), one in Svitlodarsk, one in Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol) and another in Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk). The school director in Vasiukivka told the SMM that the school had been recently renovated and the deputy director in Luhanske said that there were checkpoints 1-2km from the school (the SMM has seen one checkpoint 1-2km north-west and another 1-2km south-west).

The SMM visited a border area not under control of the Government. At a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), in about half an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and one passenger bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine and 14 cars (five with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates) and one truck with covered cargo areas (with Ukrainian licence plates) and one passenger bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM monitored two gatherings in Kyiv. On 3 September, the SMM saw about 60 people (mostly men aged 20-30) wearing T-shirts with logos of the movements C14 and National Corps in front of a store on 4 Hrushevskoho Street in Kyiv. (According to media reports, graffiti related to events on Maidan had been cleaned off the walls of the store.) The SMM saw that one of the store’s windows was broken and also saw a stack of tyres in front of the store. At least one of the tyres was burning. The SMM saw fresh graffiti in Ukrainian language on the front of the store and black-and-red spray paint on the windows. The fresh graffiti included messages related to the events on Maidan. The SMM also saw egg shells on the sidewalk and black paint splashed across the store’s sign. The SMM saw about ten police cars parked nearby, 15 police officers standing in front of the store and about ten police officers wearing riot gear about 15m away. The gathering concluded without incidents.

On 4 September, the SMM saw about 100 people (men and women aged 35-50) gathered in front of the building of the Cabinet of Ministers in Kyiv. Participants were holding posters with messages in Ukrainian demanding compensation from authorities for property that had been damaged or destroyed, or had become inaccessible, in eastern Ukraine. One participant (woman aged 40-50) told the SMM that she had left Donetsk region with four daughters in August 2014 and had nowhere to return to because their househad been destroyed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing a heavy weapons holding area in a part of Donetsk region outside government control as the gates were locked and nobody was present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.