Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 28 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling to and near civilian properties in Slovianoserbsk and Molodizhne. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and observed ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including, again, at three crossing points at the border with the Russian Federation in Luhansk region.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Pryvilne. The Mission facilitated and monitored repair works and maintenance of essential infrastructure in Zolote and Artema. It visited four border areas not under government control and noted a long queue of trucks at the one in Uspenka. In Uzhhorod, the Mission followed up on reports of an explosion at the building where the office of the Zakarpattia Hungarian Union is located.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 500 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 620 explosions). Nearly 80 per cent of the explosions were recorded south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) in the evenings between 27 and 28 February (see below).

In continuation of ceasefire violations recorded on the early evening of 27 February (see SMM Daily Report 28 February 2018), the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 30 explosions, 164 projectiles in flight from west to east, 74 projectiles from east to west, a projectile in vertical flight, four illumination flares in vertical flight and ten muzzle flashes, all 0.5-3km south. The following evening, the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 27-28 February, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard over 300 explosions as well as bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-6km south and south-east. On 28 February, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-6km south-east.

On 28 February, positioned near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM recorded 21 explosions and about fifty bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at directions ranging from north-north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions).

On 27 February, the SMM followed up on reports of damage to and near civilian properties caused by shelling in Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk) and Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

At a house at 11 Pervomaiska Street in Slovianoserbsk, the SMM saw fresh five holes: one to the north-east-facing wall of the house, one to a north-east-facing metal gate, one to the roof of a north-east-facing canopy near the house, one in a pillar of the canopy and one in a tree near the house. All five holes were assessed as caused by impacts of cannon (30mm) rounds fired from a north-easterly direction. The SMM also saw three fresh impact sites, each 8-20cm in diameter, in a field north-east of the house. The house’s owner told the SMM that the impacts had occurred at around 06:00 on 26 February and that he had been home with his wife and two children when it occurred.

The SMM observed two shattered north-east-facing windows of the house at 10 Pervomaiska Street in Slovianoserbsk and a hole in the north-north-east-facing metal gate of the house. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by cannon (30mm) rounds fired from a north-easterly direction.

Around 200m north of Molodizhne, the SMM saw six fresh craters clustered in a field and a mortar tailfin near one of them; it was able to assess one of the craters as caused by the explosion of an 82mm mortar round. The SMM noted the craters were about 250m from the nearest house and about 100m from a building known to the SMM to be used by “LPR” members (the SMM observed two armed “LPR” members near the building). The owner of the house told the SMM she had been present when her house was impacted at around 21:00 on 26 February.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 28 February, positioned in Zolote-5 (Mykhailivika, non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned near the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Petrivske the SMM noted calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, the SMM again observed four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta‑B, 152mm) near Pryvilne (government-controlled, 31km north of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 17 February 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM observed three tanks (T-64) near Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area outside government control in Luhansk region, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that a tank (T-64) was again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and an anti-aircraft gun in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw four IFVs (BMP-1) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT‑LB) in Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk), all on 28 February, and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT‑LB) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk) on 27 February.

The SMM monitored and facilitated repair works and maintenance works to a fibre-optic cable in Zolote and the Petrivske pumping station in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to note disruptions in Vodafone mobile telecommunications services in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region. Three residents of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk) told the SMM they were still unable to connect to the Vodafone network in the town. (See SMM Daily Report 23 February 2018.)

On 28 February, the SMM visited four border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw three men, three women and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw five cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and one bus exiting Ukraine, as well as four cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk), for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw a man exiting Ukraine and a man and a woman entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw five cars (two with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw over 100 cargo trucks queuing to exit Ukraine. Two truck drivers told the SMM they had been queueing since the previous evening and said that the unusual amount of traffic was attributable to the closure of the border crossing point near Novoazovsk.

Near Amvrosiivka (non-government controlled, 56km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a white minivan with “DPR” plates displaying a sign saying “Cargo 200” in Russian behind its windshield, travelling south-east on road T0507.

In Uzhhorod (182km west of Ivano-Frankivsk) in Zakarpattia region, the SMM followed up on media reports of an explosion at the building where the office of the Zakarpattia Hungarian Union is located. (See SMM Daily Report 28 February 2018.) On 28 February, at 5 Pravoslavna Embankment, the SMM observed significant charring on the building’s exterior wall around one of its ground-floor windows, extending up to the first floor. Both of the building’s ground floor windows had been covered in plywood. The SMM was not able to enter the building. The SMM spoke with a senior police official in Zakarpattia who informed the SMM that an investigation was ongoing. On 5 February, the Mission saw one of the windows of the same building had been broken. (See SMM Daily Report 6 February 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson,[3] Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, an “LPR” member, citing orders from other “LPR” members, again told the SMM that it had to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, an “LPR” member again told the SMM that it had to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an “LPR” member again told the SMM that it had to leave the area.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said that he had no information regarding any de-mining in the area in the last 24 hours. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] Addendum: The language referred to in SMM Daily Report 28 February 2018 in describing events in Henichesk, Kherson region, was “Crimean Tatar”, not “Tatar”.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.