Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 8 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

More ceasefire violations were recorded by the SMM in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement areas: it observed ceasefire violations near Zolote, and a white flared being fired in Stanytsia Luhanska. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* Damage to houses and a shop caused by shelling was observed and assessed by the SMM in Krasnohorivka and Pikuzy. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored repairs to high voltage power lines between Mykhailivka and Almazna. In Kyiv the SMM followed up on reports of an explosion on the grounds of the Embassy of the United States.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region including 573 explosions, compared with 250 in the previous reporting period.[1]

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the night of 7-8 June the SMM heard 123 undetermined explosions 8-12km north.

On the night of 7-8 June the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded a total of: 36 explosions assessed as impacts and 30 airbursts 3-5km north-east; 30  undetermined explosions 4-9km north-east; 106 projectiles in flight from west to east and 58 east to west, 3-8km north-east of the camera. On 8 June the camera recorded ten explosions assessed as impacts 5-7km north-west.

On the night of 7-8 June the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, eight tracer rounds in flight from east to west, two from west to east and 58 from west to east, all north and north-east. Thereafter the camera recorded totals of five tracer rounds from east to west and 36 from west to east, one explosion assessed as an impact and one projectile in flight from west to east. On 8 June the camera recorded three explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds (122mm) 2km north.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 7-8 June the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-8km south-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard 46 outgoing artillery (122mm) rounds 1-2km east and 15 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire 5-7km south-east and 84 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-east and 7-10km south. The SMM also heard bursts and shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 5-7km south-east and 7-10km south.

On the night of 7-8 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded a total of 52 undetermined explosions, three explosions assessed as impacts, three airbursts, 16 projectiles in flight from north to south and four from south to north, all 4-6km east-south-east or south-east. On 8 June the camera recorded 19 explosions assessed as impacts 4-6km east-south-east.

On 8 June, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 2-4km east and east-south-east and saw and heard one explosion assessed as an impact 1km west-south-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions 0.5-8km west and bursts of small-arms fire 1-3km west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard 53 undetermined explosions and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations including 85 explosions compared with the previous reporting period, including 490 explosions.

While in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk) on the night of 7-8 June the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions 2-8km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 10km east-south-east. Positioned 2.5km south of Muratove the SMM heard four undetermined explosions (two assessed as artillery) 10-15km south and south-east and small-arms fire 2-3km south.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 7-8 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) recorded one explosion assessed as a mortar or artillery round 5-7km east-north-east, three undetermined explosions 3-5km east and bursts of small-arms fire approximately 3.5km east, all of which were assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned east of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard five explosions assessed as outgoing rounds 5km west-north-west and five subsequent impacts 5km north-east, assessed as having impacted outside the Zolote disengagement area. Positioned in a government-controlled part of Zolote the SMM heard 24 undetermined explosions 10-12km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

About 300m south of an “LPR” checkpoint on the south side of the Zolote disengagement area the SMM saw one fresh crater that it assessed to have been caused by an artillery round (probably 122mm) fired from a westerly direction. The SMM observed also two fresh craters in fields nearby.

South of the bridge in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area the SMM observed an armed man fire a white flare into the air. The SMM saw 17 armed men and 10-12 men in military-type clothes positioned 100m south of the bridge; one of them told the SMM that this was a signal of their readiness to disengage. The SMM observed that no disengagement took place. On the government-controlled side a Ukrainian officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) said that they had no plans to disengage on the day.

The SMM observed 12 armed men with machine-guns (PK-type), submachine-guns (AK-type) and a heavy machine-gun (12.7mm) inside the disengagement area north of an “LPR” checkpoint on the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska. On the government-controlled side the SMM observed a trench-digger operated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces moving inside the disengagement area. The SMM also observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces Kraz truck with an excavator outside the disengagement area on the government-controlled side.

The SMM, following up on reports of a civilian casualty, spoke with medical staff at the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka. Staff told the SMM that a man had been admitted on 7 June with injuries to his head, chest and arms caused by shelling. Residents of Poloha Street in Kadiivka told the SMM that the man had been injured by shelling while in the yard of his house on nearby Dekabristov Street. At 16 Poloha Street the SMM saw fresh shrapnel-damage on trees at two locations 20-30m from the nearest house. No crater was visible. The SMM assessed the direction of fire was from a northerly direction but could not assess the type of weapon used. About 80m to the north the SMM was told by residents that an explosion had damaged gas pipelines and the roof of a house at 16 Poloha Street on the night of 7-8 June. The SMM saw repair workers fixing the gas pipeline and the roof of the house. The SMM was unable to reach the injured man’s house as the gate was locked.

