Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM assessed a number of impact sites near Shchastia. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the Zolote disengagement area and saw a white signal flare fired from near a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including at a checkpoint near Sidove.* The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians travelling across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM visited one border area not under government control. It monitored gatherings in Dnipro and Odessa.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including 55 explosions, compared with compared with the previous 24 hours (20 explosions).

On the night of 25-26 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, one tracer round in flight from north to south, one tracer round in flight from west to east and one tracer round in flight from north to south, all 3-4km east-south-east. On 26 June, positioned in Avdiivka for about four hours, the SMM recorded one undetermined explosion 2-3km south.

On 26 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-5km ranging from west to north-west.

On the night of 25-26 June the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from east to west, one illumination flare in vertical flight, one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, followed by aggregate totals of 12 explosions (one assessed as an impact and 11 undetermined), seven rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east, 15 tracer rounds west to east, about 160 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, seven tracer rounds in flight from south to north, and seven tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east, all at undetermined distances north.

On the evening of 25 June, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west, five shots of small-arms fire 5-7km north-west and 11 undetermined explosions 10-12km north. 

On 26 June, positioned 8km south-west of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre for about one hour, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km south-south-west.

Positioned 1km west of government-controlled Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire approximately 600-800m east-north-east while conducting a flight of its mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the area. The SMM assessed that the shots were aimed at the UAV, which was approximately 850m east-north-east of the SMM’s position. The SMM recalled the UAV, which landed normally, without any evident damage. After approximately 20 minutes, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer approached the SMM stating that he had not been informed about the UAV flight and that one soldier from his unit had fired at it. Earlier in the day the SMM had informed, as per established practice, the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) about the plan to conduct the UAV flight in this area.   

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 13 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (no explosions).

On the evening and night of 25-26 June, while in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (two undetermined, four assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds and six as outgoing artillery (152mm) rounds), all 4-5km south-east.

The SMM assessed a number of impact sites near the contact line. Accompanied by a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC, the SMM observed four fresh impact sites near the bridge and a power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). The SMM saw a damaged concrete slab 3m east of the perimeter wall south-west of the power plant with the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round protruding, assessed as fired from an easterly direction. The SMM saw a fresh crater 20m east of the perimeter wall in a field, assessed as caused by a mortar round fired from an easterly direction. The SMM saw two additional fresh craters in a field about 100m east of the perimeter wall, assessed as caused by mortar rounds fired from a south-easterly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 24 June, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) recorded one projectile in flight from north-west to south-east 3km east, assessed as inside the disengagement area; one projectile in flight from north to south 3km east; and three projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west 4-6km south-south-west, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 25 June the same camera recorded one undetermined explosion 3-5km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 26 June, positioned 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw black and grey smoke rising 1-2km north-north-east; the SMM could not assess its source or whether it was inside the disengagement area. Later in the day, at 11:51, the SMM was positioned near the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge when it saw an armed “LPR” member fire a white flare up into the air. According to “LPR” members, the aim of the flare was to express their readiness to disengage. At 11:51 another SMM patrol positioned north of the bridge also saw a white flare. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had received no orders to disengage.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed that three towed anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again absent.

The SMM revisited a “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were again missing.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle[2] and tracks assessed as those of tanks in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw one stationary infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near the checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw multiple tracks assessed as those of tanks (T-64 and T-72) heading north and south near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), as well as multiple tracks, assessed as those of tanks (T-64 and T-72) near Mytkovo-Kachkari (32km north-east of Mariupol) heading west. The SMM saw a green sport utility vehicle (UAZ-469) with a heavy-machine-gun mounted on its rear near Yasynuvata on Ordzhonikidze Street, heading west.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians travelling across the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. On 26 June at the government checkpoint at 10:20, the SMM saw about 50 people queuing in both directions. The SMM observed that several of the wooden boards covering two ramps in the broken part of the bridge had been replaced. (See SMM Daily Report 22 June 2017).

The SMM visited one border area not under the control of the Government. Positioned at the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM observed 11 civilian vehicles (seven with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates) and one truck with Russian Federation licence plates queuing to exit Ukraine. The SMM saw one bus and two civilian vehicles with Ukrainian licence plates enter.

The SMM monitored gatherings in Dnipro and Odessa. On 24 June the SMM monitored a protest at Heroes of Maidan Square in Dnipro. About 30 people (mostly men between 20 and 35 years old) gathered at the square in 15 vehicles, carrying flags of Ukraine, “Automaidan”, and red-and-black flags. Some of them told the SMM that they were protesting against the appointment of a former Berkut commander as municipal police chief. (See SMM Report 3 June 2017.) At the same time the SMM observed another group of about 20-25 young men in about four vehicles obstructing participants’ exit from the square. An argument between the two groups followed and, after 20 minutes, the SMM saw the latter group allow the former to leave the square. Ten police patrol officers were present at the square throughout the time. The protesters then headed to the mayor’s residence, but the SMM did not continue to monitor the protest due to security concerns.   

Following up on media reports that a journalist and environmental activist had been attacked in the centre of Odessa and that the house of another activist had been broken into, on 26 June the SMM monitored a protest in front of the Odessa regional administrative building. About 400 demonstrators (men and women between 20 and 55 years old), including representatives of political parties, had gathered in front of the building. Some of them were wearing T-shirts depicting imagery associated with the Right Sector, the State Initiative of Yarosh (DIYA) and other self-defence groups. The SMM observed 15 national police and National Guard officers lined in formation to prevent protestors from entering the building of the regional administration building. There were additional 25 national police and National Guard officers in the rear of the building. Demonstrators were demanding a full investigation into the aforementioned attacks against the two activists. The SMM observed the head of the regional state administration come out of the building to address the demonstrators. He confirmed the two incidents and said that appropriate police procedures had been initiated. By 18:00 the SMM noted that the number of protestors had decreased to 100.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• On 26 June Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXOs, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• On 26 June a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• On 26 June the SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said the road south of the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 26 June on the north-western edge of “DPR”-controlled Sidove (106km south of Donetsk) armed men denied the SMM access through a checkpoint, citing orders not to allow the SMM through. The SMM informed the JCCC. After about one hour, the SMM left the area.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.