Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 28 August 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations in the vicinity of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and it saw a grenade fixed to a fence in a passageway used by pedestrians on the south side of the bridge. Its access remains restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere, including again in Verkhnoshyrokivske and to a heavy weapons holding area not under government control. An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Oleksandropil and Zelene Pole. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance to infrastructure in Zolote and Krasnyi Lyman. The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 15 explosions).

On the evening and night of 27-28 August, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one illumination flare in vertical flight, one tracer round in vertical flight, one undetermined explosion, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, three tracer rounds in flight from west to east and 44 tracer rounds from east to west, all at unknown distances north.

On the evening and night of 27-28 August, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts and shots of automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-east and south-south-east.

On 28 August, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and about 45 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-4km west-north-west.

Positioned about 2.3km south-south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard 15 minutes of uncountable overlapping bursts and shots of small-arms fire assessed as a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (no ceasefire violations).

On 28 August, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Shyshkove (11km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard three explosions assessed as the detonations of mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) 5km south (see below).

On 25 August the senior Russian Federation officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the leadership of armed formations in non-government-controlled areas had informed all “commanders” about the recommitment to the ceasefire. Armed persons at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) and Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers at a checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that they were aware of the recommitment to the ceasefire. Armed persons at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to respond to the SMM’s questions on the topic.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 27 August, while on the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM heard ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-5km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and six shots of small-arms fire 4-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 28 August, near an armed formations’ position 4-5m south of the broken part of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, for the first time the SMM observed a hand grenade (with a fitted fuse and its pin visible) fixed to the side of a fence at knee-height. (The fence is along a narrow passage which is used by pedestrians when crossing the bridge.) On the other side of the passage, opposite the grenade, the SMM saw a wire and a hook attached to a tyre wall. The SMM assessed that the wire was long enough to reach across to the fence and be attached to the grenade which would enable it to be used as a booby trap.

On 28 August, positioned in government-controlled Zolote the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, on 27 August an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted seven stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) amongst civilian infrastructure in Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk), the same number as previously seen on 24 August (see SMM Daily Report 25 August 2017) and eight stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 27 August an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a self-propelled air-defence missile system (SA-13 Strela-10, 120mm) in Oleksandropil.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In areas not under government control beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and noted that three towed howitzers (one 2A65 and two S21) were again missing. At another area, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and, for the first time, two military-type trucks with ammunition parked next to the MLRS (BM-21). At another area, the SMM observed that six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a part of Donetsk region outside government control, whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines, and observed that ten tanks (three T-64 and seven T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government controlled areas, the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) in Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) travelling north and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM) south of Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) heading north-west.

In areas not under government control, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) heading north.

The SMM observed UXO – an artillery (122mm) shell - for the first time about 2m north of a road 3.6km south-west of “LPR”-controlled Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the water wells in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) by the Luhansk Water Company and to a water pipeline near Zolote.

The SMM saw a forest fire in the southern edge of “LPR”-controlled Metalist (7km north-west of Luhansk) and a fire brigade. The chief of the fire brigade told the SMM that the fire had caused the detonation of three pieces of UXO which the SMM assessed to have been the same explosions as those heard while positioned in Shyshkove (see above).

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. On 28 August, at the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), in about half an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (nine with Ukrainian licence plates and four with “DPR” plates), two passenger buses (with “DPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine and 19 cars (six with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates), six covered cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two fuel tankers (with Russian Federation licence plates) enter Ukraine.

At the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), in about half an hour, the SMM saw 12 cars (four with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and seven passenger buses (five with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine and 15 cars (four with Russian Federation and five with Ukrainian licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates), two passenger buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) enter Ukraine.

At the border crossing point in Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), in about one hour, the SMM saw 20 cars (nine with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates), two buses (one marked “Krasnyi Luch-Rostov” with around 40 passengers and one marked “Lugansk-Rostov” with around 20 passengers, both with Ukrainian licence plates) and eight pedestrians (four men and four women) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw 12 cars (seven with Russian Federation and five with Ukrainian licence plates), one bus (marked “Rostov-Stakhanov” with around 40-45 passengers with Ukrainian licence plates), five covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and nine pedestrians (three men and six women) enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Armed persons prevented the SMM from proceeding east at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed person denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a part of Donetsk region outside government control, citing an order from his superior. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• Three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers stopped the SMM at a checkpoint on road H20 near government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) citing orders from their superiors not to allow the SMM to pass. The SMM informed the JCCC and was able to proceed about 45 minutes later. 

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.