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling and assessed a number of impact sites in residential areas. The SMM observed damage to summer houses in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). At 5 Heolohichna Street, the SMM saw a summer house that had been destroyed by fire and was still smouldering. Shrapnel damage was visible on walls and on surrounding trees up to 20m away and the SMM also saw remnants of a shell. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by a mortar (82mm) round. The owner (a woman in her fifties) said that she had heard four explosions at around 22:00 on 7 June. At 8 Heolohichna Street the SMM observed two fresh holes in the east-facing wall and another one in the east-facing side of the roof of a shed that was 3-4m south of the house. The owner (a man in his fifties) told the SMM that he had heard three explosions between 22:00 and 22:30 on 7 June. The SMM assessed the damage was caused by IFV (BMP) rounds fired from an easterly direction.

In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage that had been caused by shelling. The SMM saw a fresh crater and shell fragments 2m west of a shop wall and assessed that a second shell had hit a tree on the eastern side of the building. All the building’s windows had been shattered and the roof had been damaged. The SMM assessed that the damage was consistent with artillery (122mm) rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. The shop owner (a woman in her thirties) told the SMM that the damage was caused on the night of 4-5 June.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas the SMM observed ten anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) stationary near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk) that were attached to what appeared to be ammunition boxes; the SMM saw also fresh tracks around the weapons. Also in violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed seven anti-tank guns (MT-12) being towed north near government-controlled Bila Hora (67km north-west of Luhansk) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa, 120mm) moving south near government-controlled Muratove.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas the SMM saw ten multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near “LPR”-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol). The howitzers were positioned close to the area where the SMM heard small-arms fire as it flew an unmanned aerial vehicle on 7 June (see SMM Daily Report, 7 June 2017).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed 11 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), four of which were connected by tow bars to trucks that were fully loaded with ammunition boxes. Twelve towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and four (2A65) continued to be observed as missing and one towed howitzer (2A65) was observed as missing for the first time. At one site the SMM observed six anti-tank guns (MT-12), three of which were connected to armoured personnel carriers (APC; MTLB), and fresh tracks. At another site in a government-controlled area the SMM observed that eleven anti-tank guns (eight MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited heavy weapons permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In “LPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that the following weapons continued to be missing: one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), one MLRS (BM-21), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm) and a tank (T-64).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: six APCs (five BTR-80 and one BTR-70) and two trucks - one of which was carrying a section of pontoon bridge - travelling north and six APC (BTR-80), one cougar vehicle and one Humvee, all stationary near Muratove, one IFV (BMP-2) on a stationary flatbed truck near Avdiivka, one stationary APC (BTR-70) near Netailove (22km north-west of Donetsk), three APCs on trucks heading north from Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) and an anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23-2) mounted on a moving truck in Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas the SMM observed one APC (BRDM-1) near Kadiivka and one APC (BTR-AT), three IFV (three BMP-2) and one armoured combat vehicle (BRDM) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk), and one APC (MTLB variant 7.62mm machine-gun turret) near Zaichenko.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. On the north-western outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk, the SMM monitored to enable repair workers to fix high voltage power lines between the Mykhailivka substation in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote and “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk) that were damaged by shelling in 2014.

The SMM followed up on reports of an explosion on the grounds of the Embassy of the United States in Kyiv in the early hours of 8 June. At the scene the SMM observed an area around embassy was secured by police tape and that National Guards, police officers and embassy security personnel were present. Kyiv police reported that an unknown person threw an improvised explosive device into the grounds, which exploded, causing no injuries. Police also said that an investigation had been opened under Article 258 of the Criminal Code (Act of Terrorism).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• Armed “LPR” members told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in the Zolote disengagement area (58km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road beyond the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On four separate occasions, armed men stopped the SMM at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk) and denied passage to the town. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men stopped the SMM at the “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) entry-exit checkpoint and checked the interior of vehicles. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• An armed man prevented the SMM from entering a weapons holding site in an “LPR”-controlled area for almost one hour. The SMM informed the JCCC.

 

[1]  Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.