Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, and more in Luhansk region – including almost 300 explosions overnight while in Popasna – compared with the previous reporting period.The Mission continued monitoring the three disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of respective withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.The Mission facilitated and monitored repairs to the Mykhailivka-Almazna high-voltage power lines. It asked the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination to establish a permanent presence at the SMM’s office building in Donetsk city.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including about 200explosions, compared to the previous reporting period (almost 1,000 explosions).[1]

In the early morning of 30 June, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and 12 shots of anti-aircraft cannon fire, all 8-10km north-west.

Later in the morning, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded one undetermined explosion 3-4km east-north-east. While positioned in Avdiivka, also in the morning, the SMM heard – during an hour and a half –20 undetermined explosions, as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 1-5km east and south-east. While positioned 2.5km west-north-west of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 2-3km west and north-west.

At mid-day, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard – during three and a half hours –nine undetermined explosions and small-arms fire 2-5km at directions ranging from south-east to west, almost 30 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-west, and one undetermined explosion 10-15km north.

Positioned 1.6km west-south-west of government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (four of 122mm mortars and four of undetermined weapons), all 3-6km south and south-west. Positioned 2.7km west-north-west of the town, the SMM heard over 60 undetermined explosions 3-6km at directions ranging from south to west.

On the evening and night of 29 June, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing 122mm artillery rounds 6-7km north-north-west, and 16 explosions assessed as outgoing 82mm mortar rounds, about 250 shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), about 250 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and at least 50 bursts and 50 shots of small-arms fire, all 4-6km south-east and south-south-east.

On the night of 29-30 June, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, seven tracer rounds in flight from east to west, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from south-west to north-east, ten tracer rounds from west to east, two rocket-assisted projectiles from west to east, one undetermined explosion, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, four tracer rounds from west to east, two rocket-assisted projectiles from south-west to north-east, 13 tracer rounds from east to west, 21 tracer rounds from west to east, six undetermined explosions, five tracer rounds from west to east, three undetermined explosions, 14 tracer rounds from east to west, two tracer rounds from west to east, two tracer rounds from east to west, two tracer rounds from west to east, four tracer rounds from east to west, four tracer rounds from west to east, 14 undetermined explosions, 14 tracer rounds from east to west, one illumination flare in vertical flight, one tracer rounds from west to east, two tracer rounds from east to west, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, seven tracer rounds from east to west, two tracer rounds from west to east, one rocket-assisted projectile from south to north, two tracer rounds from west to east, two tracer rounds from east to west, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, five undetermined explosions, 18 tracer rounds from east to west, four tracer rounds from west to east, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, five tracer rounds from east to west, three undetermined explosions, three tracer rounds from east to west, one undetermined explosion, 11 tracer rounds from east to west, one undetermined explosion, one rocket-assisted projectile from east to west, and one tracer round from east to west, all at unknown distances north and north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including almost 300 explosions, compared to the previous reporting period (about 33 explosions).

On the night of 29-30 June, while in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, in sequence: 14 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 5-10km north-west;ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and about 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all4km east; about 300 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-south-east; 60-70 airbursts of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) fire 4-5km south-west (the Mission also saw these); five explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 1-2km north-north-east;20 explosions assessed as 120mm mortar rounds and 10-15 explosions assessed as artillery (122mm and 152mm) rounds, all5-10km at directions ranging from east to south;10-15 explosions assessed as 122mm and 152mm artillery rounds 5-8km north-north-west;70-90 undetermined explosions3-5km south-south-east; 20-30 explosions assessed as impacts of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17, 30mm) fire and eight explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, all 3km east; two explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 10km east;and 17 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at an undetermined distance east.The SMM temporarily relocated from its forward patrol base in Popasna on the morning of 30 June.

During the day on 30 June, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne(63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 50 shots of small-arms fire 700m east-south-east, assessed as a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 30 June, positioned south of the bridge near government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire 300m east-north-east,  assessed as inside the disengagement area. Later in the morning, the Mission saw “LPR” members and the Russian representativeto the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination(JCCC), as well as media representatives, arrive at the site. Shortly before noon, the SMM saw an armed “LPR” member fire a white flare into the air.

On the night of 28-29 June, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded, in sequence, two undetermined explosions 5-6km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), one undetermined explosion 4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), three undetermined explosions 2-4km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), and one undetermined explosion 5-6km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 29 June an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) stationary near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission saw two stationary tanks (one T-72, one of undetermined type) near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) and, on 30 June, a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) travelling north near Panteleimonivka (26km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the Mission observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 13 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), and noted as missing 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12), 15 mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and five towed howitzers (D-30), as previously observed.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft cannon[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 29 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 15 IFVs (one BMP-1, eight BMP-2, six BMP-variant), six armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (one BTR-60, one BRDM-2, four MT-LBs), a fire control vehicle (MT-LB-variant), and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Popasna.(The UAV also spotted several fresh craters within 200m of some of the vehicles, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds.) On 30 June, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) and APC (BRDM) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 29 June an SMM mini UAV spotted one IFV (BMP-1), three APCs (BTR-70), one APC (MT-LB), and three fire control vehicles (MT-LB-variant) near Luhansk city.Another SMM mini UAV spotted fresh tracks assessed as those of artillery pieces, as well as several fresh craters assessed as caused by impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, near Lozove (13km west of Donetsk). The tracks and craters were within 100m of civilian houses.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to high-voltage power lines between the Mykhailivka substation (in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote) and “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk). Near “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw 12 workers carrying out repairs, and north of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw 14 workers carrying out repairs.

The SMM asked the JCCC to establish a permanent presence at the Mission’s office building in Donetsk city to assist in ensuring the SMM’s safety and security at that location.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.