Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas. The SMM camera recorded explosions inside Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including again in Siedove (twice) and at a permanent storage site.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Vrubivka. The Mission facilitated and monitored repairs to the Mykhailivka-Shchastia Thermal Power Plant high-voltage power lines near Berdianka. The SMM followed up on reports of a lack of electricity in non-government-controlled parts of Zolote. The Mission visited three border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions).

On the night of 13-14 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west.

On 14 July, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-4km west, and about 15 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-east and south.

On the evening and night of 13-14 July, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions and about 50 bursts of small-arms fire, all 6-12km south-east.

On the evening and night of 13-14 July the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, two rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east, five tracer rounds in flight from west to east, one undetermined explosion, followed by aggregated totals of one undetermined explosion, one illumination flare in vertical flight and 133 tracer rounds (105 north-west to south-east, 19 west to east and nine east to west), all at unknown distances north and north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (64 explosions).

On 14 July, positioned on the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 2-3km south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 12-13 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded nine projectiles in flight (eight from north-west to south-east and one from north to south) 3-6km east-north-east and east, assessed as having occurred outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 13 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons about 1.6km south, assessed as having occurred inside the disengagement area.

The SMM remained unable to access its camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 210mm) in the northern edge of government-controlled Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk) moving south.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted on 29 June two surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near Myroliubivka (46km north-west of Donetsk). (This aerial imagery only recently became available to the SMM due to technical issues.)

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM continued to note that nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in “DPR”-controlled areas, whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines, and observed that one tank (T-64) was again missing. The SMM was not able to enter other storage buildings as a “DPR” member denied access.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw, on 13 July, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) mounted on flatbed trucks heading north near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and on 14 July one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM-2) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk). An SMM mini UAV spotted one APC (MTR-60) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk) on 13 July.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the high voltage power line between the Mykhailivka substation (in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote) and the Thermal Power Plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). Near “LPR”-controlled Berdianka (45km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw six workers conducting an assessment of the power lines.

The SMM followed up on reports of a lack of electricity due to shelling-related damage in “LPR” controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk). A group of five residents of Zolote-5 (both men and women) told the SMM on 14 July that there had been no electricity supply to the northern part of the town in the past five days.

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. At the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), in about half an hour the SMM saw 18 cars (nine with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw five cars (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) and one bus (with “DPR” plates) enter Ukraine.

At the border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east from Donetsk), in about 25 minutes the SMM saw 16 cars (seven with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates), 11 trucks (seven with Ukrainian, two with Belorussian, one Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw seven cars (five with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), three buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 25 pedestrians enter Ukraine.

At the border crossing point in Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), for about one hour, the SMM saw ten pedestrians exiting Ukraine and no one enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.          

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1.2km north-west of “DPR”-controlled Siedove (33km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members again stopped an SMM patrol and denied it to proceed further on the road towards Siedove, citing orders from superiors. The SMM informed the JCCC. (See SMM Daily Report 13 July 2017.)
• Later the same day, at the same checkpoint Siedove, a “DPR” member in plain clothes stopped another SMM patrol and claimed that a prior consent from a “DPR” structure was required for it to enter the town of Siedove as it was “a border area with a special entry-exit status”. (The SMM saw drivers and passengers enter a small building nearby before passing through the checkpoint.) Shortly thereafter, three armed men in military-style attire approached the SMM and, while refusing to identify themselves, demanded in an aggressive manner that the SMM leave the area. The SMM departed the checkpoint and informed the JCCC. (Earlier in the day the SMM had requested the JCCC accompany its visit to Siedove but it had declined.)
• The SMM was unable to access some buildings of a permanent storage site in “DPR”-controlled areas as an armed “DPR” member said he had no keys to open them. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.